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User: SHILL

Judicial District- Teton County

ROAReport
Case: CV-2010-0000329 Current Judge: Darren Simpson

Thomas H Ulrich, etal. vs. John Nicholas Bach
Thomas H Ulrich, Mary M Ulrich vs. John Nicholas Bach

Other Claims
Judge

)ate
)/31/2010

New Case Filed -Other Claims

Gregory W Moeller

Plaintiff: Ulrich, Thomas H Attorney Retained Charles A. Homer

Gregory W Moeller

Plaintiff: Ulrich, Mary M Attorney Retained Charles A. Homer

Gregory W Moeller

Filing: A- All initial civil case filings of any type not listed in categories B-H, Gregory W Moeller
or the other A listings below Paid by: Holden Kidwell Receipt number:
0045280 Dated: 8/31/2010 Amount: $88.00 (Check) For: Ulrich, Mary M
(plaintiff) and Ulrich, Thomas H (plaintiff)

9/7/2010

Motion for Temporary Restraining Order

Gregory W Moeller

Summons Issued

Gregory W Moeller

Notice Of Hearing

Gregory W Moeller

Hearing Scheduled (Motions 09/07/2010 02:00PM) TRO

Gregory W Moeller

Minute Entry
Hearing type: Motions
Hearing date: 9/7/2010
Time: 2:34 pm
Courtroom:
Court reporter:
Minutes Clerk: PHYLLIS HANSEN
Tape Number:
Plaintiffs Attorney Charles Homer

Gregory W Moeller

Hearing result for Motions held on 09/07/2010 02:00PM: Continued TRO Gregory W Moeller
Hearing Scheduled (Motions 09/17/2010 10:00 AM) for preliminary
injunction

Gregory W Moeller

Affidavit of Service

Gregory W Moeller

Motion for Preliminary Injunction

Gregory W Moeller

Notice Of Hearing

Gregory W Moeller

9/10/2010

Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any File Or Record By The
Clerk, Per Page Paid by: John Bach Receipt number: 0045375 Dated:
9/10/2010 Amount: $5.00 (Cash)

Gregory W Moeller

9/16/2010

Filing: 11 - Initial Appearance by persons other than the plaintiff or
petitioner Paid by: Bach, John Nicholas (defendant) Receipt number:
0045425 Dated: 9/16/2010 Amount: $58.00 (Cash) For: Bach, John
Nicholas (defendant)

Gregory W Moeller

9/9/2010

Defendant John N. Bach's (Specially Appearing To Contest Lack Of
Gregory W Moeller
Personal Service And Lack Of Personal Jurisdiction) Motion Per IRCP,
Rule 12(b) (2) (4) (5); Rule 4(i) (2); Rule 3 (a) (1); Rule 3 (b); Rule (d) (1),
etc., To Strike, Quash And/Or Void Any Purported Service Upon Him, For
Sanctions Against Plaintiff & His Counsel, Etc.
Motion By John N. Bach, Specially Appearing, Lack Of Personal Service & Gregory W Moeller
Jurisdidction, To Peremptorily Disqualify The Honorable Gregory W.
Mueller, Per I.R.C.P., rule 40 (d) (1) (A) (B)

>ate: 4/20/2012

Judicial District- Teton County

'ime: 10:25 AM
>age 2 of 6

User: SHILL

ROAReport
Case: CV-201 0-0000329 Current Judge: Darren Simpson

Thomas H Ulrich, etal. vs. John Nicholas Bach
Thomas H Ulrich, Mary M Ulrich vs. John Nicholas Bach

Other Claims
)ate

Judge
Minute Entry
Hearing type: Motions
Hearing date: 9/17/201 0
Time: 10:05 am
Courtroom:
Court reporter:
Minutes Clerk: PHYLLIS HANSEN
Tape Number:
Charles Homer, Plaintiffs' Attorney
John Bach, Pro Se

Gregory W Moeller

Hearing result for Motions held on 09/17/2010 10:00 AM: Continued for
preliminary injunction

Gregory W Moeller

Order of Disqualification

Gregory W Moeller

9/20/2010

Order of Assignment

Gregory W Moeller

9/21/2010

Lis Pendens (Notice Of Pendency Of Action)

Darren Simpson

9/22/2010

Notice Of Hearing

Darren Simpson

Hearing Scheduled (Motions 10/15/2010 10:00 AM) Preliminary lnjuction

Darren Simpson

1/17/2010

9/30/2010

Defendant John N. Bach's Specially Appearing Notice of Motions and
Darren Simpson
Motions Re: 1. Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice, IRCP, Rule 12(b)(6), etc
2. Motion for Summary Judgment IRCP, Rule 56 (b)- (e); 3. Alternatively,
Motion for More Definitive Statement, Rule 12(e) 4. Motion for Sanctions,
Costs and Fees Against Plaintiffs & Their Counsel, ule 11(a)(1) All
Forgoing Motions Re Requested Sua Sponte
Affidavit Of Service

Darren Simpson

10/5/2010

Order Directing Copies of All Documents to be Transmitted to the Presiding Darren Simpson
Judge at his Resident Chambers

10/8/2010

Notice Of Intent To Take Default

Darren Simpson

Amended Notice Of Hearing

Darren Simpson

Motion for Order Shortening Time

Darren Simpson

Petition for Order of Survey Pursuant to Idaho Code 6-405

Darren Simpson

Minute Entry
Hearing type: Motions
Hearing date: 10/15/2010
Time: 10:03 am
Courtroom:
Court reporter: Sandra Bebee
Minutes Clerk: PHYLLIS HANSEN
Tape Number:
Plaintifffs' Attorney Dale Storer
Plaintiff Thoms Ulrich
Defendant John Bach

Darren Simpson

Hearing result for Motions held on 10/15/2010 10:00 AM: District Court
Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Sandra Beebe
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated at:250

Darren Simpson

10/13/2010
10/15/2010

10/29/2010

Memorandum Decision Re: Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Darren Simpson
Denying Bach's Motion to Dismiss, Motion for Summary Judgment, Motion
for more Definitive Statement, and Motion for Sanctions, Costs and Fees

)ate: 4/20/2012

Judicial District- Teton County

·ime: 10:25 AM

User: SHILL

ROAReport

>age 3 of 6

Case: CV-201 0-0000329 Current Judge: Darren Simpson

Thomas H Ulrich, etal. vs. John Nicholas Bach
Thomas H Ulrich, Mary M Ulrich vs. John Nicholas Bach

Other Claims
)ate
10/29/2010
11/16/2010

Judge
Bond Posted- Cash (Receipt 45759 Dated 10/29/2010 for 500.00)

Darren Simpson

Order Granting Preliminary Injunction

Darren Simpson

Verified Answer and Counterclaim

Darren Simpson
Darren Simpson

12/3/2010

Reply To Counterclaim

12/23/2010

Order for Hearing

Darren Simpson

12/27/2010

Hearing Scheduled (Status Conference 01/07/2011 01:00PM)

Darren Simpson

1/4/2011

Amended Notice Of Hearing

Darren Simpson

1/7/2011

Hearing Held (in Bingham County)

Darren Simpson

1/11/2011

Minute Entry

Darren Simpson

Court Trial Scheduling Order

Darren Simpson

Hearing Scheduled (Pre-Trial Conference 05/06/2011 01:30 PM)

Darren Simpson

Hearing Scheduled (Court Trial 06/08/2011 10:00 AM)

Darren Simpson

2/4/2011

Plaintiffs' Expert Witness and Fact Witness Disclosure

Darren Simpson

2/9/2011

Defendant's John N. Bach's Expert Witness List And Percipient/Facts
Witness List

Darren Simpson

3/10/2011

Notice Of Compliance

Darren Simpson

Motion for Summary Judgment

Darren Simpson

Motion for Summary Judgment

Darren Simpson

Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment

Darren Simpson

Affidavit of Thomas H Ulrich in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment

Darren Simpson

Notice Of Hearing

Darren Simpson

Hearing Scheduled (Motions 04/08/2011 11:00 AM) for Summary
Judgment

Darren Simpson

Notice Of Service

Darren Simpson

Defendant and Counterclaimant John N. Bach's Memorandum Of Points
And Authorities In Opposition To Plaintiffs Summary Judgment Motion

Darren Simpson

Affidavit Of John N. Bach, Defendant & Counterclaimant ProSe, Re
Objections And Opposition To Plaintiffs' Motion For Summary Judgment

Darren Simpson

Affidavit Of John N. Bach Re; Receipt Of Plaintiffs' Motion For Summary
Judgment And Other Documents, Sat., March 12, 2011

Darren Simpson

3/28/2011

Supplemental Memorandum of John N. Bach, Defendant &
Counterclaimant in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment

Darren Simpson

4/5/2011

Reply Memorandum In Support Of Plaintiffs' Motion For Summary
Judgment

Darren Simpson

4/6/2011

Defendant & Counterclaimant John N. Bach's Objections and Refutations
Authorities to Plaintiffs Thomas H. Ulrich's Motion for Summary Judgment

Darren Simpson

1/14/2011

3/11/2011

3/25/2011

)ate: 4/20/2012

Judicial District -Teton County

-ime: 10:25 AM

User: SHILL

ROAReport

)age 4 of 6

Case: CV-2010-0000329 Current Judge: Darren Simpson

Thomas H Ulrich, etal. vs. John Nicholas Bach
Thomas H Ulrich, Mary M Ulrich vs. John Nicholas Bach

Other Claims
)ate

Judge
Minute Entry
Hearing type: Motions
Hearing date: 4/8/2011
Time: 11:05 am
Courtroom:
Court reporter:
Minutes Clerk: PHYLLIS HANSEN
Tape Number:
Charles Homer, Plaintiff's Attorney
John Bach Pro Se

Darren Simpson

Hearing result for Motions held on 04/08/2011 11:00 AM: District Court
Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Sandra Beebe
Number ofT ran script Pages for this hearing estimated at less than 100

Darren Simpson

4/22/2011

Defendant And Counterclaimant John N. Bach's Opposing And Counter
Memorandum Brief To Plaintiff's "Replys Memorandum In Support Of
Plaintiff's Motion For Summary Judgment," dated March 31, 2011

Darren Simpson

4/28/2011

Plaintiffs' Pre-Trial Memorandum

Darren Simpson

4/29/2011

Memorandum In Reply To Defendant And Counterclaimant John N. Bach's Darren Simpson
Opposing And Counter Memorandum Brief

5/3/2011

Defendant and Counter-Claimant John N. Bach's Pre-Trial Memorandum
Part "1"

Darren Simpson

5/6/2011

Hearing result for Pre-Trial Conference held on 05/06/2011 01:30PM:
District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter:Sandra Beebe
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated at: telephonic in
Bingham County

Darren Simpson

5/10/2011

Minute Entry - Pre-Trial Conference

Darren Simpson

5/19/2011

Affidavit of Charles A Homer in Support of Motion in Limine and for
Sanctions

Darren Simpson

Motion in Limine and for Sanctions

Darren Simpson

Memorandum in Support of Motion in Limine and for Sanctions

Darren Simpson

Notice Of Hearing

Darren Simpson

t/8/2011

5/23/2011

John N Bach's Notice of his use at Trial/Call ins as Witnesses all Those
Darren Simpson
Persons Named in his List of Witnesses (Filed Feb. 09, 2011) will be Used;
and Secondly, the Attached Proposed List of Exhibits to be used at Trial, is
Presented until this Court Rules on the Present Motions Under its
Consideration.

5/25/2011

Notice of Deposit of Plaintiffs' Exhibits with Clerk of Court

5/31/2011

Defendant and Counterclaimant John N. Bach's Memorandum Brief RE:
Darren Simpson
Objection & Oppostions (With Motion to Strike, Quash & Preclude in all
Aspects) Plaintiffs' (1) Motion in Limine & for Sanctions, Affidavit of Charles
A Homer, & Memorandum Offered in Support Thereof; and (2) Motion to:
Compel Discovery, Etc.,

6/6/2011

Order Vacating Trial

Darren Simpson

Judgment

Darren Simpson

Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment

Darren Simpson

Darren Simpson

)ate: 4/20/2012
-ime: 10:25 AM
)age 5 of 6

Judicial District- Teton County

User: SHILL

ROA Report
Case: CV-201 0-0000329 Current Judge: Darren Simpson

Thomas H Ulrich, etal. vs. John Nicholas Bach
Thomas H Ulrich, Mary M Ulrich vs. John Nicholas Bach

Other Claims
)ate
Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any File Or Record By The
Clerk, Per Page Paid by: Ulrich, Mary M Receipt number: 0047703 Dated:
6/7/2011 Amount: $4.00 (Check)

Darren Simpson

Miscellaneous Payment: For Certifying The Same Additional Fee For
Certificate And Seal Paid by: Ulrich, Mary M Receipt number: 0047703
Dated: 6/7/2011 Amount: $1.00 (Check)

Darren Simpson

3/8/2011

Hearing result for Court Trial held on 06/08/2011 10:00 AM: Hearing
Vacated

Darren Simpson

3/20/2011

Affidavit of Charles A Homer in Support of Memorandum of Attorney Fees
and Costs

Darren Simpson

Memorandum of Attorney Fees and Costs

Darren Simpson

Defendant and Counterclaimant John N. Bach's Notice of Motions re/per
IRCP, Rules 59 (a) 1, 3,4,5,6 & 7; 59 (e); and Rule 60 (b) (1) (2) (3) (4) &
(6).

Darren Simpson

3/7/2011

7/1/2011

Affidavit of John N Bach in Support of All Post Judgment Motions

Darren Simpson

Hearing Scheduled (Motions 08/05/2011 10:00 AM) Post Trial

Darren Simpson

Darren Simpson
Defendant & Counterclaimant John N. Bach's Notice of Motions and
Motions Per Rule 54(d)(6), to Disallow any or all Parts of Plaintiffs' Attorney
Fees and Cost; and per Rule 549e)(6), 54(e)(7), 54()(1) through 54(e)(8)
7/7/2011

Notice of Intent to File Responsive Pleadings

Darren Simpson

7/21/2011

Motion to Strike Affidavit of John N Bach in Support of All Post Judgment
Motions

Darren Simpson

Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike Affidavit of John N Bach in
Support of All Post Judgment Motiond

Darren Simpson

Notice Of Hearing on Motion to Strike Affidavit of John N Bach and
Memorandum of Attorneys' Fees and Costs

Darren Simpson

7/28/2011

8/5/2011

8/12/2011

Defendant and Counterclaimant John N. Bach's Objections, Oppositions & Darren Simpson
Motions to Vacate/Quash Plaintiffs - Untimely & Void in Form & Service Motion to Strike Affidavit of John N. Bach and Memorandum of Attorneys'
Fees and Costs."
Memorandum in Opposition to All of Defendant john N. Bach's Post
Judgment Motions

Darren Simpson

Minute Entry
Hearing type: Motions
Hearing date: 8/5/2011
Time: 10:04 am
Courtroom:
Court reporter:
Minutes Clerk: PHYLLIS HANSEN
Tape Number:
C. Timothy Hopkins, Plaintiffs' Attorney
John N. Bach, Pro Se

Darren Simpson

Hearing result for Motions scheduled on 08/05/2011 10:00 AM: Hearing
Held Post Trial

Darren Simpson

Hearing result for Motions scheduled on 08/05/2011 10:00 AM: District
Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Sandra Beebe
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated at: Less than 100

Darren Simpson

Judicial District- Teton County

)ate: 4/20/2012
rime: 10:25 AM
=>age 6 of 6

User: SHILL

ROA Report
Case: CV-2010-0000329 Current Judge: Darren Simpson
Thomas H Ulrich, etal. vs. John Nicholas Bach

Thomas H Ulrich, Mary M Ulrich vs. John Nicholas Bach

Other Claims
Judge

Jate
:1/13/2011

Order Denying Defendant John Bach's Rule 59 and 60 Motion and Granting Darren Simpson
in Part Plaintiffs' Request for Attorney Fees and Costs
Civil Disposition entered for: Bach, John Nicholas, Defendant; Ulrich, Mary Darren Simpson
M, Plaintiff; Ulrich, Thomas H, Plaintiff. Filing date: 9/13/2011

10/21/2011

First Amended Judgment

Darren Simpson

10/24/2011

Filing: L4 -Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal to Supreme Court Paid
by: John Bach Receipt number: 0048913 Dated: 10/24/2011 Amount:
$101.00 (Combination) For: Bach, John Nicholas (defendant)

Darren Simpson

Notice of Appeal and Appeal by Defendant Appellant John n Bach, Pro Per, Darren Simpson
IAR Rules 11, 14,17
10/25/2011

Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any File Or Record By The
Clerk, Per Page Paid by: John Bach Receipt number: 0048922 Dated:
10/25/2011 Amount: $4.00 (Cash)

Darren Simpson

Miscellaneous Payment: For Certifying The Same Additional Fee For
Darren Simpson
Certificate And Seal Paid by: John Bach Receipt number: 0048922 Dated:
10/25/2011 Amount: $1.00 (Cash)
10/28/2011

Bond Posted- Cash (Receipt 48956 Dated 10/28/2011 for 200.00)

Darren Simpson

11/4/2011

Request for Additional Record

Darren Simpson

Request for Additional Record

Darren Simpson

11/10/2011

Request For Additional Record

Darren Simpson

11/18/2011

Miscellaneous Payment: For Comparing And Conforming A Prepared
Record, Per Page Paid by: Holden Kidwell Hahn Crapo Receipt number:
0049138 Dated: 11/18/2011 Amount: $2.00 (Check)

Darren Simpson

Miscellaneous Payment: For Certifying The Same Additional Fee For
Certificate And Seal Paid by: Holden Kidwell Hahn Crapo Receipt number:
0049138 Dated: 11/18/2011 Amount: $1.00 (Check)

Darren Simpson

Bond Posted- Cash (Receipt 49493 Dated 12/30/2011 for 260.60)

Darren Simpson

Condition of Bond: preparation of the Clerk's Record

Darren Simpson

1/31/2012

Notice Of Hearing and Appellant John N. Bach's Motion for District Court's
Order Granting Him Leave to have ( 1) Objectins Heard and Decided to
Clerk's Transcript and Record Not prepared; (2) for Corrections, Aditions
and Preparation of all Clerk's Received Filings from April 8, 2011 through
January 3, 2012. (I.R.E. Rules 28 & 29)

Darren Simpson

2/1/2012

Hearing Scheduled (Motions 03/16/2012 10:00 AM)

Darren Simpson

2/16/2012

Notice of No Objection to Defendant John N Bach's Motion for District
Darren Simpson
Court's Order Granting Him Leave to Have (1) Objections Heard and
Decided to Clerk's Transcript and Record not Prepared; (2) For
Corrections, Additions and Preparation of All Clerk's Received Filings From
April 8, 2011 Through January 3, 2012

3/13/2012

Order Granting Defendant's Motion to Supplement the Clerk's Record on
Appeal

Darren Simpson

Order Granting Defendant's Motion to Supplement the Clerk's Record on
Appeal

Darren Simpson

Hearing result for Motions scheduled on 03/16/2012 10:00 AM:
Vacated

Darren Simpson

12/30/2011

Hearing

COURT MINUTES
CV-2010-0000329
Thomas H Ulrich, etal. vs. John Nicholas Bach
Hearing type: Motions
Hearing date: 4/8/2011
Time: 11:17 am
Judge: Darren Simpson
Court reporter: Sandra Beebe
Minutes Clerk: PHYLLIS HANSEN
Charles Homer, Plaintiffs Attorney
John Bach ProSe
J calls case; ids those present
Motion for Summary Judgment
J have read pleadings both in favor and in opposition
J- Bach objected on some time frames
Bach- if service by mail looking at 28 + 3
3 different envelopes on the same day
Pitney Bowles type of stamp- that is inadequate to start the time running
Occupied on four other matters
Only library that is adequate is in Blackfoot
Have been mostly concern that lack of access to library- terrible
Asking for opportunity to be prepared
Rush to Judgment
Received Memo from opposing council - read for first time page 7
Don't address verification of my counterclaim

Lay out motion from the get go

1125
PA - file will reflect certificate of mailing - all were mailed on March 08 which would give
time for filing plus time for mailing
Bach didn't file response briefs timely
Filed reply brief on Thursday march 31
Have filed within 28 days with time for mailing

J-what about Bach's argument on new issues in reply brief
PA - 1 - we are allowed to
2 - I don't believe we have

J- would you have problem with Bach filing supplemental reply brief
Would object for additional filings of affidavits
1130
Bach responds How did I get three different envelopes
Where is counter affidavit that I received those on time
Got blindsided
1131

J- record does show were mailed on the 8th
Have been filed timely will allow to stand
Will allow time after this hearing to day to file memorandum
They will be able to respond
No additional affidavits
Bach need ten working days
PA- need five working days to respond

OR

J- Additional briefing Due April 22 by 5:00 PM
Homers due by May 02 at 5:00 PM - mailed by then
1134
PA- if court grants relief, would dispose of all issues before the court
Including dismissing counterclaims filed by D
Alternative way to access his property
1141
Tried to respond to everything brought up
1148
Legal issues
1151

Jis Coward case
PA- right three theories
1153

J -what bearing do the signs have on that analysis
1155
Bach- move to strike, quash and preclude following paragraphs
5, 15, 16, 17 or initial paragraphs
Renew objection to jurisdiction of this court
1211
PA- objection not factual things but legal matters

J - noted -

raised some in affidavit so going to let him raise it

1224
PA responds
Motion to strike untimely and irrelevant at this time

Verified complaint speaks for itself
Not claiming this is a public easement; not asking to be public
Easement dealt with in brief
Miller case - bound by easement in the record
Easement on subdivision - issues are irrelevant
Court can take judicial notice
Bach indicated Ulrich never asked permission before 2009 - buttresses our position
We had alternate access- never needed anything else
Need did not arise until he stopped us prior to that time

J-have deadline schedules
1228
No irreparable harm

J- briefing scheduled is outlined
Once received will deem admitted

JOHN N. BACH, P.O. Box 101
Driggs, TD 83422/Tel: (208) 354"'8303
Defendant/Counterclaimant Pro Se

SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT) IDAHO) COUNTY OF TETON
CAsE No·:' CV 2010~329
THDr1AS HI ULRICH AND f4ARY f'1,· UUUCH~·
husband and wife,

DEFENDANT AND COUNTER~
CLAIJVI.AN':I' JOHN N. BACH '·S
OPpOSING AND COUNTER
MEMORANDUM BRIEF TO PLAINTIFF'S 1:~R@p1ys Memorandum
In Support of Plaintiff's
Hd':ltion for Summary Judgment", dated March 31,

Plaintiffs,

Vf,_

JOI-W N. BACH

and all parties claiming
to hold title to the hereinafter des.ti:'
ciibed proper pursuant to that certain
warranty deed record in the records of
Teton County, Idaho on June 14, 1994
as InstrU:ment No. 116461 and all unk7'
nown claimants, heirs and devisees of
the follov.ring property:

A portion of the South V:z South liz Section 6,
Township 5 North, Range 46 East, Boise
Meridian, Teton County, Idaho, being further
described as: From the SW comer of said Section
6, South 89 50'12" East, 2630.05 feet to the true
point of beginning; thence North 00 07'58" East,
813.70 feet to a point; thence North Or37'48"
East, 505.18 feet to a point; thence South 89
58'47" East, 1319.28 feet to a point; thence South
00 07'36" West, 1321.69 feet to a point on the
Southern Section Line; th~nce North 89 51'01"
West, 1320.49 feet along the Southern Section
Line to the Soutfl'l4Comer of smd Sectwn 6, a ·
point; thence North 89 50'13" West, 12.13 feet
along_the Southern Section Line to the-point of
beginlling. SUBJECT TO a 60 foot road and
utility easement along the Western Property lines.
AND SUBJECT TO a 60 foot road and utility
easement along the Southern Property Lil{es.
'

I.

PREFACE:

.

"'"

,,

\ 2011
---'---

\
/

,,

Due to not just the late

iling of Plaintiffs'

REPEY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDG~1ENT,

bUt. the fact, that such brief addresses in part for

the first time some, but not all issues

,.~'Jtised

JNB's Opp/Counter Memo t0 Plt's Reply Memo re S/J'
'
. - - .. , 0. 1-' .

00 6

by John N. Bach

P.

1.

his Affirmative Defenses, as reincorporated (Per IRCP, Rule
10 (c),,, his.· counts and causes of actions via his courrtenclaim,
and due to John N.
of

Bach~s

objections as to violations not only

the provxsions of Rule 56(a) through 56(d), but both the

violations of his constitutional procedural and substant&ve
rights of due process and equal protections, this Court has
allowed defendant and counterclaimant to file this additional
opposing and counter wemorandum to refute and address those2
issues 1and cited authorities by said Plaintiffst Reply Memoran,
dum which they never addressed nor raised in their initial
mmm0randum in support of their motion for summary judgment,
Defendant and counterclaimant JOHN N. BACH, still reasserts
refut~

and incorporates all his objections, motions to strike and

ations previously filed herein, still claiming and contending
that in the first instance and even with said Reply Memorandum,
plaintiffs have both untimely, improperly and in vioJJ.ations
failed

and ignored the mandatory requirements of said Rule 56

sections to even have the Court

consider~

let along hear and rule

upon granting their said motion in any particulars, whatsoever.
Sun Valley P~oes v. Ros:holt,, RoiJertson"'~~~~~er 133 Idaho 1, 5-ct;, 981 P2d
236 (1999) (No basis for granting Summary Judgment due to late untimely filing)
Even the rehasfuill.ngr)l6y Plaintiffs of their previous
ments and tha cases they cited
3, pages

f~o:t

argu~

their arguments A, 1, 2, and

J through 9, are more than inapplicable, misrepresented

and dispite their citations and reliances upon the three!(3) cases
(Suchan v. Rutherford, 90 Idaho 288, 295; Tower Asset Sub,

In~.

v. Lawrenc!='r 143 Idaho 710, 714, and Kofu&uch v. Kramer, 120 Idaho
JNB' s Opp!Counter Merro to Plts'

65)

such cases in fact, undermine Plaintiffs'' contentions and

arguments and in truth of their,c::particular opinions, support,
sustain and require the granting of summary judgment in fa¥or
of defendant and counterclaimant''s positions perviouslv stated
and now herein reevalutated and analyzed correctly.
A.

JOHN N. BACH has raised, supported and presented
previously and again now, that there are properly,
adequate, complete and primary legal remedies.s which
which preclude

plaintiff~s

quiet title, declaratory

and injunctive c1aims.
Plaintiffs admdlt, pages 4 .,..5 of their Reply J'llemo, that
John N. Bach has raised and presented more than legal, case
authorities and support, especially per Defendant 1' s J'llemor.- of
Points and Auth. page 3, that legal remedies are more than avail,..
able

jurisdiction~eand

to Plaintiffs which preclude this Court 1 s

even discretion to consider quiet title, declaratory relief, etc.,
herein.
The sole attack by Plaintiffs' to John
lack of equitable jurisdiction) discretion,

Bach~s

objection of

justicibility and

standing/capacity, is the statement with cited

case~Jas

follows:

"A legal remedy, i.e_. 9-a~ag~~, "i's ins~fi;-i~~)lt,i~\th;;i~\)l;l'a'tt:er
because real propert , i's ~e,0l:i:Silidered ·'tin~ ftie_~. As the Idaho
Supreme Court has repeated :i' ~-iecoqnizea ,---,.a specific tract (of
land ) is unique and impossible of duplication by the use of
a:r:rvr'amount of money.'· Suchan v.
Rutherford,. 90 Idaho 288, 295,
410 P.2d 434, 428 (1966} (discussing the uniqueness of land in
context of specific perfovmance of land contracts.)_ ~ .CEmph Added).
The Idaho Supreme Court,

said nothing of the sort as quoted supra,

but ln point 6f law and fact stated/rules exactly to the contrary.
JNB' s

Opp/Counter Memo to Plts 1:- Reply MerTIC}> re S(J' P. "· 3~

Here •·s what Taylor, Justice's opinion in ~ucl:"J,~ Accurately
stated, held and is now

controlling~

l.

The remedy at law via damages is adequate, plain,
speedy and completel

2.

Land involved was not unique.,~ that sale of similar
land involved was frequent,

3.

Equity will not enforce a contract when to do so
unjust, oppressive or unconscionable.

4.

The land here involved is not uni~ue.
It is irrigated
farm land co:mrnon to the-general area in. which it is
located and the court '·s haven '·t hesitated to determ:zime
market value of farm.. landsin breach of a contract cases
and of lands in general. in condemnation proceeding, nor
have they hesitated to determine the damages to be allow,
ed.

5.

At

woulill·~

be

As to the speculation that the vendor may otherwise ilJose
t~e opportunitit;es for otif£;p2s:l \«. invest in it, is pate:n,~·
'that such a·· reasQn is' o·, ~emot·.' 'a':rld• s}sle<;::u'9_a1tive as to
have no standin~g J:n, a;o;;
u:rt< of Utw. { 90 Idaho. @:5 29 5.,..29 6)
(Emphasis Added}
pages 301 through 303, the Idaho Supreme Court further

held, such not being related nor quoted by Plaintiffs t· R,eply Brief:
6.

7.

(Even) Equity will not strictly enforce a contract when ·
to do so would be unjust,
oppressive or unconscionable
---or would produce harship or injustice~,not reasonably
wihhin contemplation of the parties at the inception of
contract; .such {lardship or injustice need not arise from
fraud or mistake and need not be such as :will prevent th~
contract fro~ becoming an obli<~ration in point of law~ but
exists whenever the contract would produce a co~ditlon
to the defendant followed by injurious consequence.s w'tli.ch
could not be deemed to have been conte;rnp1a te.d when t'tl.e
contract was executed. (Citing to 49 Nner. J·ur 1 . $pee.
Performance Section 59)' (J$lpbAsis AP.cted):
·
Rem~ at law was adequate, plain,. speedy and, complete,

So besides Plaintiffs' counsel inaccurate representations
of what principles Suchap hold and requires to be followed, he
adds a personal accomodation/request to this Court:

"Consequently,

Defendant's argument regarding Plaintiffs'· alleged failure to pursue their 'remedies at law' as listed by Defendant should be disregarded."
P. 4.

How blatantly obvious is plaintiffs' counsel's
quest of

Suchan'~

holding principles?

Judge ignore the law
herein~

and principles enunciated clearly and required
a favor.

re-

do us

. look the otner way and discriminate against

defen~

dant and counterclaimant '· s cited binding and controlling cases.
B.

PLAINTIFFS' ARGUMENT AND CITED CASE AUTHORITY IS
IS ALSQ FRIVOLOUSLY- UTTERLY TA7ITHOUT MERIT, THAT
THEY HAVE B;EFUSED /FAILED TO JOJN ALL INDISPENSABLE

'

On pages 5 and 6 of their Reply Memorandum,, plaintiffs
quote _from the cited case, !ower

Asset~u£_rnc.

v, Lawrence

143 Idaho 710, 714: "joinder of all parties with an interest
in the subject matter of the suit is not required; rather, only
those who have an interest in the obiect of the suit should be
joined."

At this second fundamental, without jurisdiction and

justicibility issues, since Judge Simpson has made the defaulted
defendants in Teton Civil Action 02-208 once again somehow parties
in this acbion, Plaintiffs again, but so blatantly: and patentlycorruptly, :maKes a requBst:
"Although the other property owners
of the Bach Property may have an interest in the subject
!!_latter of the suit, as property owners, only Defendant
Defendant has attempted to interfere witn Plaintiffs' int'::'"
erest in the property. Consequently, the other property
owners do not have an interest in the object of the suit.
Therefore, the other owners of the Bach Property are not
indispensible parties.~
Attached hereto, is a complete copy of JOHN :N, B,ACHt;:;

AP:p~~lallt Is. C?P~l1~:ty;r ~~t~:L tJ!., ~Q@D9 $1)p!;;$;n~ ~ GQ1JJ3~~ o9C:ket "No' '38 37 0.
The issues he raises/raised therein and to be determined in said
appeal docket, necessitates that· as to any reest.ablisn.ed .fiduciary
duties,

dblig~tions

and/or possible future activites in this action,

JNl3 '-'$: opp;courrter 11enP' to 'P :tt$ r:.

RePl:rM61)0 ~e' ·s;J

, P _., 5 •

of the positions, assertions of rights and consequences thereof,
against them, that he has raised herein.

Secondly, if they are

in fact indispensible parties, which they arer they must, be served,
so as to appear and any counts, causes of action or relief against
them, must be presented herein, so that a comrlete, final and
sp~edy

resolution of all joint venturers differences, rights

and partitioning of the Peacock Parcel be finalized.
Pro Indiviso, Inc. v.

Mid~le

-

Tower cited

Holding Trust 131 Idaho 741, 746 (Y.fuere the Bowles

argued the district court should 've disrrissed the suit as such trust, owner of
the property was not a party, an indispensible party, to the suit. This Court,
stated:"Had this been a quiet title action this argument would have merit."
The Tower Asset Sub Inc, case, miscited and deliberately
misstated as to its principles, requires such joinder. 430 Idaho
713-715. (See Justice Eismann's concurring in part and in result
Opinion

In Tower,

a tenant brought a declaratory and injunc-

tive relief counts, claiming he had the right to use a road over
the neighbor's property.
but the Idaho

Summary judgment was granted to him,

Supreme Court vacated and remanded such order

and judgment for him.

(This was second of two cases involving

the E}asic questions: l) Whether Tower has standing? 2 )Is-was Hall an
indispensible party? and 3} Did the district court error in

declar~

ing the existence of an express easement on summary judgment?
Starting at 403 Idaho 713, the Idaho Supreme Court held that;
the issues of "@tanding" is a subcateory of justiciability, a
preliminary question oo be determined by the Court before reaching
any merits of the case.

Held-since HalJ;l;s 0\.JTiership of the easement not ques-

tioned he was not indispensible party since no qoiet title sought re his ownership.

JNB's

Memo

to Plts'

p. 6.

Herein Plaintiffs seek a quiet title against all the
ownership held in four

one~quarter

(~)

undivided ownership in
,Pro Indi-v~o, Inc. ,

ihe=:§penathr:ilft:. trusts forming a joint venture.
131 Idaho

741~

746, and Tower, supra, hold that where quiet title

is sought to Plaintiffs" claimed easement, all the undivided
owners via said spendthrift trust joint venture, must be joined
as indispensible parties, otherwise this action must be dismissed.
Thus, plaintiffs' own aforesaid cited cases require:
'."l1.'l

l.

That the equitable counts of quiet title, injunctive

relief be dismissed with prejudice as

plaintiff~t

have clear, ade-

quate, plain-;; speedy and complete remedies at law. Suchan, supra.
2.

That all party members of the Spendthrift Joint

uenture trust (Exhibit "1 " to John Bach's Affidavit In Opposition to Sllimmary Judgment)

are indispensible parties who must be

made defendants to this current

complaint~

served and allowed to

appear, a:.::aise their individual answers, affirmative defenses and
Indiviso

counterclaims and/or cross complainants.
Tower , supra.

Inc.' and

Also, Barlow v. International Harvester Co.

(1994)

95 Idaho 881, 893 (inaccurately cited by Plaintiffs as 85 Idaho
881) 522 P.2d 1102, 1194, in which counts for slander and tort
interference with contract issues were held to

RAISE

genuine

issues of fact precluding summary judgment, the Idaho Supreme Court,
specifically held: a) A contract voidable because of noncompliance
may still be subject matter of action for interference with
act;

contr~

and b) A Plaintiff cannot make a lack of mutuality of the

contract to which he was not a party, available as an excuse for
his wrongful

and unjustiified conduct.(95 Idaho@ 893-895,); and

JNB's Opp/Counter; MaiD' to Plts'· Reply Merrio :r;-e"S(J
pi~_-,~
r~

1

P.' 7.

of such importance S''Ch

c) Failure to join indispensible party

lS

cannot be waived. Barlow, supra,

also

analyzed~d

the principles of d) violation of

ttertd.'OQ~::

lllithl: cent:raet:;

aBdc~wi:tg.sprospecti ve

applied

-interference , ' o

economic advantages,

per

which cause of action recovery is not limited to those damages

.l.

within the contemplation of the parties to the contract as the
probable and foreseeable result of a breach, citing to: Wl L.
Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts, sec.l29, pp 948-949
Ed. 1991); Rest (Second of Torts, Sec 774A,
90,

Coro~ent A~c,

(Tentative Draft No. 14, 1969) Barlow, 95 Idaho

@

(4th

pp 86-

896)

(See

also, Akers v. D.L. White,C:ohst':h'uction·\Inc. 142 Idaho 293, 301, l
127 P.3d 196, 2004
tiffs. In Akers,

(2005), also miscited and misapplied by PlainA record land owner of reality brought actions

against adjoining. land owner for i) trespass, , ii) negligence and
iii} quiet title.

Case was remanded for purpose of conducting

additional fact finding re whether at time of serverance of

alleg~

ed dominant and servient estate, use of access through servant
easement "was reasonably necessary to enjoyment of alleged domiinant estate." )

Such is also a factual genuine issue of fact herein.

The misuse of equitable claims.L s.uch as quiet title and
declarator7/injuncitve relief is exemplified by the holdings of
not just the above citedlisted cases, but, National Bank v. &i\ss
Valley_ Foods, Inc:.: 121 Idaho 266, 272.,-289

1.

~24

P2d 841, 862.,-868.

The bank brought foreclosure proceedings and additional legal
claims arising from loan to a partnership, general partners,
and limited partners, all who raised several affirmative defenses
and actions at law counterclaims.
the parties, the case proceeded

JNB's

Opp/CoUnter Memo to Plts'

Re~:~"

After the trial court realigned

to a.· jury trial as· a: tort- case

\\M

.~~

f~S/J

P. 8.

against the bank rather than as a foreclosure proceeding. The
jury returned a verdict of $5,7 million dollars against the
plaintiff and counterclaim defendants, especially on the torts
of bad faith, violation of implied

2c~enants

of good faith and

fair deiiings, interferences with contractual relationshipp and
with prospective economic advantages. The

tr~al

court failed to

make its own findings as required by IRCP, Rule 52(a) re denial
of equitable issues

on foreclosure by the bank and gave several

incorrect jury instructions re law and issues for jury to decide.
National Bank v

Bliss'-Val

herein along with Suchan , supra, that at law remedies took
exclusive precedent to the omission of equitable foreclosure
121 Idaho @ 283-89, the Idaho

action brought by the bank. From

Supreme Court, citing a Washington State Case,
of state authorities to adopt the tort of
of contractual relationships and

and other out

wron~f~l

pros~ective

interference

economic relation-

ships or advantages, and, along with the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealings, citing therewith Badge"t
Sank 116 Wash 2d 563, 807 P.2d 356
covenant. repeating the conclusion:

_v.;J'z~~~curity

State

(1991) applied said implied
11

A violation of the implied

covent is a breach of the contract.u Such covenant occurs 11 only
when either party violates, nullifies or significantly impairs
. contract." Barloo·,,

7.,..3, also precludes plts ,_
S/j motion!
Thusly, even though the realestate purchase contract

any benefit

of the .

pcJ

which defendant and his cojoint venturers purchase.fi per their
recorded spendthrift trust joint venture deed/agreement nowhere
in negotations or in any purchase contract or deeds is/are the
individual names of the Ulrich'·s,'i'Thomas nor Mary stated, ~i:gnated
JNB's Opp/Counter Merro to Plts' Repi::{ Merro Y~ 'sy,:f P. 9.
l~

nor disclosed.

No one is disclosed in name, by entity or title

whatsoever as to the purported 60 foot easement: no one!
As was the case in

C0~~rd'V~-~adley(2010)246

P.3d 991

the easement deed mentioned notihing about the easement benefiting no

one~s

adjoining lot, noththe

predecessor~s

of Ulrichs,

nor how far back in time if at all such easement existed, and
most certainly, not any trusts or trust which was immediately
adjacent to the north, west or even south of Peacock Parcel.
Two main principles apply, supported by,Coward

till wit:

l.

"In construing an easement in a particular case, the instrument granting the easement is to be interpreted in connection with the intention of the parties, and the circumstances in existence at the time the easement was granted.~·
Kolouch v. Kramer, 120 Idaho 65, 69, 813 P.2d 876, 880 (1991)
. :{and)If, however, the instrument of copveyance is amfu~g..,..
uous, interpretation of the instrument is a ioatt::gr of :flact for
the trier of fact.• .
. ~ (Herein no ~eve~lation ~xisted
in any contract or deed benefiting defendant and his undivided
one quarter spendthrift trust owners, what person, nor even
mention of an adjoining real property owner was a dominant
or even implied, inferred to use exclusively the 60 foot right
of way. Simply put no adjoining owners, nor tenants nor irrigation easement holders had standing nor capacity whatsoever
to make a quiet title claim nor for equitable declara~ory relief! Plaintiffs had not purchased their acreage to the north
until two (2) years plus later,

2

An express easement does not grant rights in the easement to
the parcels other than the dominant estate, Further, there
can be no private dedication to a restrictd class of individuals, such as those only owning property abutting an right
of way.
The rule that a common~law dedication must be for
public use Has always been a part of Idaho jurisprudence.
Requiring the dedicatin to be to the public, and not to individuals or to a class of private gra:h:tees, is a widely
accepted p~inciple~
246 Idah6 @ 396~98
From not just the Coward v. Hadley case alone, even if

a quiet title action by Plaintiffs had standing or the capacity
justiciability to pursue their equitable claims, which are invalid
JNB's Opp/Counte-r Meno- to Plts'' Reply Memo re £/J

P, 10.

if not void, the Plaintiffs'', even to this date, have nev€r
had, never claimed any form of actual or constructive possession
of the 60 foot road right of way over the westerly boundary of
the Peacock 40 acre

parcel~..,..-NEVER!·

Therefore, the Plaintiffs never had a dedic.ated easement
for them as a dominent easement estate, never had an implied
easement, even if they had earlier asserted they did, by the
doctrine of not just waiver, abandonment, but agreement, by
acquiesence and estoppel, promissory, in pais, quasi estoppel
etc. They do not

nor could they acquire any easement. What is

there for them to bring other than a legal action at law, certiaaiy never having possession over, on or using the 60 foot easement claimed on

defendant~s

40 acre parcel; no"

can lie nor be pursued.

quiet title action

Dizick (Oregon, 2010)0r. App.)

234 P.3d 1037, 23 Or. App. 594,

(A party who is not in possession

of land may not maintain a qUiet title action against a party in
possession. 'Nor does an equitable remedy lie where there is an
adequate remedy at law.

(234 P.3d@ 1039.)

No showing has been made per any survey result or other
relevant admissible civil engineerts plat or overview of the
claimed lJl:J? ich 1 s 60 foot easement, that such Ulrich::s easement
abuts, adjoins and lies immediately upon the northern boundary
line of the Peacock weiterly 40 acre parcel.
speculate, conjECture and assume that it does

We are left to
1

but such is a

genuines question of fact that is more than required to have been
established without dispute per Plaintiffsh moving affidavits and
all memos,

Just on that fact alone, their sununary judgment motion

must be denied.
JNB' s Opp/Counter

_They have no dominant easement estate. No standin.sr:
Memo to Plts 1 Reply_ Memo re = S/J
t~

P. ll.

II.

IF PLAINTIFFS 13 VERIFIED COMPLAINT IS NOT DISMISSED
BECAUSE THEIR LEGAL REMEDIES ARE ADEQUATE, COMPLETE,
SPEEDY AND CLEAR, THEN CO'V'JARD"v~ HADLEY IS CONTROL,.,.'
LING AS DISPOSTIVE OF THE *~SUES"'-~, TH*~' CASE, AI.pNG
'WITH SHELTON V. BOYSDSTEN' ~EACH"-~SS'''N\ \C'ITED SU:gRA.
,_.

In Plaintiffs'
jump

a

~-

.,

.

e;-

"

.

..

-

-

~~-..,...-.:

REPLY MEMORANDUI1, pages 6-10, 'Ehey

chasm of issues unaddressed not subject to the granting

in any form or degree the genuine issues of fact which
have not addressed.

they

Plaintiffs failure to carry their burdens

of showing the complete absence of any genuine faet,.::.issnes -:i;s-:::faiJal.
~

Their so called and offered "trump card case decision 1'
is Ko lauch; v • Kramer

1

12 0 Idaho 6 5 , 813 P . 2 d 816

(19 91) now

not only an anarchronism, but inapplicably distinguishable,

1
unconstitutional and against the legal principles and controlling facts

1

issues add rulings of"c'oa~rct
\r~.:<B:adley 1
-...
,~.

24 6 P. 3d 391,

~-

and Sheltc.n v. Boysdesten, Beach'Ass''ti (Ct.,App, 1983}102 Idaho 818.
In Plaintiffs" quoting fromT~Koiouch

re the distinquislidng

factors of Shelton, Reply Memo page ],. g, thev show that, Shelton
'

is in fact the controllinq

case;

(In Shel bsn~:"

. ,

11 The

•.

~

'

~

·..,

'

trial

court found that the plaintiffs had prevent as,sociated :me:ml::Jerrs
from using the property for the express purpose o:t the easement
and that the easement had :therefore been extinqu,~s,n,ep py adverse
possession.
That holding was· affirmed on appeal: ~ : ~ Th,e record
in Shelton reveals that the easement was' i:n fact be;[,ng used per.;Lod~
ically for the purpose for which,it was· des~igned an.d that the plain~
tiffs were forced on several occasions t.o actually ch,a,se people of;f
the easement area.
As the trial court Q,Oi:;:ec:l\in its F.;Lndings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law, ,,. I't'- ;j;s: al,s~b\e'!Lea)'' that: this· use of
the property by the Sheltons", prey~·:n't.-e·a.\_~ez 'i:ise::: b:f:;. that< ]?ropei-t~i by
others for the expr'EiSS pui:)?'6'se' '()j:Z tfu':fe~ eas~e~t\ \ \ lf '(BffiPfusis -Added)
In Kolouch

,

@ p. 67 , the compla,int was f.or declaratory

re~

lief; no objections were made that.there was an adequate remedy at
law which precluded any equitable issues or count within said declar-

~5~0ppjeounter ·Memo to PJts' Ret;Jy~.Merro re
1
See Pages 19-21- infra

S,/J

P~ 1,_2.

atory relief complaint.
But

the

~rule~

stat~5,

at page 67 is now not only

overturned, superseded and moreover, unconstitutional, having
sloU<§'lled not

t

accurately researched <re subsequent Idaho Supreme

offQui~~v,,St0ne

Court cases, after the cited supporting cases
~.--\

~.... , · - .

fl-

75 Idaho 243, 245

(1954),

(now over 55 years unaddressed) and

the further cited New York

Castle'- Ass(')ciates v'1 Schwartz case,

407 N.Y.S.2d 717, 83 A.D.2d 481 (1978}

(Kolouch 120

Idaho~@

67-68.)

These are the Kolouch rules, now inapplicable, overruled,
inaccurately applied:and more than voided by

Cowar~v.

, supra,

and even earlier""I:\-~ppett \t.'·Davis,
102 Idaho 527, 633 P~2d 592.
.
.
\

'\

tha-t mere

of the easement." (Emphas±s Added)

What is well known,. shown by a physical

view of the Ulrich '·s acreage to the north of the Peacock 40 acres, is
U!hrich-'s southern boundary, not shown to be the same as Defendant's
northern boundary, is some eight and a half
higher in elevation that the Peacock •·s

(8~).

north2~::-

to ten HLO) feet
boundary, which

northern boundary is in a wash, couliee or drain area and creek
bed 6rd.1ginating from South

Leighi~Creek

meandering southwesterly

within the westerly portion of Peacock draining into Dry Creek,
also known as Bear Creek, but traversing through the IdaboTlDepart,..
ment of Transportation 12 acre borrow, gravel and sand pit. About
fifty

(50) yards from Peacock's northwest corner is a very large

agricultural irrigation well and electric pump wfuth underground
irrigation water pipes/conduits to irrigate parts of Ulrich•s
land and the Stillwater Ranch Subdivision to the west and north
of

Ulrich~s

and beyond.

JNB'S Opp/Counter Memo
2.

~to

Peacock when purchased in 1994 did not

Plts',

Repjz.y,·Memo::_.:r~S/J··,-P·,·

1 3.

neciderlsaine year- 19~4, reporh:!rl"~f'1)0!~1ey, infra pp 17-18.

have irrigation rights from said big wel,l and agricultural pump.
However, approximately within
corner, a pond bed of

2~3

75~yards

south of the north west

acres would fill upn with subwaters

to place pumps to irrigate approximately one quarter to one third
of the northwest internal acreages of Peacock.

Thusly, visually

anyone claiming whatever easement of 60 feet for roadway purposes,
as the

Ulti~h•s

now are had more than mere nonuse notice, that bhey

could not use nor access said 60 foot right of way regardless if
theY' claimed it was per grant or implied existence.

Most critical-

l:¥y brought to their attention of nonuse if that wanted a road
constructed through such depressed, water well and subterranean
seasonaly pond

accumulations, they could not pass through it.

At- the internal northwest corner of Peacock is where Defendant placed a fence,

po~ts,

rails and no trespassing, no entry,

keep out signs and a large tractor front rake to prevent passage
whatsoever.

Such barriers, warning signs and obstacles were

enforced by defendant personally, -especially with regularity from
March of 2003 through the present

date~

stopping, precluding and

even removing persons trying to access through said northwest
corner into the rest of the Peacock forty acres and especially
all along the internal westerly 100 foot corridor of Peacock to
the southerly hound !ary , along such westerly 100 foot corridor
inst~lling

and maintaining three

(~)

separate fences and gates

also with multiple no trespassing, no entry, keep out, etc.,
He also planted mutiple trees, over twenty five
(30) r:'tidsize to large schrubs, , bushes.

signs~

(2521, over thirty

and annual flowers, farm

and garden crops, and restricted completely access to said strip,
other than upon personal request and individual permission granted
JNB's Qpp/counter Merro to Plts~' Reply

-nnFS'/J

P. J 4.

only for such person so requesting and on/for no other use,
date or event whatsoever.
The

Ulrich~s

saw, witnessed, observed, experienced

Defendant's restrictions, control of very limited access and
enforcement of preclusions of :;any unauthorized intrusions
or attempts at trepassings w-ithout defendant ''s express permission,
limited in purpose uses of access over any part of Peacock. THey
accepted.....~.

abided, agreed to and more than acquiesced to Defendant ''s restrictions.

Trappett v. Davis 102 Idaho 527, 531-.-34; Coward v. Hadley,246 P.3d@ 395-98.
For the Plaintiffs to argue thai: Kolouch is dispositive
and not Shelden, nor Coward v. Hadley, supra, without the trier
of fact,

11

construing an easement, claimed by Ulrichs in this parti-

cular case, if they even have one and can proceed per quiet title
claim,never having had nor still not having actual possession,
nor their name revealled as granted to them ati'the time Peacock
was purchased by Defendant via said Spendthrift Trust Joint Ven7
ture Agreement, ignores/avoids and,prevents,·interpreting all
deeds and documents,
the

d€:),-e'nni~ing\ the i~t·ention":~

'and the circums.,-

which did not include

tances at the time the easement
And further the like

granted or created.

or ancillary question of whether a

particular use of an easement is reasonable and commensurate with
the parties intention when the easement was granted/created is a
question of fact for the trier of fact in, a constitutional jiJ\7Y
trial~

a iury upon a required legal remedy at law.·"B'axber v·,',

116 Idaho 767, 780 P.2d 89
Thus,

(1989}

Kolouch .i:-sr:t't authority ;re precluding defendant to

have inconsi?ten'i:;ly constructed,fu1d rrnaintained· a holding irrigattion water pond, or any irrigation undergound pipes, condutt:s with
JNB' s Opp/Counter Memo to Plts' Reply Memo.-re S/J P. 1 :,5

b19

a very large agriculture deep well with large electrical pump
supplying up to or more than 5000 gallons per minute water for/
with above ground aluminum pipes, sprinker irrigating dispensing
outlets to

irrig~te

the entire 40 acre Peacock Parcel, for crops,

defendant's horse, farm and domestic stock animals., all within the 60 foot
claimed easement.
Rem"B:mber, the Ulrich's were not present or around 7 except
for two

(2) times during the summer to early fall, to service

and tend to their beehives,

from 2004 through emcl,(,!)f summer 2010,

.?-

six (6) year period, they never occupi:eEL' .l?Ossessed or use.d
whatsoever the claimed 60 foot right o.f_w~TQey

didn't need i...:Lat <31l.

The case holding and analysis of'~:J?'appett"-:V~' DaVis, 102 Idaho
527, 530-532, dealt with the quieting title of a boundaxy
just by

adverse possession,. prescription or adverse use/, but

"by acquiescense'{
the

not

premise of

11

At pa,ge 53l th.e Jdah.o Supreme Court set forth

Adverse J?ossession and Agreed boundary a,re dis-

tinct theories, "and at p, 532 h.eld;
uA third exception is not really an exceRtion at all•
but rather a different rule, having as· ;bts 'source a dif".
ferent doctrine,
Idaho has recogni~ed the 'Cloetrine of
-agreed boundary or bounda.rv by<~cquie'$'Ceh~e •.:. , \;: \ (Emphasis Added)
In a

~NOTE 11 ,

page 532, i t referencedly stated:

''Note, Boundaries by Agreement and A.cquiescen;(;le in Utap,
1975, Utah L. Rev. 221 (1975} Although th.e ¢ioctrines are distinct, they have had some common attributes. For example, in
Kesler v. Ellis, supra, this Court borrowed the statutory
period from adverse possession theO.¥¥ and applied i t to a,greed
boundary cases, holding that ~it is but log±cal to sa,y that
such acequiescence must be for a period of less th.an five yea,rs,
thus conforming to the period, established by,,t.he sta~ute of
limitations in cases of adverse. possession.''''· Kes~re·r"· V\"- E'ilis, r,
47 Idaho at 744i' 278 p'·. at J67 ~.
Subsequently·') howevf;r~, in·
t;aurle:y;. v/' Barr! s. 7 5 Idaho 1.12. 268 P !2d 351 (19 54 U t)1i.s
Court abandoneE! the five-:-year requirement ~-for acqLJ.iescen~e,
holding that the period of acquiescenc~,, .i:s merely regarded
as competent evidence of the agreement~ ~. .. "'Id. at 117 f;' 2 6l P
P.3d at 353.u
(See also pages 533~341
JNB' s Opp/Counter Memo to Plts' Reply Memo re SjJ.... · P.'- '1 ·6

0{)2(J

Paurley

v~

Barris, 75 Idaho 112, 268 P.2d 381 (1954),

(decided same year as

Quinn v. Stone, 75 Idaho 243, 250 l

· •was a legal action of ej ectrnent of a boundary dispute. At
page 117 of Paurley , especially pages
opinion,

120~121,

the dissenting

S''CC;nc+ly' evaluates and analyzes what the majority

opinion then and therafter did not require for acquiescence.
Defendant 1's affidairit and even Plaintiffs •· own incomplete and hearsay complaint ''s paragraphs and the further affidavit of Plaintiff Thomas Ulrich, have already admitted if not
confessed defendant•s proof of open,
unn~ppted

not~rious,

continuous and

use of the claimed easerent for all periods, if

..,.any there still be because of 'Trapper.v,. Davi\S ·~ supra, at page 532,
he

is entitled to the presumption of adverse,

'

ac:;q'uies£.,s;;nc~

,' _:lc,fa.i)ze r,

and abandonment use and purpo'ses" 9f use, inconsi"s'tent wi t;b a:n)[ c·of
i-Bt-errtions or purpose in the all'e_9ed .ea:-s,ement.
Kolouch •·

following sentence is senseless,, contradictory

and implausibledn both form 1.,.. intentions and application, at Pages
68-69:
~Applied here, we may paraphrase this rule to read that
where the easement was created, but no occasion has arisen
for its use, the owner of the servienV·itenement may plant
trees, erect a fence, etc., and such use will not be deemed
to be adverse, until tfie:::need to use the easement arises (or
inconsistent to use 'Shelton '·s terml until the neecll to use
the easement arises, etc. We think this rule makes sense
in light of the well established rule that the owner of the
servient estate is entitled to u~e his:__ ic:~pd,, evep though
encumbered by an easement, f0r ~n:Y'· ·pl.fr{l&'S~ · hbt· '-i\pconsist-ent
with the purpose reserved in the easE!I.'rlffit. · , ·
·~
(Etnpnasis Added)

t· · '

The many so.,..called

rules of Kolouch as cited, supra, are

more than contradictory and ambiguously con,trived, and misapplied
to rewrite a written easement which is not applied with cognent
clear, sdctint

rules of the intention of the parties, and, most

JNB's Opp/Counter Memo to Plts' Reply :Memo re S/J
f•

·.M}.~·.1

P. 1-7.

HIS'TAKENL'X",

without mutuality of j_ntention or meeting of the

minds, gives to

a nonexistent pa;rty· or pa;rtj:_es·, ll.e;r;e

th~

'Ulrichs

1

an unagreed condition of subjective cond;L_tj:_on precedent of
when they can start the running o;f; any applicable statute of
limitations and further violatesthe statute of

fra,uds~

The

more the ULrich's deny or refuse to a,dn)it t:P.e precj_se date/time
the "Ulrich ''s need to use the easement

a;r:-ose·-~·,

Ul:'rich ''s can

without impunity and without any arlqJitted knowledge of

in~onsis.,-

tent uses, purposes or a,ctions of their claimed easement, simply
snooze, sleep on their

rights~

ignore and evade all

responsibili~

:ties of any statutes of limitations or of fraud, because
the Alice in Wonderland principles of
can rewrite, reform and modify

Ko:I_oucl}.~

under

the trial court

the true and mutality of agree-

ment and meeting of the minds, at will of th.e servient easement
holder, discriminating against him, without any semblance C[r
application of all terms, conditions a,nd covenants actually agreed upon.

Put Dlaintiffc:: contend, -if the erlsement in nuec:tinn insirle dPfen-

dant'c: wec:tern boundarv was just fnr their fu+urp families c:pendthrift trusts'
lots~

splits-

the~

3.

bvthP dortrine of mergPr, there

easement. berause of thP dortrine of mPrger.

w~s

nn

gr~ntPd

or otherwisP

Fxactlv, such meraer is binding!

Tp-;aUow,:; ·CRrbj_ trary rules and uncertain implied
understandings and claimed rules of policy re

terms,

reconstructing

the intenti<D:r.ES of the parties apa;rt of origina,l conveyances ·toc;create the
easement,

"ALLOWS~·

a trial court judge to ignore, misuse and

act in excess of jurisdiction, without consistent rules of
discretion, maliciously and biasedly violating a,ny standards of
permitted discretion or public policies enumerated, thus, engaging
in arbitrary, capricious, whimsical and prejudicial favoritism·
JNB''s Opp/Counter

3.

Ma:nc'-..-;;w~Plts 'r

Reply J\1emo,,r~ S/ J .. P. 18, .

p~~e~E~f 0 X•IAt~@tR@r: 8~9(it t~~c l~~"' an g. o2°Rfit,,!MJ~~~~6p ~p~_yt hns nnw~~ to nrant
-

'I{,' t-

III.

IF PLAINTIFFS' CURRENT VERIFIED COMPLAINT IS NOT DISMISSED
FOR BOillH OF THE REASONS, THAT THEY HAVE A CLEAR, IMMEDIATE,
ADEQUATE, COMPLETE AND PLAIN Rfit,1~DIES AT LAW AND THE TOTAL
FAILURE TO JOIN INDISRENSIBLE PARTIES, THEN DEFENDANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS UNDER THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE
U.S. CONSTITUTION, OF DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION TO
A PUBLIC JURY TRIAL IS A STRUCTURAL DEFECT THAT ALSO REQUIRES
THE ENTIRE PLAINTIFFS" COMPLAINT DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

Plaintiffs' current complaint, which their counsel have framed
in two (2) equity counts of quiet title, ~nd of declaratory relief with
injunctive issuance orders, is more than a deliberate tactic and ploy
cuntenanced by this dist*ict court to not just prevent, but completely
eliminate defendant's U.S. Constitutional, trourtheenth Amendments rights
of due process and equal protection to a public jury trial of required
remedy at law issues that are required to be addressed and raised solely
by Plaintiffs only herein. Suchan v. Rutherford, 90 Idaho 2888, 295;
National Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc. 121 Idaho 266, 278-289; Spears v.
Dizick, (Oregon 2010, Or. App) 234 P.3d 1037, 23 Or:. App. 594; and Trappett
102 Idaho 527, 531-34 (see page 15,-1;8;tiS'upraL and

Towe.!:_A~e.!_S~Inc:2..

v. Lawrence, 143 Idaho 710, 714, and Pro Indiviso, Inc., v. Mid-Mile Holdinq
Trust, 131 Idaho 746, 746 (Part B., pages 5-11, supra).
This Court has further violated the aforesaid U.S. Constitutional
rights by bring in as equitable issues, supposedly reached with finality,
but no so at all, when the Court took full judicial notice, knowledge and
inserted it's Decision in Idaho SupremP Court Dkts #34712 and 35334 (Teton
CV Ol-265J as controlling the individually named trusts, persons and entities
who owned and still own the Peacock 40 acres. The district court judge who
after remand rendered a SECOND AMENDED JUDGMENT in TEton CV 01-265, which
was not then nor now final, but appealed by JOHN N. BACH herein and as
ap?e,llant Complainant In Intervention, who has filed his Openina Brief in
..
.
the Idaho ~uoreme Court's Docket 38370, is Judge Darren Simpson, the assigned
jurist in this quiet title action. The facts as stated above, raised overtly
•.

and critically, not just the appearances, but the actuality of a biased trial
judge herein, who to protect his SECOND AMENDED JUDGMENT, now on appeal in
Teton CV 01-265, I.S.C. Docket 38370, has so far denied and overruled Defendant's requests to dismiss Plaintiffs' entire complaint herein for failure
JNB' s · Optl/Co'unter Memo tlo Pl ts' Reo 1y

Me;~:t·,re

S/ J

ntt2~,

p.

19.

and refusals to oroceed solely on legal remedies at law causes of action
and to join all indispensable parties.

Such refusals and failures as

currently allowed by Judge Simpson are in fact and constitutional effect,
violations and deprivations of John Bach's said Fourteenth Amendment Rights
to

du~orocess

961, 974-979.

and equal protection as set forth in State v. Perrv 245 Idaho
Althouah Perrv dealt with oroceedinas and errors in a crim-

inal trial, the citing and quoting of Chief Justice Rehnauist, writina in
Mizona_'!_._l_u~inat_g_,

499 U.S. 27q, lll S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d (1991),
at £eLLy. starting oage 974-top right, 975 is most relevant, applicable
and controlling.
Herein anrl in Teton CV 01-265, upon remand before Judae Simpson,
is appears that such .iurist has followed, oer under color of law. Idaho
judicial custom, oractice and procedures, to unconstitutionally favor

and aoply equitable actions of quiet title, declaratory and injunctive
relief. when none of such equi table actions are allowed, nor mandated,
but do short en and reduce involvments of the trial district court judge
sitting without a jury, who under Idaho statutes will make almost imoossible to overturn findings of fact and conclusions of law, rather than
the verdict of a public trial jury who award damages as instructed, and
whose verdict and the iudament thereon to be entered are given greater
confirmations. verifications and validities by Idabo Statutes. (See Perrv
page 97Ll, right column, as to such due process and eqllal nro+ection riohts
violations which are structural defects.
The following reworded quote from

Sullivan v.

Louisian~_a

508

U.S. 275, 113 S.Ct. 2078. l2Ll L.Ed.2s 182 (1993) . . "the jury was given a
defective

instructions and the U.S. Supreme r.ourtfound that (the pnrtj 1 s)

Sixth Amendment riqht to a jury trial had., therefore been violated . . . such
violation constituted a structural defect . as it 'vitiate (d) all the jury's
findings'
J11st on the Suchan case alone defendant's Fourteenth AmF>ndment
II

J!'l£_'_?.__OQQ_ICot,ntF>E_MF>mo_!o_E_lts '__B_er.ly~emn re C:./J_ ·2o. __

06'~4

anrl vitiated.
IV.

CONCLIISION
Per all of .lQHN N. RA(I-.t's motionc, momoc, a-ffirlavits and this,

most cur-rent nppnSINh AND COIINTER MEMORANDUM BRIFF,
ospoci~llv

this rourt should,

for lark o-f or warrant of cubiect matter jurisdiction anrl fail-

ure of joining mndispensihle narties orrler the following:
1.

Oismiss wibh Prejudice the Plaintiffs' VerifiPd Complaint.

? ·

R~cuse itself of decline to hear any matter further inrlurlinn
Plaintiffs' rleficient luncupportahleMotion for Summary Judgment

3

nefondrlnt rlnd rounterclrlimrlnt's JnHN ~~. B8CH motion ~nd
por lilic filinns and momoranrta, romnla+e S"mmrlry iudnmont rlgainst bo~h P'ai-ti£fs Ulr;chs.
Gr~nt

;.pplic~tinn

4. Olf' Ahate, Stay all nroreerlinns in this ar.tinQ, 1rntil the rosollltion with Finality nf all i<::SUPS in tho current anperll in Idi'lhO
<:upremo Co"rt rlocket 18370, Tetnn C" 01-265
5.

Tmpnse sanrtinns nf cnstc, roserlrch feos, ros+s and exnences
etr., attornev's 7 paralPgal fees/expensPs anainst hath
Phintiffs and their twn COIInsol, Mr. Womor and Mv-.
in
vinla+ions of Rule 11 (a\(1\, e+ al for failure tn do cimnly
rasos. reserlrch to loc;'~te- cite and arivice tBP C0 11 rt nf SIIChi'ln '
~~~r·s "· Dizirk, Tr"p~tt u. Drlvic, P~uerlev v. Warris rlnd
Cowarrr-v-.-Hadl ey caces anrlfor deli bPratemi sst atementS-i'lnd
misrepresonti'ltfons of tho orinciples and anplications of the
defective cases thev diri cite.

Terminate, abate anrl vacate anv restraining order or nreliminary i nj1mcti on issued or further reauesterl. (The rourt has a1ready
found/helrl that therP is no bi'lsis for anv iniunrtive relief.
(The ordered survey could have been
rlleri per IRrP, RulP ~4,
ner disr.overy rules and prinr.iples )
April 22, 2011
/1/A/\
!) (,1' (!
6.

DATED:

l

. ,,

11
,

J• N N. BACH./Pro Se

vtet"

rERTIFTCATE OF SERVIEF BY MAil; I the tmdorsign rprt .Y'this April ?2, ?011,
that T dirl place this/a ropv of the foregiing documen. in the li.S.Mail with
first class postane affixed to SPparatP envelopes adrlre<::serl to: l) rharles
Homer. P.O. Box 5 0130 Idaho Falls, ID G3405; and T~~~norable Darren Simpson.
Bingham County Courthouse.501~!.Maole #310, Blackfoot Id<\ho 83221.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket NO:

JACK LEE McLEAN, Trustee and WAYNE
DAWSON, Trustee,

38370~2010

(Teton CV 01-265)
Plaintiffs/Resp-,ondent,

v.
CHEYOVICH FAMILY TRUST and VASA N.
BACH FAMILY TRUST,
Defendants.
JOHN N. BACH

I

Intervenor/Appellant,

/
/

/

v.

JACK LEE McLEAN, Trustee, WAYNE
DAWSON, Trustee, DONNA DAWSON, ~
ALVA A. HARRIS, Individually and
dba SCONA, INC., a fictitous
entity, and KATHERENE M: MILLER,
AND DOES l-30, Inclusive,
Third Party
dants

defen~

APPELLANT JOHN N. BACH ~·s, PRO SE, OPENING BRIEF

JOHN N. BACH, Pro Se
P~O.Box 101
TJDriggs, ID 83422
Tel: (208} 354-8303
. 'MARVIN ~1. SMITH, Equire
581 Park Ave., Ste 202
Idaho Falls, ID 83402
Attorney for Respondents
( 20 8)
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TERVENOR. COMPLAINT BARRED THEIR STAND'7·
ING OR CAPACITIES.

J-4 •

THE ISS~ REMANDED TO Tf!E DISTR:CCT COURT
WERE ALREADY RESOLVED IN API?ELLANT'B FAVOR,
BARRED BY LACK OF FURTHER JURISDICTION VIA
MOOTNESS, ACQUIESENCE, INVITED ERROR AND
WAIVER DOCTRINES.

2

THE FOREGOING ANALYZE AND AUTBORITIES RESULT
ON REMAND THAT JUDGE SIMPSON 1'S ORDER & SECOND
AMENDED JUDGMENT ARE VOID AB INJTIO.,

29·:

D. 'J'THEr:ORDER AND SECOND AMENDED JUDGMENT OF OCT.
29, 2010 ARE BARRED BY THE DOCTRINES OF JUDI,-.
CIAL ESTOPPEL, QUASI ESTOPLLE, RES JUDICATA,
COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL OR CLAIM PRECLUSION,

29.

B.

~C.

5.:

E. THE TRIAL COURT UPON REMAND FAILE.D A.ND ERRORED
GREATLY IN ATTEMPTING TO CONSTRUCT. DUE DISCRE:"""'l'T®.N:-WHICH IT DID NOT HAVE. NOR PROPERLY EXER.CISE
IN C:;RANTING DAWSON'S RULE. 60 (b) (6}. M<DTION AND VIA.
TAKING UNDISCLOSE UNKNOWN JUDICIA.L NOTICE
30 •
F.

TRIAL COURT

_, ERRORED IN DENYING ALL THREE
MOTIONS SET FOR/NOTICED FOR
HEARING DECEMBER 17, 2010.

(3)

APPELLANT~S

35.

CONCLUSION

35
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JOHN N., BACH t·s

OPENING APPELLANT BRIEF
I.

NOTICE OF APPEAL, Filed Dec. 9, 2010
(C.T.

76~86)

Appellant JOHN N. BACH, filed a NOTICE OF APPEAL ,
Prose, I.A.R., Rule 17, etc.,
PLAINTIFF WAYNE DAWSON ''S
dated October

from:

1.)

MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT

29, 2010 (CT

11~31),

INTERVENOR~COMPLAINANT

1

2.) SECOND AMENDED

JUDGMENT, filed October 29, 2010 (CT 7
DENYING

ORDER GRANTING

~

10) and 3) ORDER

JOHN N.. BACH's MOTION TO STRIKE,

TO ALTER OR AMEND,'OR RELIEF FROM FINAL JUDGMENT, 1(;) pages,
ad directly with this Court.

fil~

-ATTACHMENT
hereto
is a copy of "3) ORDER."
·
·

Through the issues and motions made by Appellant during
the REMAND of thcis Honorable Idaho Supreme Court to d&strict
court Judqe, the Honorable Darren B. Simpson, no hearings were
allowed

by him either on what he was to consider on Remand, nor

did he permit nor allow any hearings, in person or via telephone
conferences, on

Appellant~s

Re: 1.) To Strike, Quash &

Vac~te

Court's Order Granting Wayne Dawson'· For Relief from Judgment
&

Second Amended Complaint, I.R.C.P., Rule 12 (f), 12 (g),

19, et

seq~

(4),

2) Order Granting New Hearing Before Unbiased,

Qualified Judge, I.R.C.P., Rules 59 (a) (6)
dence, error in law/against the law)

ber 15, 2010.

(Insufficency of Evi-

& Rule 59(e)} and

er Per I.R.C.P., Rule 60(b) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)

three

(2)

&

3) Ord-

(6), filed Novem-

(CT 32-4 3) Appellant Notice for hearing all said

(3) motions

on Friday, December 17, 2010,

- l

-

31

(CT 51-870).

III.
A.

~~Nature

STATEMENT OF THE. CASE., REMANDED

of the

The verified complaint brought by plaintiffs Jack
Lee McLean and Wayne Dawsons, as trustees of their family
trust labelled Quiet Tile and Partition Real Estate, filed
December 18, 2001,

(R.Vol 1, pp

1~5;

R. Vol.II. p. 479, was

served upon John N. Bach, as successor trustee of the defendant €ASA N. BACH FAMILTURST.
nor served as an

indiv~dual

JOHN N. BACH, was not named

defendant, although he was one

of the four joint venturers, dba as TARGHEE POWEDER EMPORIUM,
LTD., who was a holder of an undivided one-fourth interest in
the PEACOCK FORTY ACRE PARCEL, the sole real property involved.
B.

CoUrse of Proceedings
John Bach,

1

on FebrRary 26, 2002 was granted leave to

intervene in the case asserting his personal interests therein.
He filed a verified Complaint:' illntervention March 26, 2002 naming as Intervenor Third Bai:ty defendants: JACK LEE McLEAN, Trustee, WAYNE DAWSON, Trustee, DONNA DAWSON, ALVA A. HARRIS,

ind~v

idually and dba SCONA, INC., a sham Idaho entity, KATHERINE M.
MILLER, and DOES 1-30, Inclusive.

2

ff032

No answer no other responsive pleading was filed
by the Third Party Defendants, although Alva Harris as their
attonney did file an appearance for them, but not for Katherine
Miller.
Appellant made various motions to dismiss, for
sanctions, etc., all being denied.

Jan. 3, 2005 entered an

Order dismissing Jack Lee McLean, who had died Dec.5, 2005 (R.
Vol. I, pp 61-66.

A

DISMISSAL with PREJUDICE FOR LACK OF

D;LLIGENT PROSECUTION of both Plaintiffs Complaint was granted
by the district court, upon duly noticed motion brought by
Appellant, heard on

August

f ,

2007 (R. Vol I, pp 61466,

349-369.)

Appellant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment in
this Action and companion action Teton CV 01-33, with numerous
supporting

af~idavits,

exhibits and memorarlda of points and

authorities; Respondent Dawson's attorney, Alva A. Harris filed
no counteraffidavits, no memoranda opposing said summary judgment
and did not argue, although he was present at the noticed hearing
and oral argument by Appellant for his summary judgment motions.
which the court granted without opposition, without objections
and which the Court determined was stipulated and consented in
full by the Third Party Defendants who had appeared

b~t

who

had filed no. responding valid pleading.
Respondent

newly substituted counsel,

DAWSON~s

Marvin Smith of Idaho Falls, filed Oct 17, solely a Motion for
Reconsideration per Rule ll(a) (2) (B, IRCP, seeking reconsider-

3

3:8

ation of the Court''s Septel1l.ber 11, 2007 Joint Cases Opinion
Memorandum, etc and the Quieting Title Judgment solely in
favor of Appellant John N. Bach with permanent injunction
provisions against all named third party defendants.
The motion for reconsideration was not accompanied by any
timely affidavits by DAWSON nor his two attorneys, Alva Harris
as his first counsel, nor his then newly substituted counsel,
Marvin Smith, nor any one explaining or trying to show under
oath why there was any good, sufficient legal cause to
der the said summary judgment granted and imposed,

recon~

Without

such timely 14 days period in which affidavits could have been
filed,

and per the holding of Jensen v. State 139 Idaho 202,

(Idaho 2003) the trial court lost jurisdiction over DAWSe>N's
DAWSON's said v6id motion for

motion for reconsideration.

reconsideration did not raise any basis of facts or law, that
it extended or was sought to reverse, the Dismissal with Prejudice of Dawon's and also McLean's complint for lack of

dili~

gent prosecution.
February 8, Dawson and McLean ''s Estate and purported
heirs, of which there

we~e

no estate or heris with standing or

capcity fileda motion to set aside order and quieting title
judgment per IRCP, Rule 60(b) (6) with a rambling affidavits
and exhibits thereto,

but premising said Rule 60(bl (6) motion

on DAWSON's earlier filed motions for reconsideration, which
failed to timely and properly be filed within the required 14
days, thus making it void ab

initio~-

(R. Vol

II~

pp

617~628,

654-660)

April 8, 2008 a Memorandum Decision:aiid Order Denying

4

Plaintiffs'/Third Party

Defendants~

was entered. R. Vol. II, 667,686.
2008

Motion for

Reconsider~tion

Among several April 10,

orders granted was that of Denying As Moot Plaintiffs'

Motion to Change Caption, R. Vol II,
April 16, 2008
Amend a Judgment.

686~697.

DAWSON filed a Motion to Alter or

which was denied July 2, 2008 .• R"Vol II,

710-717, 753-756.
The district court entered its First Amended Judgment.:--alt:ering the early judgment so it did not>qihiet title to
John N. BAch in an 8 plus acre Zamona Casper parcel, and revising the language of the mandatory injunctioncprovisions.
R. Vol II, 730-738.
July 9, 2008, Respondents Dawsons and whoever should
have been

McLean~s

the absence of any

representatives, but weren't and
proba~e

di~pite

representative or duly appffiinted

estate, filed a Second Amended Notice of Appeal. R.Vol II 757-761.
C.
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DAWSON in his appeal, docket 34712, filed his
APPELLANT"S BRIEF, 8:JL pages, June 19, 2009.

The name of

JACK LEE McLEAN, NOR HIS ESTATE NOR ANY REPRESENTATIVES OR
DAUGHTERS were presented nor

d:ilsclosed anywhere ffin the cover

and in said brief as an named or interested party in said appeal.
The five denominated issues on said appeal clearly
to appellant therein DAWSON and only DAWSON,.

w~~e

limited

Throughout the

ARGUMENT portion and the Conclusion requested its was only DAWSON,
so appealing and seeking relief.

(DAWSONr'S OPENING BRIEF, PP 5-20)

DAWSON admitted that hlhs Rule 60(b) (6) motion which
had not been ruled upon, could

o~ly

be granted for "any other

reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment."
."only upon a snowing of unique and compelling circumstances."
He cited Palmer v. Spain, 138 798, 802, 69 P.3d 1059, 1062 (2003).
In Dawson's quote from Palmer, he accepted its statement that:
"it would be an idle exercise and a waste of judicial resources

n

to set aside a judgment if, in fact, there is no genuine justiciable controvery.

(Citations omitted}. While this requirement

that a Rule 60(b) movant must show a meritorius defense has generally been applied in Idaho appellate decisions where the

chal~

lenged judgm:emn.was taken by default, e. g. Reeves,. its is equal.,..
ly

applicable in the present circumstances where the judgment

was rendered on the merits.

It would be pointless to vacate a

summary judgment and reopen the proceeding iif the party seeking
relief has not shown taht it can raise genuine factual issues
to defeat the summary judgment motion. •·
Respondent JOHN N. BACH's

(Dawsons' AOP, Pg 6-7

brief in opposition to

DAWSON's cited two most recent cases which had cogent controlling application, to
l.

w~t:

Esser Electric v, Lost River Ballistics Tech, Inc.
decided May 20, 2008(30 days befor~ D~~s6n~~ Opening
Brief was filed) 145 Idaho 912, 916~920,. 188 P.3d 854.
(@ 917:
"For over 110 years this Court has held that
a party is not entitled to a relief from a judgment on
the ground that judgment was entered due to the negligence or unskillfulness of the party~s attorney, Esser
Electric has not convinced us that we should change
that policy. Therefore, it is not entitled to a new
trial on the gounrd that its counsel committed misfeasance in failing to respond to the motion for summary
judgment. 11 )
917-918: ''we have not required the trial court to
rule on the admissibility of the affidavit where there
is no objection to it.
If there is no timely objecttions, the trial court can·. grant summary judgment bas
ed upon an affidavit that does not comply with Rule 56·,,

(@

(e) . "
I

_

-h ---0036
_·u.

2.

United Student Aid Fund"', :rnc ~r. Espi:o.osa, __ u.,_s.
Sup£eme Court decision Mar. 23, 2010, L.A. Daily
Journal, D.A.R. 4307, 4309~4311. Re: A losing party
can not rely on Rule 60 (b) (4), Or 60 (b) (6) 1 as a
substitute for a timely appeal. Rule 60 (b) does not
provided a licenses for sleeping or avoiding timely
to perfect his rights as he"s forfeited them on any
basis via a claimed of 60(b) application.

Respondent John

Bach~s

brief cited over 7 other Idaho

case authorities which not just voided any application of
Rule 60 (b) (1) thourgh BO (b) (6), but held such efforts to
seek relief per section 60(b) (4) through (b) (6 were beyond
the court's jurisdiction and authority. ((These cases will be
addressed under the appeal points, infra, all of which were
either not cited or misapplied by Judge Simpson upon remand.)
The Idaho Supreme Court •· s TOp inion by Justice Jones,
in

Dock~t

34712, overlooked and failed to apply any of the

foregoing cited:·cases authorities bucft did ai!Ifirm the denial
of DAWONS"Motmon

for Redonsideration, per Rule ll(b) (2)

The opinion REMANDED the case back to the district court,
Judge Darren B. Simpson to rule upon Dawson '·s motion per
Rule 60(b) (6) which Judge Simpson had failed to address and
rule upon.
D.

AFTER RECEIPT OF REMAND, TRIAL COURT REFUSED TO ALLO\i'J
GRANT'_ OR SET HEARINGS AND ARGUMENTS ON THE ISSUE REMANDED
':'TO IT ANF REFUSED ALL FURTHER INPUT FRO:M APPELLANT.
Upon receiving the file pack July 30j. 2.010, 1the Court

sua sponte issued a Status Order, Sept. 1, 2010, stating:
" . • this Court has requested the transcript of the oral
argument before the Court on February 14, 2008, regarding
he Plaintiff's Rule 60(b} (6) motion.
Upon receipt . • the
matter will be deemed submitted for purposes of tfuis Court
issuing its ruling upon said motion. The Court will review
the previous and relevant pleadings and argument made in

support and opposition to said motion,
No additional brief may be submitted without a
written order of the Court. n Remand Clerk~'s Transcript" Rcr P. l-3
Septerrber

16, 15 days later, a Second Status Order, informed

such FEb. 14, 2008 transcript has been received and the matter
was submitted for purposes of the Court''s consideration,

reit~

era ted no additional briefing without a written court order.
RCT: P 4-5.

:<C'

District Court Judge Simpson did not serve the par-

tires with a copy of such transcript, nor was there any notice

if,

what documents would be given judicial notice per I . R. E. ,

Rule 20l(b) (c) (d) (e), etc.

The trial court cited no local nor

I.R.C.P, it was following.
October 29, 2010 a SECOND AMENDED JUDGMENT was filed at
Blackfoot County, in Chambers (CRT: 7-10) along with an ORDER
GRANTING PLAINTIFF WAYNE DAWSON 1'S MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT. RCT: ll-31.
The pertinent parts of the SECOND

~1ENDED

JUDGMENT

read:

"THIS COURT, having gr:ante4 Plaintiff Wayne Dawson 1 s Motion
for Rel.ief: from Judgment, finds that the First Amended Judgment,
entered in this case on May 27, 2008, should be vacated and this
Sl3cond Amended Judgment should be substituted thher·ecEor.
Plaintiff's Complaint, as it pertains to Wayne Dawson, is '\('~-··
Plaintiff
with prejudice for failure to p~osecute.
Jack Lee McLean, TrusteEj_f: was previously dismissed with prejudillce from this lawsuit.
d~smissed

Intervenor-Complaint John N, Bach 1·s JY\Oti'On for S1.lff1Ilary Judgment is
granted upon :_-:.D:aw:si,:m •·s failure to respond the!Eeto ~
In accord:t-v :·.:
arice with his verified Complaint in Intervention, John N. Bach,
individually, shall have quiet title to an undivided one~fourth
(~) interest in the forty (40)~acre parcel of land referred to
as the "Peacock Parcel"' or the RPeacock 40-::-Acre Parcel. 'J· The
P~acock Parcel is described as?
(Legal Description omitted herefrom)

8

.,...
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Defendant Cheyovich Family Trust, Milan and Diana
Cheyovich shall have quiet4titl~ to an undivided one-fourth
(~) to the Peacock Parcel.
Tnr~ Court takes judicial notice that Plaintiff Dawson
was granted an undivided one-fourth interest in:bhe Peacock 5
Parcel in Bach v. Miller, Teton County case no. CV-2008~202.

This Court also takes judicial notice that Plaintiff
McLean, deceased, by and through his representative Lynn
McLean was granted an undivded one-fourth interest in the
Peactfck Parcel in Bach v. Miller, Teton County case no CV-2008-W~rJ~2 OB -.

'This is a final order, appealable as a matter of right pursuant
to Idaho Appellate R\i{le ll (a) (l}. u:
=
IT IS SO

ORDERED.·~-

RCT ~

7,..-9

The Order Granting Plaintiff Wayne
from Judgment, states,

Pawson~\

in pertinent pB,rt

··~II,

Mot;ton for Rel;tef
ISSUES"';

McLean. and D~wson ''~ 6~ (b) Motion. rei;te~ uJ?op tp_e argu,.
ments made ln their Mption-, for Reconsideratton ,_
A;Ll, of t\le
arguments raised in McLean and Dawson ''S' Motion ,for Recons.td-::-era tion were addressed in the Hemorandum Decis-ion and Order
Denying Plaintiff~V-·/Third Party Defendants-!·. M,ot-cbon for
Reconsideration.
The :Idaho Supr:sme Court directed tl:l.is Cou,rt. to cons;Lder
9
relieving Dawson.of the original judgml_IQt entered in.this case.
as well as the Flrst Amended Judgment, - · on the basls of the
inconsistency be'95_een the relief requested by Bach in his inter"'
vening complaint
and the relief granted in the Judgment and the
First Amended Judgment. 12
Based upon this Supreme
sented include:

Court's directive, the issues pres- r:.h• ·:

l.
Has Dawson shown unique and compelling circumstances
justifying relief from the First Amended Judgment?
2.
If Dawson meets the standard for Rule 60(b) (6). what
relief is he entitled to received?
. RCT; 12-13
The

rest~of

Order granting Dawson's motion, failed il!ocurately

to state, analyze, apply or quote the Jo~nt

IY~EMORANDm-r

issued by Judge-=-

,Jon. Shindirling controlling in the -Quiet Title Judgements,_ in

<

November 15, 2010 Appellant filed

three (3) motions,

to wit: 1) To strike, quash & Vacate Court's Order Granting
Plaintiff Wayne Dawson •·s for Relief from Judgment

&

Second Amen..::.

ded Judgment, Jli_R.C.·P,, Rules 12(f), l2(g) (2)*4), 19, et seqi
2) Order Granting New Hearing Before Unbiased, Qualified Judge,
:LR.C.P., Rule 59 (a) (6) insu·fficiemy of Evidence, error in law/
against the law) & Rule 59(e}; and 3) Order Per I,R.C.P. Rule
60(b) (l) (2) (3) (4) (5)

&

(6) ,,

Respondent DAWSON,

RCT: 32.,..43
filed along with McLean, on Nov. 19,

2010 a series of Objections to Appellant's said motions. RCt: 4450.

Appellant , Dea. 3, 'nQ!:iced,. .called

three (3) motions·
included

fo~

to strike

Up;,~.::

rl

for hearing his said

Friday, Dec. 17, 2010 at 10:30 a:m., whihh
McLean•sjDawson•s objections,

intfu~ding ~oid+

ing Marvin Smith's Dec. l, 2010 letter to Judge Simpson,

(RCT: 53),

and setting forth further points and authorities in support of
his three ( 3) motions. ( (RCT: 50.,..70.
After McLean and Dawson sought to appear telephon±cally,
which included their request to deny Appellant oral argument and
decide his motions on briefing, etc.,
filed his Notice of Appeal

1

APPEAL

71~75~)D~c~'9}

(RCT: 76-79) along with his

tion and a motion to strike McLean's
Dec. 17 hearing date. (RCT:

(RCT:

80-82.

&

1 appellant

Opposi~

Dawon' s objections to the

A second copy of i'Rppellant' s NOTICE OF

is set forth at RCT, Pages 83.,..86, wherein as ISSUE 7: he

raises the Question:
"DID THE TRIAL COURT ERROR FURTHER IN DENYING
ALL OR ANY OF APPELLANT"S THREE (3) MOTIONS
WHICH WERE (TO BE ) HEARD ON OR ABOUT DECEM~
17 I 2010? (RCT: 85)
Dec. 13, 2010, four days before the notice Dec, 17 hearing
McLean and Dawson brought a motion to strike Appellant's Reply
Memorandum, along with an order E'-~ .......r-ning time for service. RCT: 87-95
1o

..

-004G
.,

December 14, 2010, the next day after McLean/Dawson's said
filed motion and obiectisn, Appellant his written Objections,
opposition and refutations to McLean's/Dawson's reply memo, etc.,
raising again the McLean has no standing, capacity nor any basis
of repEesentation

as he is dead, having no estate established

legally, nor any duly appointed, recognized represenuative; and
that even Dawson, lacks standing or capacity to make such

objec~

tions or motions, that the October 28, 2010 said Order arid Second
Amended Judgemnt are VOID AB INITIO , per his several memos filed
ln support of his said three (3) motions and that ''NO AFFIDAVIT
IS FILED IN SUPPORT OF (Respondents' ) REQUESTED ORDER TO SHORTEN
TIME, etc., "no could it be made, as DAWSON and his counsel,
still seeking in violation of the basic rules of procedural
and substantive due process and equal protection of JOHN N.
BACH's said rights, special, baised and favorably judicial
treatment and renderings by this Court,· all in contravention
of both the ORDER and SECOND AMENDED JUDGMENT which are void
ab initio. Nor does Dawson and Mr. Smith address how McLean,
etc., could be a party herein at this date, See. I.e. section
15-3-1600.
(RCT: 96-98
II

Dated December 2 0, 2 010, but itemized in the Remand Clerk,. s
Transcript as filed without date is an erder Augmenting Appeal,
Supreme Court Docekt No. 38370.,-2010 Teton County Docket No. 2001,
265, filed May 05, 2009, at RCT, 99-100. Immediately following at
RCT, 101-105 7 filed Dec. lA,-2010 filed at 5:00 p.m

(filed one day

after--McLean/Dawson •·s -unsupported by an affidavit- motillon to
Judge Simpson issed an

strike. etc., filed also at 5:00p.m)

ORDER DENYING ORAL ARGUMENT ON PENDING MOTIONS AND OBJECTIONS.
(RCT: 101-105, ) especially

finding:

~

,

, oral arg1Iffieht wdiuld

not produce any additional benefit to the Court for purposes of
rendeting a decision on the various motions before this Court."

-.-

All pending motions and objections thereto are
hereby deemed submitted to his Court, A written decision will
issue within thirty
Thereafter,

(30)

days.'·'

forty~four

RCT: 101-104.

(44) days later, January 27, 2011,

at 11:49 a.m., Judge simpson issued an ORDER DENYING INTERVENOR'

COMPDAINT JOHN N. BACH'S MOTION TO STRIKE, TO ALTER OR AMEND, OR
FOR RELIEF FROM FINAL JUDGMENT, consist:i:ng of nine pages, wherein
at the last three (3} pages thereof, Judge Simpson Per IRCP,
Rule 11, holds: McLean and Dawson's request for attorney fees
pursuant to Rule ll shal be granted.

0

:'This Order is believed

to have been filed directly with the Idaho Supreme Court although,
J.

the Order's proof of sevice by mail does not so indicate/state.
As ATTACHMENT NO.

1 ,

a complete copy of sucn ORDER

DENYING, etc., Appellant's said three (3) motions, is made a
part of the Remanded Clerk's T:ranscrigtt on Appeal.
During the entire period of time, this matter was
returned to the trial

court judge, no oral hearing was allowed,

recognized nor perfected as required by the
and rulings of Judge Darren B. Simpson.

~2

\c -

-o·o 4

t).,

~J

""

decisions, orders

IV.

ISSUES

ON

APPEAL

1.

DID MCLEAN OR DAWSON HAVE ANY STANDING
OR CAPACITY TO CHALLENGED JUDGE SHIN7
DIRLING SEPT. 11, 2007 NUNC PRO TUNC
JUDGMENT AND THE JOINT CASES MEMORANDUM?

2.

WBRB THE ISSUES REMANDED TO THE DISTRICT
BARRED BY LACK OF JURISDICTION VIA MOOT~
NESS, ACQUIESENCE, INVITED ERROR OR WAIVER
DOCTRINES?

3.

DID THE DISTRICT COURT UPON REMAND VIOLATE BOTH PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE RIG7
HTS OF DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION
OF APPELLANT RENDERING THE ORDERS AND
SECOND AMENDED JUDGMENT VOID AB INITIO?

4.

WERE THE ORDER AND SECOND AMENDED JUDGMENT ,-~
OCTOBER 29, 2010, PRECLUDED BY THE DOCTRINES
OF d'UfHCUAL, 'ESTOPPEL, QUASI-::-ESTOPPEL r RES
JUDICATA, COLLATERAL ESTOPBEL OR CLAIM PRECLUSION?

5.

DID THE TRIAL COURT UPON RE~~ND FAIL TO APPLY
REASONABLE AND DILIGENT DUE DISCRETION IN RULAS IT DID, ESPECIALLY IN GRANTING RESPONDENT'S
RULE 60(b) (6) MOTION AND TAKING JUDICIAL NOTICE?

6.

DID THE TRIAL COURT ERROR IN DENYING ALL
THREE (3) APPELLANT'S MOTIONS SET FOR NQT7.
ICED FOR HEARING DECEMBER 17, 2010?
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I V,
A.

ARGUMENT

THE DISTRICT COURT~S DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE
FOR LACK OF PROSECDTliJON OF McLEAN 1 S AND DA\A7SON 1 S
--VERIFIED COMPLAINT & THEIR LACK OF FILING AN
ANSWER TO INTERVENOR COMPLAINT BARRED THEIR
STANDING OR CAPACITIES
The plaintiffs McLean and Dawson, herein, have not

appeall~d

nor attacked directly nor collaterally, nor can

they at ail1 the district court 1's granting of John N. Bach's
motion heard August

7, 2007, to dismiss with prejudice

their verified complaint with ·prejudice; moreover, both
of them,

even if McLean as a deadman had any claim to

assert, which he could not nor did he have any duly appointed appearing estate representative for him,

he and Dawson

~1

had never filed an acceptable answer putting ln issue the
averments of John Bach's intervenor complaint.

For all

purposes of fact and law, they had defaulted and admitted
all the

a~erments

of John N. Bach's said complaint in inter-

~ention and further as that complaint was expaned per the
a!Efidavits, exhibits and other admitted facts and evidence
by the granting of John Bach's motion for summary judgment.
Anderson-Bl~~e,

Inc. v. Los Caballerose, Ltd.

(Ct. Appl991)

120 Idaho 660, 818 P.2d 775
Under\GUdt circumstances of dismissal with prejudice and
default admissions by all appearing third party defendants,
specifically DAWSON, and even McLean's lost all their titles, rights
etc,viathe affidavits, exhibits and even memos of points and
authorities filed in support and referenced and judicially
noticed.

~ong

such irrefutable facts, determinations and

unassailable legal conclusions were the following by Judge
Shiridirling, at pages 9,

13~15

of fuis JOINT CASES

(9-11-2007)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDERS, ETC.:
11

JOHN N. BACH •· s initial memo brief in support of
said motions for summary judgment and dismissal
with prejudice for lack of diligent prosecution
presented more than adequate, if not overwhelm::.
ing case authorities, statutest etc., for the
Court •·s immediate granting of both motions on all
grounds/basis. He further sought a permanent in.,..
junction.
JOHN BACH in his EX 2: Affid.,..Teton CV
02-208 (testified) that he and DAWSON as to the
ZAMONA and PEACOCK parcels had an oral agreement
if JOHN BACH dissolved said joint ventures DAWSON
·(would) . seel to JOHN BACH any interest at book
value, such oral agreement being governed by Calif.
law and authorities, Masterson v. · Sine (196 8 J 6 8
C.2d 222.
DAWSON never timely acted to attempt
to enforce such oral at;greement and against per
Rule 13(a) as well as the two (2} year STATUTE
O:f LT~HTATION :for breach of oral agree;men.t? in '' 1. ·
Calif. , DAWSON was barred and estopped by s·uch. ~:~.
statute (to) claim any moneys due h.i:m, (It is
noted that said EXH. 2 Aff, incorpora:t,ed otl!.er
affidavits of JOHN BACH, along with severa~ :memos
of authorities he filed in Teton CV Q2.,--2Q8, which
this Court had previously considered and did so
again in granting the motions herein} u.- (@ p. 9)

"This Court is required per Rule ·1, JRCP, to provide
expeditious, fair, just and conclusive order and
judgments when required.
JOHN N. BACH has shown,
proven and despite the intents of plaintiffs and
their counsle in both CV ij;J:l~.33 and CV 01,-265 clear
and convincing evidence and authorities for the
granting of his motions for summary judgment. •t

'"The Court -firids and determines that PLA;t.NT1:E'FS
and their COUNSEL have waived, abandoned (and by
their violations of the provisions of Rule ll(a) (1),
their answers, affirmative defenses and all/any op.,..
position to the relief sought by JOHN N. BACH per
his compaint in intervention in CV 01,-265, which
also applies to their complaint in CVol,.33 1 per the
express provisions of the Idah.o Racketeering Statute,
l.C. 18-:-7804 (a) (b) (c), (d), (g} (1) (20 and (h) with

with Judgments and permanent injunctions to
be issued in both said actions, CV 01~33 and
01-265, per I.e. 18.,..7805 (a), (c), (d) (1) (2) (3)
( 4 ) ( 5 ) (6 )

&

( 71•

The COURT ORDERS THE IMMEDIATE DISMISSAL WITH
PREJUDICE OF BOTH CV 01-33 and CV 01.,-265 FOR UTTER
LACK BY THE PLAINTIFFS AND THEIR COUNSEL OF DILIGENT PRSOECUTION, AND SEVERE PREJUDICE TO JOHN N,
~BACH, his witness to be called and to thie very
Court. u
(@ P. 13)
By

Appellant's said granted motions by Judge Shindirling,

John Bach had both amended, expanded and been guanted full
relief including such expanded=amended issues and facts estblishing their inclusion in the summary judgment and Judgment
September 11, 1007 Nunc Pro Tunc,

As statd in 61B Am, Jur. 2d,

Section 955, page 224:
II

. . the doctrine is that where the parties-have attem-

pted to joint an issue to be tried and it has been tried, however defective ih form the pleadings may be a verdict for one
or the other will beheld to cure such defective pleadings
pleadings, that is cure them as to form and supply all omitted
averments concerning essential facts, relief of, provided the
proof of or admission of such facts was necessarily considered favor the verdict (ordetermining order of the court). The
evidence presented to the (trial court) constitutes the claim
of a party, superceding the party's description of the claim.
Where a theory of recovery is tried fully by the parties, the
court may base its decision on that theory and deem the plea~
68
'' (N .. 68.,-ci tes, Aridere_on:13~C:lke Inc v.
dings amended accordingly.
Los Caballeros Ltd, 120 Idaho 660, 818 Pl2 775 (Ct. App 1991).
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It should be

emphasized that 'lAs a general_ rule, facts

alleged by one party need not be pleaded by another.

So,

a defective pleading of one party may be aillded by the pleading of his adversary for a party will not be heard to insist
that his adversary has committed to allege the very facts which
such party has
~efegt

SllP~-

in his piLeadings t

Where the

alle~ea:.:,::.

is not only supplied by the adverse party, but where

he has also obtained the benefit of a full, fair and impartial trial in which he was given full opportunity to offer
every fact and circumstance tending to relief him from liability, he will not 1again be permitted to retry the cause."
Geros v. Harries, 65 Utah 227, 236 P. 220, 39 A.L.R. 1297 (1925).
Therefore, Judge Shindirling

had broad discretion in

view of the total absence of any opposition, no argument at
the hearing of the motions and no stated/voiced objections
to the affidavits and memos submitted by Appellant, to frame
~

his JOINT CASES

MEMORANDUM and QUIET TITLE JUDGMENT herein,

so that both conformed to the unopposed facts, law and
circuustances proven

Herrman,_' v. Woodell, 107 Idaho

693 P.2d 1118 (Ct. App. 1985)

916,

The issues expanded if such

they were and the rulings thereon by Judge Shindirling were )'
not misleading, nor unclear but with finality.

(It is noted

that Alva Harris DAWSON's counsel had over three (3) court
hearings to present contravening evidence, but did nothing,
made no opposition nor objections.
Even when Marvin Smith was substituted in to represent
DAWSON and the without standing estate and heirs of McLean,
no time, proper in form

(unde~uen~ty

of perjury) affidavits

were filed

by Smith, nor Dawson and most conspicuously,

not by Alva Harris, explaining

a)why/reason he couldn't or

didnt' file any opposition/counteraffidavits to summary judgment,
nor -b) Wl).y Dawson didn 1 t/couldn' t

file affdaiv it. denying John

Bach's acquiring all his title, interests, etc., in Peacock.
Parcel and c) possible abatement or stay of any statute of
limitations

which allows him to claim his original one fourth

undivided interest in Peacock.
Appellant had thus obtained all of Dawson's ownership
title, interests and benefits to Peacock.
his attorneys have denied i t via

a~

Dawson nor any of

relevant, factually detail-

ing affidavits otherwise.
McLean via Teton Instnment No

J48042

,

copy presented

via John Bach's affidavits submitted in supported of
judgment to Judge Shindirling, was never

su~ary

disputEd/cha1le~ged.

Appellant unquestionafuly had acquired any/a±l of McLean's
former title/interests in Peacock even before his death.

His

daughers after were denied by Uudge Simpson as substituted
named successors to McLean, dismissed witn prejudice their
appeal. Such copy of dismissal is EXHIBIT

~B

0

,

p~~~

10, to In-

tervenor-Complainant JNBACH's three (e1 motions. RCT: 41
Appellant's Affidavit in Support of said 3 motions further
expanded and clarified the overlooked facts of these conveyed
interests to him, by Judge Simpson. RCT; 33.,.-37
were unassailable and without
or Rule 60(b) (6)
Simpson.

jurisa~¢tion

All such facts

for reconsideration

review and striking or setting aside by Judge

Cnnmbs v. Churnow and

Griffith~

2009 Opn 124, Oct 13,

citing/applying Donaldson v. Henry 63 Idaho 467, 473, 121 P.2d 445

_.0.048

Among the controlling cases decisions cited by
Appellant to this Idaho Supreme Court, and even Judge Simpson,
(RCT:

57-70) (who refused to allow not just oral argument of

said case;=; but failed to even acknowledge them, their application or the fact he never shepardized nor wanted to address
them,) reveals a premindset of actual prejudice and bias againt
appellant,

The following cases

are not mentioned at all by

Judge Simpson's SECOND AMENDED JUDGMENT nor

o~~GRANTING

DAWSONT.S

MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT:
1.

Esser Electric

v. Lost River Ballistics Tech, Inc.

(May 20, 2008) 145 Idaho 912, 916-20; 188 P.3d 854.
"For over 100 years this Court has held that a party
is not entitled to a reliAf from a judgment on the
ground that judgment was entered due to the negligence or unskillfulness of the party's attorney. Esser
Electric has not convi nc~ed us that we should change
that policy.
Therefore, it is not entitled to a
new trial on the ground that its counsel committed
misfeasance in failing to respond to the motion for
summary judgment.'"

"We have not required the trial court to rule on the
admissibility of the affidavit where there is no
objection to it.
If there is not timely objections,
the trial court can grant summary !iJ.udgment based upon
an affidavit that does not comply with Rule 56(e) ."
(~ee rest of opinion pages 918~920.]
2.

United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v~ Espinoza March 23,
2010, L.A. Daily Journal, D.A.R. 4307; Rule 60 (b) (6)
motion past 4 months from determinative order/judg.,.ment does not provide any basis for relief to recon~
sider/reopen original decision.

3.

Hooper v. Bageley, Estate of Bageley, 117 Idaho 1091,
793 P. 2d 1263 (Ct.App. 1990) Where plt uses a 60 (b) (6}
motion for substitute to amend judgment via reconsideration such 60(b) (6) motionis inappropriate and must
be denied outright. 'c:~

4.

20~

In Re Bli Farms Partnership (6th Cir.2006)465F.3d654Late
lU1supr:or'SEfi.' Rule_ 60 (b) motion is without jurisdiction, a
p:q;ll,~,jzy~'

-
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Therefore,

McLean, long deceased, without any

probated estate nor personal representative duly appointed for any estate (Alva Harris having falsely/deceptively
misled the court ln Teton

CV

02~208

that one of his daugh1
ters had been so appointed when in fact she hadn't) had no
interest in Peacock, nor did Dawson. Not having appealled
the dismissal with prejudice of their complaint, and such
transfer of their titles and interests in Peacock, being proven

via Appellant's summary judgment motion granted by Judge Shindirling res judicata, collateral estoppel, claim and issue
preclusion doctrines were sua sponte to be applied,
One point whic Judge Simpson overlooked or decided not
to consider in attempting to return

McLean, deceased, and

DAWSON' titles and interests to Peacok:

The facts, issues

and his determinations in granting said summary judgment,
1) went far beyond the limited issues of the amended judgment
in 02-208 re Dawson's interest, such issues now being decided
with finality by him when 2) Teton CV 02-208 was on appeal in
Docket No. 3717, not final and not involving the same issues
which he had decided.
This Idaho Supreme Court held in
Hanks, 224 P.Jd, 468, 477

Inc. v.

claim preclusion bars further adju-

dication not only on matters offered and received to defeat a
claim but also "every matter which might and should have been
litigated in the first
sponte application

suit~."

Therein, this Court noted sua

re the "transactional concept of a claim

is broad."; that claim preclusion "may apply even where
1. Whatever judicial noticed documents, filings , etc. , Judge Simpson took
of cv _o2-_ta2_os hedwould havethad to takE
~~mat McLe_an hadtno estate
~:r;epres~. tiv~. lu:Ly app;:lln ec1 and swor ~ --~'LLI.uste:r tfie-esta e. rlf:Jpel. so· notlflfd,tl.in~ Court l n an9there;appea). ,QlJt~s derul'ed oral argument
ln the appeal which led to sal9 ~. U U :1 U

there is not a substantial

overlap'betw.een~the

theories

advance in support of a claim or in the evidence relating
to those

theories.~

Dawson~s

The holding of Storey bars both

motion for reconsideration, which was not supported by any
affidavits either timely nor untimely, and further bars any
other motion for relief per Rule 60(b) (4) through (6). What
has been continually overlooked by nop trial Judge Simpson
is that Rule ll(b) (2) (B) motion for reconsideration has a 14
day mandatory time period from the entry of a final judgment
of the entry of an interlocutory judgment which is made
Final

by a Rule 54(B) Certificate of Appealability.
The motion for recons&deration whibh Dawson and McLean's

people rely upon required.·affidavi ts sworn under oath

testi~

many to be filed within said 14 days manaatory period. No such
affidavits were filed timely

nor at any other time which

could be accepted, considered or applied.

The time

require~

ment of Rule ll(a) (2(B) motion for reconsideration is like
the 42 day limit for appealing from a final judgment; if the
NOTICE OF APPEAL with filing fees/moneys is not filed and paid,
the Appellate Court jurisdiction is lost.

In Jensen v,

State~

(Idaho 2003) 139 Idaho 202, cited by Appellant repeatedly, the
motion there for reconsideration was not ser:ved nor filed with.,..
. :!.o~"

in said mandatory 14 days.

The trial court judge struck such

reconsideration papers, as he had lost all jurisdiction to hear
such late, untimely, and incomplete motion fe reconsideration.
The fact that firstly Judge Simpson denied Appellant ''s motion
to strike the untimely motion to reconsider, .but denied· the rno21,

''0051

ion

to reconsider on the merits, which was reviewed

and affirmed by the Idaho Supreme Court before remand
for him to rule on Dawson's 60(b) (6) motion, does not
give either jurisdiction, nor any discretion nor any
right of further review and analysis even by secretive
judicial notice taken by current Judge Simpson of some
aspects of the AMENDED JUDGMENT against DAWSON, in CV 01-28 .
See Ponderosa. Paint

v Yack(Id Ct.App 1994) 195 P3d 745, il.;25,:Idaho 310,
317-318

Whatever judicial notice and application of certain
facts of ruling sa taken was done in violation of the
~~ions of Idaho Rules of Evidence, Rule 20l(a} (b)

ially 20l(c) (d) and (e).

prov~

and espec~

No exact copies were ever presented

nor served upon Appellant prior to such judicial notice, by
Judge Simpson, nor by the Court Clerk, to have complaince
with due process procedural and substantive rights; nor
was any date, time and place of being heard allowed re whatever
documents were judicial noticed and applied by Judge Simpson.
In Pmderoso Paint Mfg v. Yack, supra, 125 I6.8ho
Court

@

318

appellate

said Rule 60(b) motion essential is for reconsideration

of summary judgment motion and was properly denied. (see also
Plg

319~320.)

Thus where both an untimely without affidavits

or relevant memo of points and authorities is not filed within
said mandatory 14 days and a motion for Rule 60(b) (6) relief
is likewise incomplete, inadequate, eto.,

~t

is based upon and

incorporates whatever basis is presented per the motion for

re~

consideration, such motion per 60(b) (6) must be considered late,
unsupported, a

nulli~y

and

without~court

having no-jurisdiction.

In Re Bli Farms PartnershiJ? (6th Cir 2006) 465 F.3d 654, 657-78.
22 :· ~ -~Oll52

-,-\

By virture of the foregoing analysis of refusals,
failures and avoidances by McLean, Dawson and their attorneys, first Alva Harris and now Marvin Smith, NOT ONE HAVE A
timely, admissible, basred upon personal knowledge and testimonies of Dawson ever SHOWN

a meritorius defense to Appel-

lant's intervenor complaint as amended and expanded, all
proven by his summary judgment granted him and quieting title
to three -•

Quarte~

title, interests and rights, undivided,

v..i th the only other one quarter undivided owners, Milan and

Diana Cheyo::Vii::h.
unappeal~bl~,

What showing after the

~naasail~ble

and

final dismissal with prejudice of Dawson's verified complaint,
has even been attempted by

DAWSON or his current counsel,

that he can plead, show, present evidence of facts, etc.,
that he hasn•t viblated the Idaho Racketeering Statute, as
Judge Shindirling rules and entered judgment that he had,
along with McLean?

All avoidances of the facts and law are

established that both McLean, Dawson and even their counsel,
Alva Harris have repeatedly and flagrantly violated such
statute againt John Bach, his property titles, interests,
de~pement

and commerical uses, expansions and commercial

benefits, etc.,

which the court reserved the award of damages,

treble, attorneys fees, costs, etc., to be reset for trial
upon return from the Idaho Supreme Court after reaffirming his
Order and Judgm-ent. of Sept 11, 2007 Nunc Pro Tunc.
In Dawson's Appellant ''S.:-Brief in Dkt No 34 712, pages 6-7

125 Idaho 310, 317-18, that even a Rule 60(b} movant
2

TI1ust show

11

what admissible

1

relevant still to be decided facts

constituting both the capacity/standing to recover
with and to defense of the expanded/amended intervenor
complaint.

As stated

VTfuis polcicy recognizes that it

would be an idle exercise and a waste of judicial resources
for a court to (allow the filing of an answer)
there is no justiciable

if, in fact,

controversy.~

The major second deceptive and frivolous contention
in said Dawson's

O~ning Brief, Dkt 34712 is that "This case
I•

presents a set of unique and compelling circumstances 11
No it doesn't!·

,

Dawson failed to answer John Bach's com-

plaint in Teton CV 02-208,

He failea to timely persoanlly

and as required by Rule 56(c) through (e) timely execute
and filed within the mandatory reconsideration motion period
any affidavit that presented any factual showing to avoid
the legal rule of liability application against him and
Alva Harris as followed for over 100 years, as stated in
Esser Electri, supra 1425 Idaho 912, 916-920., and the
lack of both standing and jurisdiction issues decied in
United Student Aid Funds, Inc.

v,Espino~~

2010 L.A.

D~ily

Journal, D.A.R. 4307
As a matter of law, Dawson is without standing or capacity
to benefit from the Order and Second Amended Judgment of October 29, 2010 wfuich now per

Appellant~s

appeal

mus~

be

reversed

vacate/invalidated as void, and the JOINT CASES MEMORANDUM and
ORDERs and QUIETING TITLE JUDGMENT WITH PREMANENT INJUNCTION of
Sept. 11, 2007 Nunc Pro Tunc reinstated in full in every partici.llar.

-

H0!11

B.

THE ISSUES REMANDED TO Tf!E DJST:RlCT COURT WERE
ALREADY RESOLVED IN Ji.PPE.LLA.NT 1·S FAVOR, BARRED BY
LACK OF FUTHER JURTSDTCON VIA MOOTNESS, ACQUIESENCE,
INVITED ERROR AND WAIVER DOCTRINES.
The issue or objection that a court lacks jurisdiction

over the subject matter may be raised in any manner.
v.

Hunter 291 P. 1060, 49 Idaho 723.

~ta!!:_ger,

The corolla:ty.:cwhen

some performance or condition of a judgment results in a
lack of jurisdiction is that such is now moot or mootness.

There is a further corollary called the doctrine of invited
error,

wh~ch

party such as

occurs to deny the court jurisdiction when-.a
Dawson and McLean acquiresced, r:invi ted or

led the court into committing the error.

Costco

WholesaleCorp. 95 P.3d 34, 140 Idaho 416.
For the further need to analyze this issue, Appellant
refers hereto to all his points, authorities and arguments,
etc., under Part A. supra and incorporates the same in full.
The Esser Electric v. Lost River Ballistic\:; Tech case
is a special form of not just invited error but waiver of
any subsequent motions for:neeconsideration and Rule 60
where there has also been a dismissal with prejudice

(b)

(6},

of

any affirmative defenses or mandat.ory counterclaim counts
aiidccauses of action, as was granted determined by Judge Jon
Shindirling, which latter dismissal \is final and without any.
appeal nor challenged whatsoever, at any time or stage.

25
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There is also a lack of subject matter jurisdiction
when a court violate both procedurally and substantively
a party rights of due process and equal protection.

Such

rights are basically constitutional, U.S.Constitution and
Idaho State Consiution.

These violations did not occur until

Remand was ordered back to Judge Simpson.

As Appellant was

denied all allocution, notices of a meaningful hearing with
specific day, time and place to present his argument and authorities, this is the first time that he has been able to raise
such constititional violations, besides his three (3)motions
wfuich were also denied any meaningful hearing and allocution,
although notieed for hearing on Dec. 17, 2010.

McGloon0et~i

Gwynn,g, ISC Dkt 29450, 2004 Opn 113, Oct. 24, 2005; "Dragotoius_
v. DragotoiuiJ 113 Idaho 644, 647, 991 P.2d 372

(1998).

As both said ORDER and SECOND AMENDED JUDGMENT of Oct.
29, 2010 were issued in violations of said due process and
equal protection rights, they are ¥oid ab

initio~

But another right of due process was violated by Judge
S'irriE'son, that of an unbiased and impartial judge to try the
proceedings
~enyr

before him. He revealled that the reasons he did

argument is that Appellant did not object to his two stat-

us order and therefore he waived his such rights.

No citation is made of any Idaho Civil Rule of Court
that allows/presents such basis of the Judge's selfimposed
waiver, but two I.R.C.P. Rules more than operate to the conta)

. to wit, Rule l (c) and Rule 16 (a) .

These two rules

prohibit any local judges subjective unapproved rules of pro2t-

oasn

cedure that has not peen brought to the Idaho Supreme
Court's attention with request for approval and a written
enactment approval by this very Court for such rule. Rule
l6(a) pertaining to status and procedural setting and motion
orders, requires that all counsel be informed and their input
received in advance or their objections. Such determination
of Appellant 1'S waive is unsupportable and not just unconstitutional

but without authority, or judicial basis of jurisdic-

tion.
A December l, 2010 from Dawson's counsel, Marvin Smith is
RCT: 53.

It is written to Judge Simpson,

informing him on

a personal basis to make a correction for SMith on the written
objection by Dawson to Bach,, s November 15, Motions.

Smith

sets forth the correction he requests be made and then states:
"Please contact me if you have any questions about the foregoing."
The direct request ip of/for a,n e:x pa,rte contact from Judge
Simspon.

Such. overture is not simply that of an innocent

nor proper request.

It violates the n.1ies of professioanl

and judicial conduct that an attorney and judge in a particula
case cannot have personal ex parte contact and requests for
Such is highly improper, urlethical

more follow upnof the same.
per se.

Complaint of Judicial Misconduct (9th

F.3d 1179, 1187, 9w1sey v. I.A.C.

Cir. 2005) 425

(2005) 141 Idaho 125, 132-38

No reply was received by Appellant with a copy or any
copy or responding letter to Mr. Smith to stop nis unethical
ex parte contacts requests.
In such letter is revealled a personal relationship that
does not adhere to judicial rules or principles of ex parte con27

" .:.

i)1) 57

contacts

that are precluded from personal requests

of a clerical nature which impact the objectivity and
impartiality required

of Judge Simpson.

A question is brought up which cannot be answered
by the secretive and silent procedure followed by Judge
Simpson re his taking whatever judicial notice that he
did, relied upon and based his ORDER and SECOND AMENDED
JUDGMENT of Oct. 29, 2010.
judicial notice, Judge

Such unknown and how complete

S~mpson

did not declare specifically

in advance to Appellant, did not provide him copies or an
transcript on the record of

as required, nor afforded

Appel~

lant the protections of I.R.E. Rule 20l(b) (c) and (d) nor given
any opportunity to be heard per (f).
If such lack of due process, procedurally and substantively produces VOID or VOIDNESS in Judge Simpson's order and
Second Amended Judgment, the following statement he inserted
in said ORDER, par. 12, page 9, RCT: 18 :

11

Nothing in the

record show that McLean either sought or was granted a
sal of tile

1-3~05

rever~

Order which dismissed McLean from the Lawsuit."

McLean was dead by such time being deceased for over a year and
almost two (2) months with no personal representative)
C.

THE FOREGOING ANALYZE AND AUTHORITIES RESULT ON
REMAND THAT JUDGE SIMPSON'S ORDER & SECOND AMENDED
JUDGMENT ARE VOID AB INITIO

The same analysis under part

A.

and

B. incorporated

herein and more than result and establish the conclusion
supra, under this Part C.
28
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D.

THE ORDER AND SECOND JUDGMENT OF -'OCT 2 9 ,
2010 ARE BARREb:::BYccTHE DOCTJRTN.E S OF JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL, QUASI ESTOPPEL, RES JUDICATA,
COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL OR CLAIM PRECLUSION

All foregoing analysis per PARTS A thrbugh

C

are incorporated herein as though set forth in full
Two cases already cited further support the foresaid
conclusion:

1) Storey

Canst~~

Inc, v. Hanks 224 P.3d 468, 477

re claim preclusion is brought about by the finality of
Dawson's verified complaint bE1ing dismi;:;sed with prejudice/
any claims and every matter which might and should have been
litigated by reason of said dismissed verified complaint results in all claim preclusiveness as to such included or
related claims that could have been pursue with supporting
evidece.

Such evidence was not presented and is now barred

further by res judicata and as a matter of law judicial estoppel, the latter to stop

any repetitious regurgitation by

DAWSON in any further attacks or motions to reopen the JOINT
CASE MEMORANDUM, et., and QUiETING TITLE JUDGMENT, NUNC PRO
TUNC issued by Judge Shirdling, September 11, 2007.
. Churnow

Griffiths

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

2009 Opn 124, applying

2) Coombs

Dona~dson

v. ·

Henry, 63 Idaho 467, 473, that Judge Simpson had no jurisdiction nor authority regardless of what this Court on remand directed him to do, or so he thought he was to do,

becuase he could

not reopen thE record nor redo whatever judicial notice and
admission thereform, Judge Shindirling had accepted and inserted
in his JOINT CAESE MEMORANDUM and ORDER9, etc. Judge Simpson
neither had authority nor jurisdiction to attempt to correct what
he believed were judicial errors guieting title to Zamora parcel.

The foregoing

and incorporated authorities and

arguments, supra, Parts A and C require the complete
unaltered 1 reinstatement and

binding effects of the JOINT

CASES MEMORANDUM and ORDERS, along with the QBIETTNG TITLE
JUDGMENT SOLELY IN JOHN N. BACH'· s favor with Permanent
Injunction, being

reinstated, of September 11, 2007 Nunc

Pro Tunc.
E.

THE TRIAL COURT UPON REMAND FAILED AND ERRORED
GREATLY IN ATTEMPTING TO CONSTRUCT DUE DISCRETION WHICH IT DID NOT HAVE NOR PROPERLY EXERCISED:
I'M GRANTING DAWSON'S RULE 60(p) (6) MOTION AND
VIA TAKING UNDESIGNATED FACTS,. JUDICIAL NOTICE.

The foregoing analys±s and arguments per parts A.
through D are referred to and incorporated herein as though
particular~

set forth in each and every
. Judge Simpson ''s

ORDER GRANTING DAW$0N' $ Iii(') (b} (6)

he misstates and misapplies what specific facts and evidence
must be not demonstrated but include in es·tabl.;i:shing a unique
and compelling unequivocal circumstances justifying relief.
At his page 12 of said
l

·'

1.

n~DER
'

(RCT: 221 he cites Firat" Security

I

Bank of Idaho v.'Stauffer ,

112~

Idah.o 133 (Ct.App. 1986). pecause

the district court amended its judgment wtthout a hearing. But
the facts and issues therein are far distance and none

compar~

able to the issues raised by Judge Shindirling'·s wording of
the JOINT CASES MEMORANDUM and ORDERS plus the QUIETING TITLE
JUDGMENT, etc.,of Sept 11, 2007 Nunc Pro Tunc.
Without any such factual analysis of facts, issues and
evidence involved, Judge Simpson leaps to Idaho Supreme Court
case Berg v. Kendall, 147 at 579,. 212
3ol

P~3

O_OF\;.

at 1009 re reversal

dismissal

of a minor '·s personal injury action by the

ineptitude of her guardian, that the representative
of a minor lacking capacity to sue, "competely fails to
prosecute a meritorious claim that results in the claim
being dismissed with prejudice't·, granting relief under
Ru 1 e 6 0 (b) ( 6 ) .
The facts

~nd

probable issues, along with the

existence of a meritorious claim in Berg are clearly
and immediate worlds apart and more than distinguishable
from the facts and issues/evidence resvlved by Judge
Shindirling.

Jst a few facts/issues to note in dist.inctions

and without correlation herein; Dawson and McLean were not
minors. They hired -A·lva Harris who did file a verified complaint.
for Dawson and McLean, both experienced senior citizens and
adults, who

invested in developmental properties and Living

JOINT VENTURER SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS.

It was juust Alva Harris

who for some 6 and a half years dragged on said lawsuit,
··but both McLean and Dawson did nothing to have him bring it
to fruition and resolution, wnich would h.ave been via a court
nonjury issues
involved.

via final resolution of partition of the realty

The rest of the

clearly distinguishable facts

been set forth in A and B, incorpoated

hav

herei~.

It wasn't just Alva Harris that was misfeasant and mal7
feasant, it was also Dawson, who even after said Quiet Title
judgment issued in John Bach's favor, who never filed an affidavit or presented any relevant· evidentiary showing to excuse
under the other subparts of Rule 60(b} (1) through 4, why not
31
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a motion for reconsideration per Rille'. 11
filed.

(a)_

(2)_ (p). wasn '·t

What parts of the evidence herein and the issues

resolved per Judge Shindirling 6n Sept. 11, 2007 Nunc Pro
~unc

are duplicative of any of the

s~lient

issues in Berg.P

Are arenlt even close , nor did Judge Simpson in his said
ORDER even attempt to make such identical facts, issues and
procedural points

in his said order.

(See RCT:

22~25.

The

assertions Judge Simpson attempts to use as somehow a trump
card is nonexistent, irrevlevant and against the public
policy decisions of Esser Electric;, supra,. re the establishment
of over 100 year precerltint, Pthat a party is not entitled to
relief from a judgment on the ground (it) was entered due to
the

nso~ligence

of unskillfulness of the party •·s attorney."

Whether such negligence of unskillfulness be misfeasance,
malfeasance or intentional deception, some criminal act or
blaCkmail-:·-' extortion of his clients.
BERG's biggest and sole issue was to somehow stay or
barred the running of the applicable statute of limitation
to be able to file a lawsuit via a competent attorney to
prosecute the minor's merimorius claim.
To determine whether a court abused its discretion
involves a three part test:

l) Whether the trial court

cor~

rectly perceived the issue as discretionary; 2) Whether the
trial court acted within the boundaries of its discretion
and consistent with the applicable legal standards; and 3)
Whether the trial court reach its determination through an
exercise of reason.
115 P. 3d 731, 736

Campbell v.Kildew
(2005)
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141 Idaho 640, 645,

However, Judge Simpson in failing to properly research and shepardize for the Esser Electric and U .18· .Suprme
Court case, United Student Aid Funds v. Espinoza, and the other
cases cited, supra, page 19,
cretion to abuse herein;

would not have utilized any d±s-

he did not have any discretion whether

to apply the principles of said above cases, as such was mandated
by the very holdings of said Esser Electric and Espmnoza casesEspinoga specifically held that a litigatn cannot sleep on his
appeal rights and utilize 60(b) (4) (5) and (6} in

lieu of a

timely perfected appeal.
JJ:udge. Simpson •: ~ . ORDER DENYING TNTERVENOR.,-COMPLAINT JOHN
N. BACH's MOTION TO STRIKE, TO ALTER OR AMEND, OR FOR RELIEF PB0M
FINAL JUDGMENT (see copy of said Order in Attachment hereto. E1age
5-6 contains two very inaccurate statements of the law which
he seeks to impose contrary to the above cited Esser Electric
and Espinoza cases.

He is in error when he states, "The Second

Amended Judgment is neither again the law nor in conflict with the
great weight of evidence as

the relief granted tracks the very

relief upon which Bach based his Complaint ih::Intervenion" and
that "Rule 60(b)" . . provides a means for an aggrieved party to
obtain relief from a "final judgment, order or proceeding'' directly
form the trial court without resorting to an appeal. These:' arerJnot
accurate and true

correct perception of the issue as being dis-

cretinaly nor acting applying said inaccurate conclusions within
the boundaries of a coutt•s discretion
cretion, which it did not.

her~in

if it had such dis-

Finally even if there existed such
33

. discretion the court did not·· q:J~ilize . it thDough any exercise
of reason, but revealled a predetermined and biased, partical
and unopened mindsetL

Judge

Simpson, besides violating Appel-

lant's rights of due process, abusing h±s authority and

po~±tion

to not follow the Esser Electric case, further created both legal
erros and

perfunctorily undermines his entire analysis by his

conclusion, Attachment page 6: Furbhermore, Rule 60(b) (6)
is the catahall for the rule, was not intended to allow
a court to reconsider the legal bais for its original decision."
citing First Bank.& Trust of Idaho v. Parker Bros, 112 Idaho at
32. Such cited case is now controlled and overruled if not invalidated by Esser Electric and the Espinosa cases, supra.
JUDGE SIMPSON ABUSED NOT JUST A NON EXISTENT AND INACCURATELY
INSERTED DUE DIS(?RETION

ST:PIRDARD INTENTIONALLY MISAPPLIED THE

LEGAL PRINCIPLES AND LAW HOLDINGS OF ESEER ELECTRIC AND ESPINOZA.
A last point ne Judge Simpson•s repeated reliance on what
Appellant's First

Verified-Compl~int

in-Teton CV

02~208

and his

Complaint in Interv,ention averred that Dawson and McLean, who
non exitent estate and non existent representative dismissed
themsel~es

with prejudice from=mhis Appeal,

had originally an un-

divided one quarter interest in the JOint Venture Agreement,

In

paragraph 21 of such Fir:st Amended complaint, 02-208 he requested
he be awarded

mo~e;

in view of both

Daweon~s

and McLean's default

and the effect and required application of IRPC, Rule 13(at

the

trial court acted without jurisdiction or authority to ordered
such one quarter:; interests to Dawson and McLean.

The Intervention

complaint herein as amended, expanded and relief granted per the
Idaho Racketeering Act, all error if any of which was invited by
Alva Harris mslfeasance in not op
?A

·

0Q($~ch

summapyjudgment .

F.

TRIAL COURT ERRORED IN DENY+NG A.LL T:UR.E.E
(3) APPELANT'S MTIONS SET FOR/NOTICE FOR
HEARING DECEMBER 17, 2010.

Appell~nt

refers to all the issues, analysis and argu7

ment presented in A through E supra and incorporates the same
herein as though set forth in full.
All of said incorporated parts A

t~rough

E, reveal and

Appellant contends more than sufficiently establishes the misapplication, miscitation, and misunderstanding of the issues,
legal authorities and cases cited which required as a matter
of law, especially p:er the violations of jurisdiction, due proc::
cess rights denial and the prejudging and

bi~ed

mindset and

ulterior motive of Judge Simpson ''s ruling, t.Order and Second Amen,-,
ded Judgment, as being greatly in exces-s of and beyond his auth,..
ori ty and judicial powers/process •. Last-no attorneys fees

are-;justified

as awarded DAWSON and MCLEAN.per Rule 11; appellant cited applicable
and material case authorities wh~ch Judge Simpson voided-ignored.
CONCLUSION:

f0pon the limited record a:Llowed py th.is Court,

the cited case law prec( @dents and issues· analyzed and arguments
p:tesenteq, Appellant respectfully requests that this Court:
1.

Reverse the district court~s Oct. 29, 2010 ORDER
and SECOND AMENDED JUDGMENT in its entirety

2.

Reinstate, by granting this Appeal in full, and
t:Ji:mledia tely reaff,i rm the JOINT C1>:S.ES MEMORANDUM AND
ORDER and JUDGE SHINDIR LING's QUIETING TITLE JUDGMENT
with All Provisions of the Permanent Injunction, all
filed Sept 11, 2007 Nunc Pro Tunc.

3.

GRANT IN FULL AND EACB MOTION of the THREE MOTIONS
AND ORDERS SOUGHT, REVERSING THE ORDER DENYING THEM
OF JANUARY 27, 2011.

4.

Reverse the district court~s decision granting Dawson's
and McLean's Rule ll Award of any attorneys fees.

5.

Costs and attorneys fees expenses to Appellant
per I.e. 12-121, etc.
DATED: April 4, 2011
. JOHN N. BACH PRO SE Appellant
~Awarding
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVJCE BY MAIL
I ·hereby'rcertify that i

served two (2) copies of

the foregoing document this date,r;Apriln4, 2010, via U.S. Mail,
withthe necessary postage affixed thereto, to:
MARVIN M. SMlTR, SIIIliTH & BANKS, PLLC
591 Park Ave., Ste 202
Idaho Ealls, ID 83402
Attorney for Respondents

36

\

008f.

A

T

T

A

E

N

T

OOG~i

lt

n

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TETON
JACK LEE MCLEAN, Trustee, and WAYNE
DAWSON, Trustee,

)
)
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)
vs.
)
)
CHEYOVICH FAMILY TRUST and VASA N. )
BACH_FAMIL Y TRUST,
)
)

Case No. CV-2001-265

ORDER DENYING INTERVENERCOMPLAINANT JOHN N. BACH'S
MOTION TO STRIKE, TO ALTER OR
AMEND, OR FOR RELIEF FROM
FINAL JUDGMENT

)
JOHN N. BACH, individually and dba
)
TARGHEE POWDER EMPORIUM, LTD.,
)
)
Intervener-Complainant,
)
)
vs.
)
)
JACK LEE MCLEAN, Trustee, WAYNE
)
DAWSON, Trustee, DONNA DAWSON,
)
ALVA A. HARRIS, individually and dba
)
SCONA, INC., KATHERINE M. MILLER, and )
DOES 1-30, inclusive,
)
)
_____T=hiT="=d~-P~illTI~~D~e=£=en=d=an=t=s·~----------)

BEFORE THIS COURT is the Motion by Intervener/Complainant John N. Bach
(hereinafter "Bach") to strike the Second Amended Judgment, entered on October 29, 2010, for a

ORDER DENYING INTERVENER-COMPLAINANT JOHN N. BACH'S MOTION TO STRIKE, TO ALTER OR AMEND, OR FOR
RELIEF FROM FINAL JUIDGMENT
1

..

-

Co t·~

I':

.)

new hearing, or for relief from a final judgment. 1 In essence, Bach seeks reconsideration of this
Court's Order Granting Plaintiff Wayne Dawson's Motion for Relief from Judgment?
Plaintiffs/Third-Party Defendants Jack Lee McLean, Trustee, and Wayne Dawson, Trustee
(hereinafter "McLean & Dawson") objected to Bach's Motion and requested attorney fees under
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure ll(a)(l) (hereinafter "Rule 11"). 3 Bach then moved to strike
McLean & Dawson's Objection, for the same reasons argued in his Motion. 4 McLean & Dawson
moved, pursuant to Rule 11, to strike Bach's Reply and Motion to Strike. 5

Intervenor-Complainant John N. Bach's Motions re: 1.) to Strike, Quash & Vacate Court's Order Granting
Plaintiff Wayne Dawson's for Relief [sic] from Judgment & Second Amended Judgment, LR.C.P., Rules 12(f),
l2(g)(2)(4), 19, et seq; 2) Order Granting New Hearing Before Unbiased, Qualified Judge, I.R.C.P. Rules
59(a)(1)(0rder & Second Amended Judgment Abuse of Discretion &/or Prevented from Having any Fair Hearing) &
59(a)(6) (Insufficiency of Evidence, error in law/against the law) & Rule 59(e); 3) Order per I.R.C.P., Rule
60(b)(l)(2)(3)(4)(5) & (6), McLean v. Cheyovich Family Trust, Teton County case no. CV 2001-265 (filed
November 15, 2010) (hereinafter "Bach's Motion").
2
Order Granting Plaintiff Wayne Dawson's Motion for Relief from Judgment, McLean v. Cheyovich Family Trust,
Teton County case no. CV 2001-265 (filed October 29, 2010) (hereinafter the "60(b) Order").
3
McLean's and Dawson's Objection to Bach's November 15, 2010 Motions and Motion for Attorney's Fees,
McLean v. Cheyovich Family Trust, Teton County case no. CV 2001-265 (filed November 24, 2010) (hereinafter
"McLean & Dawson's Objection").
4
Intervenor-Complainant John N. Bach's Motion to Strike/Opposition Response to McLean's & Dawson's
Objection to Bach's Nov. 15, 2010 Motions and for Attorneys Fees' and Further Reply Memorandum by John N.
Bach in Support of his Nov. 15, 2010 Motions, McLean v. Cheyovich Family Trust, Teton County case no. CV
2001-265 (filed December 7, 2010) (hereinafter "Bach's Reply and Motion to Strike").
5
McLean's and Dawson's Motion to Strike Bach's Reply Memorandum Dated December 7, 2010 and Response to
Bach's Motion to Strike, McLean v. Cheyovich Family Trust, Teton County case no. CV 2001-265 (filed December
13, 2010) (hereinafter "McLean & Dawson's Motion to Strike").
ORDER DENYING INTERVENER-COMPLAINANT JOHN N. BACH'S MOTION TO STRIKE, TO ALTER OR AMEND, OR FOR
RELIEF FROM FINAL JUIDGMENT
2
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This Court shall not reconsider the 60(b) Order. The findings therein are based largely
upon Bach's own pleadings. Furthermore, Bach offers no authority for the applicability of Idaho
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) (regarding motions to strike another party's pleading) to a
judgment.
Neither does Bach explain the applicability of Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a)(l)
allowing a new trial to be granted on the grounds of irregularity in the proceedings or abuse of
discretion which prevented a fair trial. The Idaho Supreme Court issued its decision on June 4,
2010, and remitted the case back to this Court on July 30, 2010. This Court issued its Status
Order on September 1, 2010, wherein the parties were informed:
Based upon the Idaho Supreme Court's ruling, this Court has requested the
transcript of the oral arguments made before the Court on February 14, 2008
regarding the Plaintiff's Rule 60(b)(6) motion. Upon receipt of the transcript the
matter will be deemed submitted for purposes of this Court issuing its ruling upon
said motion. The Court will review the previous and relevant pleadings and
argument made in support and opposition to said motion.
No additional briefing may be submitted without a written order of the
Court.

6

On September 16, 2010, this Court issued a Second Status Order, and informed the
parties that the transcript of the February 14, 2008 hearing had been received and that the matter
was submitted for purposes of this Court's consideration. 7

This Court reiterated that "No

6

Status Order, McLean v. Cheyovich Family Trust, Teton County case no. CV 2001-265 (filed September 2, 2010)
(hereinafter the "First Status Order").
7
Second Status Order, McLean v. Cheyovich Family Trust, Teton County case no. CV 2001-265 (filed September
16, 2010) (hereinafter the "Second Status Order").
ORDER DENYING INTERVENER-COMPLAINANT JOHN N. BACH'S MOTION TO STRIKE, TO ALTER OR AMEND, OR FOR
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additional briefing may be submitted without a written order of the Court." 8 The 60(b) Order
issued on October 29, 2010.
Bach never objected to the Court's First or Second Status Order or moved for additional
briefing.

Furthermore, he presented arguments against Dawson's motion for relief from

judgment at the hearing held on February 14, 2008, which argument was reduced to a transcript
and analyzed by this Court. For these reasons, Bach has not shown harm, nor has he overcome
the inference of waiver created by his failure to object, when he had the opportunity, to the
Court's communicated procedure. 9
Bach's arguments under Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 59(a)(6), 59(e), and 60(b)(l-6)
reiterate the same positions Bach took in his pleadings and at oral argument. With regard to Bach's
passing reference to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a) and (e), a new trial may be granted where
the evidence is insufficient to justify the verdict, 10 where the verdict "is against the law" 11 or if, after
the court makes its own assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence,
the court determines that the verdict is not in accord with the clear weight of the evidence. 12 A
motion to alter or amend judgment, made pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) ("Rule
59( e)), provides a mechanism to correct legal and factual errors occurring in the proceedings_B

8

Id.
See, e.g.: Beale v. Speck, 127 Idaho 521, 535, 903 P.2d 110, 124 (Ct. App. 1995).
10
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a)(6).
11
Tiegs v. Robertson, 149 Idaho 482, 236 P.3d 474, 477 (Ct. App. 2010).
12
Johannsen v. Utterbeck, 146 Idaho 423, 430, 196 P.3d 341, 348 (2008) [citing: Hudelson v. Delta International
Machinery Corporation, 142 Idaho 244, 248, 127 P.3d 147, 151 (2005)].
13
Slaathaug v. Allstate Insurance Company, 132 Idaho 705, 707, 979 P.2d 107, 109 (1999).

9

ORDER DENYING INTERVENER-COMPLAINANT JOHN N. BACH'S MOTION TO STRIKE, TO ALTER OR AMEND, OR FOR
RELIEF FROM FINAL JUIDGMENT
4

A trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion for new trial under Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 59(a), or to alter or amend a judgment under Rule 59(e), is discretionary. 14 A court's
discretion is examined under a three part test: (1) whether the court correctly perceived the issues as
one of discretion; (2) whether the court acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and
consistently with the legal standards applicable; and (3) whether the court reached its decision by an
exercise ofreason.

15

In this case, the evidence upon which the 60(b) Order is based comes from Bach's pleadings
and the related lawsuits which Bach repeatedly referred to in his pleadings and in the orders he drew
for Judge Shindurling's signature. The evidence is sufficient to justify the 60(b) Order and the

Second Amended Judgment. 16 The Second Amended Judgment is neither against the law nor in
conflict with the great weight of the evidence, as the relief granted tracks the very relief upon which
Bach based his Complaint in Intervention. 17 Therefore, neither a new trial, nor alteration of the

Second Amended Judgment, is warranted.
Finally, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) (hereinafter "Rule 60(b)") provides a means
for an aggrieved party to obtain relief from a "final judgment, order, or proceeding" directly from
the trial court without resorting to an appeal. 18 The rule requires a showing of good cause and

14

Tiegs v. Robertson, 149 Idaho at
, 236 P.3d at 477.
Sun Valley Shopping Center v. Idaho Power Company, 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991).
16
See: Second Amended Judgment, M~cLean v. Cheyovich Family Trust, Teton County case no. CV 2001-265 (filed
October 29, 2010) (hereinafter the "Second Amended Judgment").
17
60(b) Order, at p. 13.
18
Matter of Estate of Bagley, 117 Idaho 1091, 1093, 793 P.2d 1263, 1265 (Ct. App. 1990) [citing: First Security
Bank ofidaho, N.A. v. Stauffer, 112ldaho 133, 730 P.2d 1053 (Ct. App. 1986)].
15

ORDER DENYING INTERVENER-COMPLAINANT JOHN N. BACH'S MOTION TO STRIKE, TO ALTER OR AMEND, OR FOR
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specifies particular grounds upon which relief may be granted. 19 These grounds include mistake,
excusable neglect, newly discovered evidence, fraud, misconduct, or satisfaction of the
judgment. 20 In addition to listing specific grounds upon which relief can be granted, the rule
contains a clause allowing reconsideration for "any other reason justifying relief from the
operation of the law."21 Like decisions under Rule 59(a) and (e), consideration of a motion under
rule 60(b) involves an exercise of discretion. 22
Bach's Motion does not reach any of the grounds for relief listed in Rule 60(b)( 1), (2),
(3), (4), or (5). Furthermore, Rule 60(b)(6), which is the catchall for the rule, was not intended to
allow a court to reconsider the legal basis for its original decision. 23

Furthermore, a Rule

60(b)(6) must present 'unique and compelling circumstances' justifying relief. 24
Bach's Motion is a reiteration of previous arguments, and, to the extent he criticizes the

60(b) Order and the Second Amended Judgment, he does not present unique or compelling
circumstances for granting relief under Rule 60(b)(6).

19

Matter of Estate of Bagley, 117 Idaho at 1093, 793 P.2d at 1265 [citing: Lowe v. Lym, 103 Idaho 259, 646 P.2d
1030 (Ct. App. 1982)].
20
Matter of Estate of Bagley, 117 Idaho at 1093, 793 P.2d at 1265 [citing: First State Bank & Trust of Idaho v.
Parker Brothers, Inc., 112 Idaho 30, 730 P.2d 950 (1986)].
21
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6).
22
Wallerv. State Department ofHealth and Welfare, 146 Idaho 234,237, 192 P.3d 1058, 1061 (2008).
23
First Bank & Trust ofIdaho v. Parker Brothers, Inc., 112 Idaho at 32, 730 P.2d at 952.
24
Villa Highlands, LLC v. Western Community Insurance Company, 148 Idaho 598, 604, 226 P.3d 540, 546 (2010)
[citing: Miller v. Haller, 129 Idaho 345, 349, 924 P.2d 607, 611 (1996)].
ORDER DENYING INTERVENER-COMPLAINANT JOHN N. BACH'S MOTION TO STRIKE, TO ALTER OR AMEND, OR FOR
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McLean and Dawson's request for attorney fees is premised upon Rule 11 .zs Rule 11
requires that the signature of an attorney on any pleading or motion:
... constitutes a certificate that the attorney or party has read the pleading, motion
or other paper; that to the best of the signer's knowledge, information, and belief
after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing
law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of
existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to
harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.

***
If a pleading, motion or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court,
upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed
it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an
order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses
incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a
reasonable attorney's fee. 26
Rule ll(a) requires that the pleadings be: (1) well grounded in fact, (2) warranted by
existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law,
and (3) not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or cause unnecessary delay or
needless increases in the costs of litigation. 27
A decision whether to award sanctions under Rule ll(a) is discretionary.Z 8 Therefore,
this Court must correctly perceive the issue as discretionary, act within the outer boundaries of its
discretion consistent with consistently with the legal standards applicable to the consideration of
an award, and through an exercise ofreason. 29

25

McLean & Dawson's Objection, at p. 5.
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 1l(a)(l) (relevant portions).
27
Riggins v. Smith, 126 Idaho 1017, 1021, 895 P.2d 1210, 1214 (1995).
28
Gubler by and through Gubler v. Brydon, 125 Idaho 112, 114, 867 P.2d 986, 988 (1994).
29
Gubler, 125 Idaho at 114, 867 P.2d at 988 [citing: Sun Valley Shopping Center, Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119
Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991)].
26

ORDER DENYING INTERVENER-COMPLAINANT JOHN N. BACH'S MOTION TO STRIKE, TO ALTER OR AMEND, OR FOR
RELIEF FROM FINAL JUIDGMENT
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Bach's Motion must be evaluated for reasonableness under the circumstances? 0 In other
words, Rule ll(a) sanctions shall be assessed if the pleading is frivolous, legally unreasonable, or
without factual foundation. 31

The appropriate focus is whether Bach conducted a "proper

investigation upon reasonable inquiry" into the facts and legal theories of the case. 32
The intent of Rule ll(a) is to grant to courts the power to impose sanctions for discrete
pleading abuses or other types of litigative misconduct. 33 It is considered "a management tool for
the district court to weed out, punish, and deter specific frivolous and other misguided filings"
and should be exercised narrowly. 34
McLean and Dawson contend that Bach's Motion is "not well grounded in fact and not
warranted either by existing law or a good faith argument."35 Since the Rule 60(b) Order is
based upon Bach's own pleadings, as well as the judgment in Bach v. Miller, Teton County case
no. CV-2002-208, upon which Bach relied as controlling precedent, Bach's attack upon the Rule
60(b) Order is without reasonable basis in fact or law.

Marvin Smith, counsel for the McLean and Dawson, shall file an affidavit, within
fourteen (14) days of the date of this opinion, detailing those hours spent preparing his responses
to Bach's Motion, and Bach's Reply and Motion to Strike. The issue will be submitted seven (7)
days thereafter, in which interim Bach may file any written objections.

30

Durrant v. Christensen; 117 Idaho 70, 74, 785 P.2d 634, 638 (1990).
Id.
Riggins v. Smith, 126 Idaho at 1021, 895 P.2d at 1214 [citing: Hanfv. Syringa Realty, Inc., 120 Idaho 364, 369,
816 P.2d320, 325 (1991)].
33
Campbellv. Kildew, 141 Idaho 640,650, 115 P.3d 731,741 (2005).
34
Id., [citing: Curzon v. Hansen, 137 Idaho 420, 422, 49 P.3d 1270, 1273 (Ct. App. 2002)].
35
McLean & Dawson's Objection, at p. 5.

3t
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Therefore, in consideration of the above premises, Bach's Motion is hereby denied. His
Motion to Strike is likewise denied. McLean and Dawson's Motion to Strike is hereby denied
as moot. McLean and Dawson's request for attorney fees pursuant to Rule 11 shall be granted.
Counsel for McLean and Dawson shall file an attorney fee affidavit, as outlined above, within
fourteen (14) days of the date of this Order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

·nt

DATED this

J{

day of January 2011.
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TETON CO., ID
DISTRiCT COURT

Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TETON

Case No. CV-2010-329
THOMAS H. ULRlCH and MARY M. ULRICH)
husband and wife,
PLAINTIFFS' PRE-TRIAL
MEMORANDUM

Plaintiffs,
v.

JOHN N. BACH and all parties claiming to hold title
to the hereinafter described property pursuant to that
certain warranty deed recorded in the records of Teton
County, Idaho on June 14, 1994, as Instrument No.
116461 and all unknown claimants, heirs and devisees
of the following property:

A portion of the South Yz South Yz Section 6,
Township 5 North, Range 46 East, Boise Meridian,
Teton County, Idaho, being further described as: From
the SW corner of said Section 6, South 89 50'12 11 East,
2630.05 feet to the true point of begiMing; thence
North 00 07'58" East, 813.70 feet to a point; thence
North 01 37'48" East, 505.18 feet to a point; thence
South 89 58'47" East) 1319.28 feet to a point; thence
South 00 07'36" West, 1321.69 feet to a point on the
Southern Section Line; thence North 89 51'01" West,
1320.49 feet along the Southern Section Line to the
South ':4 Corner of said Section 6, a point; thence
North 89 50'13" West, 12.13 feet along the Southern
Section Line to the point of beginning. SUBJECT TO
a 60 foot road and utility easement along the Western
1-
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Property lines.
AND SUBJECT TO a 60 foot road and utility
easement along the Southern Property Lines.
Defendants.
COME NOW Plaintiffs Thomas H. Ulrich and Mary M. Ulrich, husband and wife,
(hereinafter "Ulrich"), by and through their counsel of record, Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo,
P.L.L.C.} and submit this Pre-Trial Memorandum pursuant to the COUlt Trial Scheduling Order
entered in this Matter.

I. EXHIBITS
A.

Deed transferring title to the Ulrich Property, as defined in the Verified Complaint
(hereinafter the ''Ulrich Property''), from Philip J. Sarasqueta and Marilyn R. Sarasqueta,
husband and wife, and Louisa S. Sarasqueta, Trustee of the Sarasqueta Living Trust, dated
October 30, 1990, to Thomas H. Ulrich and Mary M. Ulrich, husband and wife.

B.

Deed transferring title to an additional30 acres of property, adjacent and contiguous to the
Ulrich Property (hereinafter "IRA Property"), from Philip J. Sarasqueta and Marilyn R.
Sarasqueta, husband and wife, and Louisa S. Sarasqueta, Trustee of the Sarasqueta Living
Trust, dated October 30, 1990, to the Bank of Commerce IRA Fund #8768 for the Benefit
of Thomas H. Ulrich IRA.

C.

Title insurance policy for the Ulrich Property.

D.

Title insurance policy for the IRA Property.

E.

Deed transferring title to the Ulrich Property from Teton West Corporation to Philip J.
Sarasqueta and Marilyn R. Sarasqueta, husband and wife, and Joaquin F. Sarasqueta and
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Louisa Sarasqueta, husband and wife (predecessors in interest to the Sarasqueta Living
Trust, dated October 30, 1990).
F_

Deed transferring title to the Bach Property, as defmed in the Verified Complaint (hereinafter
the "Bach Property"), from Teton West Corporation to, among others, Defendant John N.
Bach's predecessor in interest. Targhee Powder Emporium, Ltd.

G.

Copy of the final plat for Grouse Landing PUD approved by the Teton County
Commissioners
Ulrich and Defendant John N. Bach (hereinafter "Bach") have not stipulated to the admission

of any of the above exhibits because Bach is appearing prose_ At this time, Ulrich is unaware of any
objections or any basis for any objections Bach may have to the above exhibits.

II. EVIDENCE IN LIEU OF LIVE TESTIMONY
No depositions have been conducted in this matter. Additionally, Ulrich does not plan to use
any admissions, interrogatory responses or other discovery responses in lieu oflive testimony at the
trial of this matter.

III. DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE SUPPORTING DAMAGES
Ulrich has not requested damages as part ofthe relief requested in this matter. Rather, Ulrich
has requested that this Collit quiet title of the Ulrich Property Easement in Ulrich, or, alternatively,
issue a declaratory judgment regarding Ulrich's right, title and interest in the Ulrich Property
Easement. Further. Ulrich has requested a permanent injunction prohibiting Bach from interfering
with Ulrich's right, title and interest in the Ulrich Property Easement. Consequently, because Ulrich
has not asked for damages, Ulrich will not submit any documentary evidence on that issue.
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IV. WITNESSES PLAINTIFF MAY CALL TO TESTIFY AT TlUAL
A.

EXPERT WITNESSES

1.

Mike Quinn, c/o Nelson Engineering, 30 North First East, Driggs, Idaho 83422. Mr. Quinn

is the lead engineet for Nelson Engineering, which conducted the survey of the Ulrich
Property Easement, as defined in the Complaint in tlris matter. Mr. Quinn will provide
testimony regarding the existence and location of the Ulrich Property Easement as described
in the Ulrich Property Deed and Bach Property Deed. Mr. Quinn's testimony will be based
upon his personal observations ofthe Ulrich Prope1ty Easement, the survey of the Ulrich
Property Easement, and his review of Teton County land records..
2.

Grant Moedl, or, alternatively. if Grant Moedl is not available, Chris Moss, c/o First
American Title Insurance Company, 81 North Main Street, Driggs, Idaho 83422. Mr. Moedl
is the manager of First American Title Insurance Company located in Driggs, Idaho. Mr.

Moss is an officer in the title depmtment of First American Title Insurance Company located
in Driggs, Idaho. Mr. Moedl or Mr. Moss will testify regarding the chain of title of the
Ulrich Property, the Ulrich Property Easement and the lack of any other legal access to the
Ulrich Property. Mr. Moedl or Mr. Moss will also provide testimony regarding the chain of
title of the Bach Property and the existence of the Ulrich Prope1ty Easement in both the
Ulrich Property Deed and the Bach Property Deed. Mr. Moedl or Mr. Moss will base their
testimony on their review of the Teton County land records.

B.

FACT WITNESSES

L

Thomas H. Ulrich, 281 W. Harvest Run, Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404. Mr. Ulrich will testify
as to all aspects of this matter.
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Mary M. Ulrich, 281 W. Harvest Run, Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404. Ms. Ulrich will testify as
to her knowledge regarding the routes Ulrich used to access the Ulrich Property.
Ulrich is not aware of any impeachment or rebuttal witnesses at this point in time, but

reserves the right to present any rebuttal or impeachment witnesses not listed here if necessary during
the trial, and to call any witnesses identified by Bach.

V. FACTUAL SUMMARY OF CASE
In December 1996, Ulrich purchased an approximately forty acre parcel of property located
in Teton County, Idaho. At the time of purchase, the Ulrich Property was conveyed to Ulrich by
Warranty Deed from Philip J. Sarasqueta & Marilyn R. Sarasqueta, husband and wife, and Louisa

S. Sarasqueta, Trustee of the SarasquetaLiving Trust, dated October 30, 1990. 1 Such Warranty Deed
gave Ulrich fee simple title to the Ulrich Property. The Warranty Deed contains an express grant
of easement providing acces~ to the Ulrich Property as follows:
TOGETHER WITH a 60 foot road and utility easement being the 60
feet directly East of the following described lines: Beginning at a
point North 89°50'12" West, 12.13 feet from the South lf4 Cotner of
said Section 6; thence North 00°07'58" East 813.70 feet to a point;
thence North 01 °37'48n East, 505.18 feet to the SW property corner.
(the qUlrich Property Easement'). Access to the Ulrich Property was also guaranteed via a policy
of title insurance. The Ulrich Property Easement traverses the western boundary of
property allegedly owned pa1tially by Bach. Additionally, the Ulrich Property Easement is reserved

1

The Ulrich Prope1iy described herein contains appmximately lO acres. Ulrich bought the
remaining 30 acres through the Bank of Commerce IRA Fund #8768 for the Benefit of Thomas H. Ulrich
IRA. Pursuant to their deeds, the Ulrich Property and the IRA Property were required to be purchased
together. Both t11e Ulrich Property and the IRA Property contain a grant of easement which traverses the
western boundary of the Bach Property.
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in the Corporation Warranty Deed granting title to Bach's predecessors-in-interest as follows:
SUBJECT TO a 60 foot road and utility easement along the Western Property lines.
Throughout the time that Ulrich has owned the Property, Ulrich has never demonstrated any intent
to abandon the Ulrich Prope1iy Easement. Additionally, until late June, 2009, Bach permitted Ulrich
to access Ulrich's property by traversing the Bach Property, albeit not via the Ulrich Propetiy
Easement, but via altemative routes.
Ulrich recently decided to develop the Ulrich Property and improve the Ulrich Property
Easement by grading and paving the Ulrich Property Easement. On April24, 201 0, Plaintiff Thomas

H. Ulrich telephoned Bach to inform him that surveyors would be present on the Ulrich Property
Easement to survey the easement to prepare for the improvements. At such time, Bach repeatedly
insisted that Ulrich has no easement and threatened Plaintiff Thomas Ulrich that if surveyors entered
onto the easement that he would call the sheriffs office and charge the surveyors with trespass.
Such insistence and threats by Bach prompted the filing of this current suit to quiet title in the Ulrich
Property Easement in favor of Ulrich. On September 9, 2010, Ulrich filed a Motion for Preliminary
Injunction, requesting that this Court permit the survey of the Ulrich Property Easement and to
enjoin Bach from interfedng in arty way with such survey or removing any survey markers. On
October 29, 2010, this Court entered an Order granting Ulrich's Motion for Preliminary Injunction.
The survey of the Ulrich Property Easement was subsequently completed. Ulrich seeks to resolve
all remaining issues regarding Ulrich's rights and interest in the Ulrich Property Easement.

VII. SETTLEMENT DISCUSSIONS
Because Bach is appearing in this matter prose, the parties have not had a chance to attempt
settlement discussions.
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VHI. SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSES TO INTERROGATORIES
Bach did not serve any interrogatories on Ulrich. Consequently, thete is nothing upon which
Ulrich would base a statement that all answers or supplemental answers to interrogatories under Rule
33 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure reflect facts known to the date of this Memorandum.

IX. STATEMENT OF ALL CLAIMS
Ulrich has asserted the following claims which remain pending in this matter:
l.

Quiet title in the Ulrich Property Easement in favor of Ulrich;

2.

A declaratory judgment that Ulrich's right, title, claim and interest in the Ulrich Property
Easement is dominant and superior to any right, title, claim or interest held by Bach in the
Bach Property;

3.

A permanent injunction and/or restraining order against Bach's interference with the Ulrich
Property Easement; and

4.

Costs and attorneys fees against Bach incurred by Ulrich in prosecuting this action.

X. ADMISSIONS OR STIPULATIONS OF THE
PARTIES WHICH CAN BE AGREED UPON BY THE PARTIES
Because Bach is appearing in this matter pro se, the parties have not been able to confer
regal'ding any admissions or stipulations which can be agreed upon by the parties.

XI. AMENDMENTS TO THE PLEADINGS AND ANY
ISSUES OF LAW ABANDONED BY ANY OF THE PARTIES
Ulrich has not made any amendments to the pleadings or abandoned any issues of law.
Ulrich is further unaware of any amendments to the pleadings by Bach_ However, due to the nature
of Bach's drafting of his pleadings, it is unclear whether Bach has abandoned any issues of law
related to the claims made by Bach in this matter.
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XU. ISSUES OF FACT AND LAW WHICH REMAIN

TO BE LITIGATED AT TRIAL AND SUPPORTING LEGAL AUTHORITIES
l.

Whether Ulrich has right, title and interest in the Ulrich Property Easement through
an express easement.
''One who purchases land expressly subject to an easement or with notice, actual or

consnuctive, that is burdened with an existing easement, takes the land subject to the easement."

Akers v. D.L. White Const., Inc., 142ldaho 293,301, 127 P.3d 196> 204 (2005). (citing Checketts
v. Thompson, 65 Idaho 715,721, 152 P.2d 585, 587 (1944));

see also I.C. § 55-603. "An express

easement may be by way or reservation or exception., !d. (citing 7 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY,
THOMAS EDlTION § 60.03(a)(2)(I) (David A. Thomas ed., 1994).

"An express easement by

reservation reserves to the grantor some new right in the property being conveyed; an express
easement by exception operates by withholding title to a portion of the conveyed property." ld
''An express easement may be created by a written agreement between the owner of the

dominant estate and the owner of the servient estate. It may also be created by a deed from the
ownerofthe servient estate to the owner of the dominant estate." Tower Asset Sub Inc. v. Lawrence,

143 Idaho 710,714, 152 P.3d 581, 585 (2007). ''Where the owner of the dominant estate is selling
the property to be subjected to the servitude, an express easement may be created by reservation or
exception." Id., 143 Idaho at 714-15, 152 P.3d 585-86 (citing Akers v. D.L. White Const., Inc., 142
Idaho 293, 301, 127 P.3d 196,204 (2005)). "No particular forms or words of art are necessary (to
create an express easement]; it is necessary only that the parties make clear their intention to
establish a servitude." See Combe v. Weeks, 115 Idaho 433, 436, 767 P.2d 276, 279 (Ct. App.

19 89)(disapproved of on other grounds, Rodriguez v. Oakley Valley Stone, Inc., 120 Idaho 370, 37 8>

816 P.2d 326, 334 (1991)).
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Teton West Corporation originally owned both the Ulrich Prope1ty and the Bach Property.
When Teton West Corporation divided up the original property into what is now the Ulrich Property
and the Bach Property, it expressly reserved the Ulrich Property Easement in the deed to the Bach
Property and granted the Ulrich Property Easement in the deed to the Ulrich Property. Because the
Ulrich Property Easement is an express easement, Ulrich is entitled to a declaratory judgment
ordering that Ulrich has right, title and interest in the Ulrich Property Easement, and is entitled to
an order quieting right> title and interest in the Ulrich Property Easement in Ulrich's favor.
2.

Whether Ulrich has abandoned the Ulrich Property Easement.
Kolouch v. Kramer, 120 Idaho 65, 67,813 P.2d 876,878 (1991), is dispositive ofthe issues

of abandonment and adverse possession in this case. The facts of Kolouch are nearly identical to the
facts of the case at hand. In Kolauch, the Kolouchs owned a parcel of property. The deed to
Kolouchs granted them an access easement over property owned by Kramer. Id., 120 Idaho at 67,
813 P .2d at 878. When Kramer acquired the subject property, there was a utility pole, a board fence,
and some trees in the easement area. Id. Subsequently, Kramer planted six spruce trees down the
center of the easement, planted other trees within the easement, constructed a fence inside the
noitherly boundary of the easement, and a concrete irrigation diversion at the end of the easement.

!d. Kramer also placed several large boulders at the east end of the easement. !d. Years later,
Kolouch decided to develop the propetty and to pave an access road over the easement in order to
service the property. Id. In pursuit of that goal, Kolouchs filed a complaint for declaratory relief
requesting a declaration that they were the owners of the easement over the K.ramer property, and
further declaring that they were entitled to use the described easement for ingress and egress and for
whatever further relief as the court deemed proper. !d.
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of an easement by grant does not affect an

abandonment of the easement. Id As the Idaho Supreme Court noted in Kolouch,
[T]he present case involves an easement by written grant which has not been used by
the Kolouchs (owners ofthe easement) since its creation. It was not until sometime
around June of 1989 that the Kolouchs decided to use the easement by developing
a road thereon for comtnercial purposes. That desire prompted their filing of the
complaint for declaratory relief. Under the holding in Quinn v. Stone, supra> it is
clear that no abandonment has taken place, as mere non-use is insufficient to work
an abandonment.
!d. Likewise, in the current case> Ulrich has an easement by written grant which has not previously

been used by Ulrich. It was not until some years after Ulrich purchased the Ulrich Property that
Ulrich decided to use the easement by developing a road thereon for ingress to and egress from
Ulrich,s property. Prior to that time, Bach permitted Ulrich to access the Ulrich Property using
alternative routes over the Bach Property. The Ulrich's non-use of the easement during the interim
did not constitute an abandonment of the Ulrich Property Easement.
Further, "an abandonment of any right is dependent upon an intention to abandon and must
be evidenced by. a clear, unequivocal; and decisive act of the party." 0 'Brien v. Best, 68 Idaho 348,
3 57, 194 P .2d 608, 613 (1948). "(l]t requires very convincing and satisfactory proofs to support a
forfeiture by abandonment of a real property right." I d. "[T]he acts claimed to constitute the
abandonment of an easement must show the destruction thereof, or that its legitimate use has been
rendered impossible by the owner thereof, or some other unequivocal act showing intention to
permanently abandon and give up the easement." Id., 68 Idaho at 357-58, 194 P.2d at 613-614.
Ulrich has engaged in no such action. Consequently, pursuant to Kolouch and 0 'Brien, the Ulrich
Property Easement has not been abandoned.
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Whether Bach has adversely possessed the Ulrich Property Easement.
Bach has not adversely possessed the Ulrich Property Easement. "Where the defense to the

claim is adverse possession, the party asserting such defense must prove by clear and satisfactory
evidence that he or she has been in exclusive possession of the property for at least [20] years and
that the possession has been actual, open, visible, notorious, continuous, and hostile to the party
against whom the claim of adverse possession is made." Kolouch, 120 Idaho at 67-68, 813 P.2d at
878-79 (internal citations omitted). Since the owner of the servient estate owns the underlying fee,
and has the right to use his entire land for any purposes not inconsistent with the rights of the holder
of the dominant easement, the use by the servient estate must be truly inconsistent ld, 120 Idaho
at 68, 813 P.2d at 879 (internal citations omitted). In Kolouch, the Idaho Supreme Comt adopted
the holding in Castle Associates v. Schwartz, 407 N.Y.S.2d 717,63 A.D.2d 481 (1978), regarding
the rule which covers situations where, as in Kolouch and the case at hand, the owner of the
dominant estate had not had occasion to use the easement. The Idaho Supreme Court quoted Castle

Associates as follows:
[W]here an easement has been created but no occasion has arisen for its use, the
owner of the servient tenement may fence his land and such use will not be deemed
adverse to the existence of the easement until such time as (1) the need for the right
of way arises> (2) a demand is made by the owner of the dominant tenement that the
easement be opened and (3) the owner of the sewient tenement refuses to do so.

Kolouch, 120 Idaho at 68,813 P.2d at 879 (citing Castle Associates,407N.Y.S.2d at723, 63 A.D.2d
at 487). The Idaho Supreme Court further stated:
Applied here> we may paraphrase this rule to read that where the easement was
created, but no occasion has arisen for its use, the owner of the servient tenement
may plant trees, erect a fence, etc. and such use will not be deemed to be adverse (or
inconsistent> to use Shelton's term), until the need to use the easement arises, etc.
We think this rule makes sense in light of the well established rule that the owner of
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the servient estate is entitled to use his land, even though encumbered by an
easement, for any purpose not inconsistent with the purpose reserved in the easement.
Accordingly, Kramer's use of his property, which was subject to the easement has not
been advetse or inconsistent with the Kolouchs' rights prior to the time the
Kolouchs' need to use the easement arose, and the trial court's finding to that effect
was not clearly erroneous.

Kolouch, 120 Idaho at 68-69,813 P.2d at 879-80. Likewise, Bach's use ofhis propertJ, which was
subject to the Ulrich Property Easement, has not been adverse or inconsistent with the Ulrich's rights
because Ulrich has not previously had a need to use the Ulrich Property Easement. Therefore, Bach
has not adversely possessed the Ulrich Property Easement.

4.

Whether the proper remedy in this action is quiet title, declaratory judgment and
permanent injunction.
Bach has asserted that "if there is an adequate remedy at law, the equity action for quiet title

and declaratory judgment is unavailable to plaintiff." First, both a quiet title action and an action for
declaratory judgment are remedies at law. Idaho Code§ 6-401 specifically provides for an action
to quiet title. Idaho Code § 10-1201 specifically provides for an action for declaratory judgment.
Second, even assuming that quiet title and declaratory judgment were not remedies at law, Bach has
argued that Ulrich's proper ''remedies at law" are "conversion, damages to plaintiffs' realty,
interference with existing contractual relations or economic business relations and prospects of
plaintiffs' developments commercially [sic] or their prope1ty [sic], negligence and even a claim for
ejectment against defendant." While Ulrich may indeed be entitled to bring some or all of these
causes of action, none of them accomplish what Ulrich ultimately seek to do in this matter- obtain
from the Comt an order stating definitively which party has right, title and interest in the Ulrich
Property Easement A legal remedy, i.e., damages, is insufficient in this matter because real
property is considered to be unique. As the Idaho Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized, a
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specific tract of land is unique and impossible of duplication by the use of any amount of money.

See, i.e.,

Fazzio v. Mason, 2011 WL 941462, *6, *7 (March 21, 2011); Kessler v. Tortoise

Developmeht, Inc., 134 Idaho 264,270, 1 P.3d 292,298 (2000); Perron v. Hale,l08 Idaho 578, 582,
701 P.2d 198, 202 (1985);

Suchan v. Rutherford, 90 Idaho 288, 295, 410 P.2d 434, 428

(1966)(noting the general common law principal that damages are insufficient in disputes over real
property due to uniqueness ofland). Only a quiet title action or declaratory judgment and permanent
injunction can provide the relief requested by Ulrich. Consequently, Bach's argument regarding
Ulrich's alleged failure to pursue "remedies at law" as listed by Bach should be disregarded.
5.

Whether Ulrich has failed to join any indispensable parties.
With regard to Bach's assertion that Ulrich has failed to join indispensable parties, Ulrich

has not sought to quiet title or requested a declaratory judgment and injunction against any party
except any alleged interest Bach may have in the Ulrich Property Easement. Rule 19(a)(l) of the
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provides that, "[a] person who is subject to service of process shall
be joined as a party in the action if (1) in the person's absence complete relief cannot be accorded
among those already pa1ties, or (2) the person claims an interest relating to the subject of the action
and is so situated that the disposition of the action in the person's absence may (i) as a practical
matter impair or impede the person's ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons
already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent
obligations by reason of the claimed interest." Idaho R. Civ. P, 19(a)(l ).
As the Idaho Supreme Court has stated, "joinder of all parties with an interest in the subject
matter of the suit is not required; rather, only those who have an interest in the object of the suit
should be joined." Tower Asset Sub Inc. v. Lawrence; 143 Idaho 710, 714, 152 P.3d 581, 585
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(2007). In the current case, no other party> aside from Bach, has indicated any intent to interfere with
Ulrich's interest in the Ulrich Property Easement. Further, the disposition of this matter in the
absence of parties other than the Bach will not impair or impede the other parties' ability to protect
their interests or leave them subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple or otherwise
inconsistent obligations. Although the other property owners of the Bach Prope1ty may have an
interest in the subject matter of the suit, as property owners> only Bach has attempted to interfere
with Ulrich's interest in the property. Consequently> the other propetty owners do not have an
interest in the object of the suit. Therefore, the other owners of the Bach Property are not
indispensable pm1ies.
6.

Whether Ulrich breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing with
regard to Bach.

Regarding the breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, Bach has not
alleged facts sufficient to bring the claim. In order for an implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing to exist, there must, at a minimum, be a contract between the parties. See, i.e., Idaho First
National Bankv. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc., 121 Idaho 266,

287~88,

824 P.2d 841,862-63 (1991).

Here 1 no contract has been alleged, nor was there ever any contract between the parties.
Consequently, Bach has not even raised sufficient facts to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted, and Bach's claim for breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing must be
dismissed.

7.

Whether Ulrich intentionally interfered with contract or interfered with prospective
economic advantage with regard to Bach.

Bach has not alleged sufficient facts for a cause of action for intentional interference with
contract or interference with prospective economic advantage.
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interference with contract are (1) the existence of a contract; (2) knowledge of the contract on the
patt of the defendant; (3) intentional interference causing a breach of the contract; and (4) injury to
the plaintiff resulting from the breach. Barlow v. International Harvester Co., 85 Idaho 881, 803,

522 P.2d 1102, 1114 ( 1974). The elements of interference with prospective economic advantage are

( l) the existence of a valid economic expectancy; (2) knowledge of the expectancy on the part of the
interferer; (3) intentional interference inducing termination of the expectancy; (4) the interference

was wrongful by some measure beyond the fact of the interference itself (i.e., that the defendant
interfered for an improper purpose or improper means); and (5) resulting damage to the plaintiff
whose expectance has been disrupted. Highland Enterprises, Inc. v. Barker, 133 Idaho 330, 338,

986 P.2d 996, 1004 (1999). Bach has pled none of the elements required for either intentional
interference with contract or interference with prospective economic advanta e. (See Verified
Answer and Counterclaim). Therefore, such claims should be dismissed.
~V\

DATED thi~ day of April, 2011.

Charles A. Homer, Esq~
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C.

15·

PLAINTIFFS' PRE-TRIAL MEMORANDUM

--obor;
u .. . , {.. ,.

208-523-9518

04-28-'11 14:17 FROM

T-183 P0017/0017 F-256

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State ofidaho, resident of and with
my office in Idaho Falls, Idaho; that I served a copy of the following described pleading or document
on the attorneys and/or individuals listed below by hand delivery, by mailing with the correct postage
.

thereon, or by facsimile a true and correct copy thereof on this
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Facsimile

Charles A. Homer, Esq. (ISB No. 1630)
Dale W. Storer, Esq. (ISB No. 2166)
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C.
P.O. Box 50130
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200
Idaho Falls, ID 83405
Telephone: (208) 523-0620
Facsimile: (208) 523-9518
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TETON
Case No. CV-2010-329
THOMAS H. ULRICH and MARY M. ULRICH,
husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,
v.

JOHN N. BACH and all parties claiming to hold
title to the hereinafter described property pursuant
to that certain warranty deed recorded in the
records of Teton County, Idaho on June 14, 1994,
as Instrument No. 116461 and all unknown
claimants, heirs and devisees ofthe following
property:

MEMORANDUM IN REPLY
TO DEFENDANT AND
COUNTERCLAIMANT
JOHN N. BACH'S OPPOSING
AND COUNTER
MEMORANDUM BRIEF

A portion of the South liz South liz Section 6,
Towns hip 5 North, Range 46 East, Boise
Meridian, Teton County, Idaho, being further
described as: From the SW corner of said Section
6, South 89 50'12" East, 2630.05 feet to the true
point of beginning; thence North 00 07'58" East,
813.70 feet to a point; thence North 01 37'48"
East, 505.18 feet to a point; thence South 89
58'47" East, 1319.28 feet to a point; thence South
00 07'36" West, 1321.69 feet to a point on the
Southern Section Line; thence North 89 51'0 1"
West, 1320.49 feet along the Southern Section

000,1
. "·

Line to the South 114. Corner of said Section 6, a
point; thence North 89 50'13" West, 12.13 feet
along the Southern Section Line to the point of
beginning. SUBJECT TO a 60 foot road and
utility easement along the Western Property lines.
AND SUBJECT TO a 60 foot road and utility
easement along the Southern Property Lines.
Defendants.
COME NOW Plaintiffs Thomas H. Ulrich and Mary M. Ulrich, husband and wife,
(hereinafter "Plaintiffs"), by and through their counsel of record, Holden, Kidwell, Hahn &
Crapo, P.L.L.C., and submit this Memorandum in Reply to Defendant and Counterclaimant
John N. Bach's Opposing and Counter Memorandum Brief, dated April22, 2011.
I. INTRODUCTION

At the hearing on Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendant John N. Bach
("Defendant") requested that the Court permit him to file supplemental responsive briefing
in addition to the Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Plaintiffs'
Summary Judgment Motion, dated March 25, 2011, and the Supplemental Memorandum of
John N. Bach, dated March 28, 2011, already filed with the Court. The Court agreed to
permit Defendant to submit additional supplemental briefing, giving Defendant a deadline
of April 22, 2011, to serve briefing, and permitting Plaintiffs to file a reply to such
supplemental briefing. On April 25, 2011, Plaintiffs received a memorandum filed by
Defendant titled in part: "Defendant and Counterclaimant John N. Bach's Opposing and
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Counter Memorandum Brief' ("Second Supp. Memo.").

Plaintiffs now submit this

Memorandum in reply to such briefing.

II. ARGUMENT
A.

Defendant's argument that Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum in Support ofMotion
for Summary Judgment was untimely should be disregarded.
On the first page of his Second Supp. Memo., Defendant states in his Preface that

Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum in Support ofMotion for Summary Judgment was untimely.
(Second Supp. Memo., p. 1-2). However, Plaintiffs did not receive Defendant's initial
responsive summary judgment documents until the late afternoon ofMarch 28, 2011, and did
not receive Defendant's additional supplemental briefing until March 30, 2011. Plaintiffs
served their Reply Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment on March 31, 2011, as
is reflected by the certificate of service attached to the pleading. Considering the late filing
by Defendant ofhis responsive summary judgment pleadings, Plaintiffs prepared and served
their Reply Memorandum as soon as was possible. Regardless, the fact that the Court has
permitted Defendant to file a second supplemental memorandum in response to Plaintiffs'
Reply Memorandum cures any prejudice to Defendant stemming from any alleged late filing
of the Reply Memorandum.

B.

THE PROPER REMEDY IN THIS MATTER IS QUIET TITLE OR
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
Defendant again asserts in his Second Supp. Memo. that Plaintiffs have an adequate

remedy at law and argues that Suchen supports this argument. However, Suchen does not
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support Defendant's assertions. First, Suchen was cited by Plaintiffs for the proposition that
the general common law regarding disputes involving real property is that real property is
unique and therefore equitable remedies, rather than remedies at law, are appropriate. This
principle is not only noted by the Idaho Supreme Court in Suchen, but also in numerous other
Idaho cases. See, i.e., Fazzio v. Mason, 2011 WL 941462, *6, *7 (March 21, 2011); Kessler
v. Tortoise Development, Inc., 134 Idaho 264, 270, 1 P.3d 292, 298 (2000); Perron v. Hale,

108 Idaho 578, 582, 701 P .2d 198, 202 (1985). While it is true that in the particular case in
Suchen, the Idaho Supreme Court found that the property involved warranted a rare

exception to this widely accepted principal, it is important to note that Suchen involved a land
sale contract of which a party sought specific performance, something that is not at issue
here. See Suchan v. Rutherford, 90 Idaho 288,295,410 P.2d 434,428 (1966). Regardless,
the common law principle regarding the appropriateness of equitable remedies due to the
uniqueness of land remains.
Additionally, as Plaintiffs mentioned in their Reply Memorandum, both a quiet title
action and an action for declaratory judgment are remedies at law. Idaho Code § 6-401
specifically provides for an action to quiet title. Idaho Code § 10-1201 specifically provides
for an action for declaratory judgment. Finally, again as Plaintiffs mentioned in their Reply
Memorandum, even assuming that quiet title and declaratory judgment were not remedies
at law, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs' proper "remedies at law" are "conversion, damages
to plaintiffs' realty, interference with existing contractual relations or economic business
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relations and prospects of plaintiffs' developments commercially (sic] or their property [sic],
negligence and even a claim for ejectment against defendant." (Defendant's Memo. of
Points and Auth., p. 3). While Plaintiffs may indeed be entitled to bring some or all of these
causes of action, none of them accomplish what Plaintiffs ultimately seek to do in this matter
- obtain from the Court an order stating definitively which party has right, title and interest
in the Ulrich Property Easement. Only a quiet title action or declaratory judgment and
permanent injunction can provide the relief requested by Plaintiffs.

C.

PLAINTIFFS HAVE NOT FAILED TO JOIN ANY INDISPENSABLE
PARTIES
Defendant argues that Tower Asset Sub Inc. v. Lawrence, 143 Idaho 710, 714, 152

P.3d 581, 585 (2007) provides support for his claim that not all indispensable parties have
been joined in this suit. Plaintiffs already discussed the issue of indispensable parties at
length in their Reply Memorandum, and will not revisit the issue at length here. However,
Plaintiffs do provide that Tower Asset Sub Inc. supports Plaintiffs' arguments regarding
indispensable parties, as is clear from Defendant's statement regarding Tower Asset Sub Inc.:
Starting at 403 Idaho 713, the Idaho Supreme Court held that: the issues of
"Standing" is a subcategory of justiciability, a preliminary question to be
determined by the Court before reaching any merits of the case. Held- since
Hall's ownership of the easement not questioned he was not indispensable
party since no quiet title action sought re his ownership.
(Second Supp. Memo., p. 6). As in Tower Asset Sub Inc., Plaintiffs have not sought quiet
title against anyone but Defendant regarding Plaintiffs' right, title and interest in the Ulrich
Property Easement. Plaintiffs only seek quiet title as against Defendant because Defendant
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is the only individual who has interfered with Plaintiffs' right to use the Ulrich Property
Easement. Plaintiffs are not asking for quiet title as against any other party. As is noted in
Pro Indiviso, Inc. v. Mid-Mile Holding Trust, 131 Idaho 741, 963 P.2d 1178, (1998), a case

cited by Defendant, "[i ]tis not necessary that all persons with an interest in the subject matter
of the suit be joined as parties, but only those who have an interest in the object of the suit."

Id., 131 Idaho at 746, 963 P.2d at 1183. Consequently, it is unnecessary to join any other
party in this suit.

D.

DEFENDANT HAS NOT RAISED ANY FACTS SUFFICIENT TO
WITHSTAND SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS COUNTERCLAIMS
In his Second Supp. Memo., Defendant states:
Also, Barlow v. International Harvester Co. (1994) 95 Idaho 881, 893
(inaccurately cited by Plaintiffs as 85 Idaho 881) 522 P.2d 1102, 1194, in
which counts for slander and tort interference with contract issues were held
to RAISE genuine issues of fact precluding summary judgment, the Idaho
Supreme Court, specifically held: a) A contract voidable because of
noncompliance may still be subject matter of action for interference with
contract; and b) A Plaintiff cannot make a lack of mutuality of the contract to
which he was not a party, available as an excuse for his wrongful and
unjustiified [sic] conduct. (95 Idaho @ 893-895.); and c) Failure to join
indispensable party is of such importance such cannot be waived. Barlow,
supra, also analyzed and applied the principles of d) violation of tortious
interference with contract, and with prospective economic advantages, per
which cause of action recovery is not limited to those damages within the
contemplation of the parties to the contract as the probable and foreseeable
result of a breach, citing to: W.L. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts, sec.
129, pp 948-949 (4th Ed. 1991); Res (SecondofTorts, Sec 774A, CommentAC, pp 86-90, (Tentative Draft No. 14, 1969) Barlow, 95 Idaho@ 896) ...

Plaintiffs are unsure as to what argument Defendant is making with the above statements.
However, given that Plaintiffs cited Barlow to show the elements necessary to bring claims
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for intentional interference with contract, Plaintiffs will assume that the above are arguments
made by Defendant to demonstrate that claim can survive summary judgment. However,
Defendant has still failed to demonstrate any of the elements necessary to bring that claim
in the first place, let alone survive summary judgment. Additionally, Defendant cites to
Akers v. D.L. White Construction Inc., 142 Idaho 293,301, 127 P.3d 196,2004 (2005) (sic],

stating:
In Akers, A record land owner of reality brought actions against an adjoining
land owner for i) trespass, ii) negligence and iii) quiet title. Case was
remanded for purpose of conducting additional fact finding re whether at time
of severance of alleged dominant and servient estate, use of access through
servant (sic] easement "was reasonably necessary to enjoyment of alleged
dominant estate." Such is also a factual genuine issue of fact herein.
(Second Supp. Memo., p. 8). Again, Plaintiffs are unsure as to what exactly Defendant is
arguing here, but to the extent that Defendant is arguing that some fact finding has to occur
regarding whether use of access through the servient estate "was reasonably necessary to
enjoyment of the alleged dominant estate," such argument is irrelevant to the matter at hand.
Akers was, in part, remanded, because there was an issue as to whether there was an implied

easement by prior use. That was the purpose of the remand regarding whether access through
the servient estate was reasonably necessary to enjoyment of the alleged dominant estate.
Akers,l42 Idaho at 305, 127 P.3d at 208. The case at hand does not deal with an implied

easement by prior use. Rather, it concerns an express easement. Consequently, Defendant's
arguments regarding easement by implied use are irrelevant, and there is no issue of fact in
that regard.
7- MEMORANDUM IN REPLY TO DEFENDANT AND COUNTERCLAIMANT JOHN N. BACH'S
OPPOSING AND COUNTER MEMORANDUM BRIEF

Defendant next spends approximately a page and a half (from the bottom of page 8
through the top of page 10 ofthe Second Supp. Memo.) making statements regarding what
he perceives to be the application of First National Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc., 121
Idaho 266,287-88, 824 P.2d 841,862-63 (1991), to the case at hand. Plaintiffs cited to Bliss
Valley Foods for the purpose of showing the elements necessary for claim for the breach of
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. (See Reply Memorandum, p. 10). Plaintiffs are
unsure of how Defendants statements regarding Bliss Valley Foods, pertain to the matter at
hand, in the context of Defendant's claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, or as to any other claim or defense raised by Defendant. Defendant closes this
section of his argument by stating:
Thusly, even though the real estate purchase contract which defendant and his
cojoint venturers purchased per their recorded spendthrift trust joint venture
deed/agreement nowhere in negotiations or in any purchase contract or deeds
is/are the individual names of the Ulrich's, [sic] Thomas nor Mary stated,
designated or disclosed. No one is disclosed in name, by entity or title
whatsoever as to the purported 60 foot easement, no one!
(Second Supp. Memo., p. 9-10). Plaintiffs assume that Defendant is arguing that for the
easement to be valid, it has to be personal to the users of the easement, or, in legal terms, an
"easement in gross." However, this case does not deal with an easement in gross, but an
express easement, which is presumed to be appurtenant. Coward v. Hadley, 150 Idaho 282,
246 P.3d 391, 396 (2010), reh'g denied (Feb. 8, 2011). An easement appurtenant "is one
whose benefits serve a parcel ofland. More exactly, it serves the owner of that land m a way
that cannot be separated from his rights in the land. Id. (internal citations omitted). By
8- MEMORANDUM IN REPLY TO DEFENDANT AND COUNTERCLAIMANT JOHN N. BACH'S
OPPOSING AND COUNTER MEMORANDUM BRIEF

contrast, an easement in gross "benefits the holder of the easement personally, without
connection to the ownership or use of a specific parcel of land." ld. (internal citations
omitted). Again, as Plaintiffs provided in their Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Summary Judgment, "[o ]ne who purchases land expressly subject to an easement or with
notice, actual or constructive, that is burdened with an existing easement, takes the land
subject to the easement." Akers v. D.L. White Canst., Inc., 142 Idaho 293, 301, 127 P.3d
196, 204 (2005). (citing Checketts v. Thompson, 65 Idaho 715, 721, 152 P.2d 585, 587
( 1944)); see also I. C. § 55-603. The Ulrich Property Easement was denoted in both the Bach
Deed and the deed ofUlrich's predecessors in interest. (See Ulrich Aff., ,-r,-r 6, 7, Ex. E and
F). The Ulrich Property Easement was appurtenant to the land, and passed expressly with
the deed when Plaintiffs purchased the Ulrich Property. (See Ulrich Aff.,

'II 2, Ex. A).

Defendant had express notice of the Ulrich Property Easement in his deed. Defendant cannot
contend that he did not have notice of the Ulrich Property Easement at the time of the
purchase of the Bach Property because it did not expressly include the names Thomas or
Mary Ulrich. There is no basis in law for this argument.
Defendant also argues that Plaintiffs "have never had, never claimed any form of
actual or constructive possession of the 60 foot road right of way over the westerly boundary
ofthe Peacock 40 acre parcel--- NEVER!" (Second Supp. Memo., p. 10-11). Plaintiffs
have no need to claim constructive possession of the Ulrich Property Easement due to the

9- MEMORANDUM IN REPLY TO DEFENDANT AND COUNTERCLAIMANT JOHN N. BACH'S
OPPOSING AND COUNTER MEMORANDUM BRIEF

- ....

01(:2

existence of the express easement in the Bach Deed and Ulrich Deed. Consequently,
Defendant's argument regarding constructive possession should be disregarded.
Additionally, Defendant argues "[n]o showing has been made per any survey result
or other relevant admissible civil engineer's plat or overview of the claimed Ulrich's 60 foot
easement, that such Ulrich's easement abuts, adjoins and lies immediately upon the northern
boundary line of the Peacock westerly 40 acre parcel." (Second Supp. Memo., p. 11). First,
even though it is not relevant, the legal description of the easement does indicate that the
Ulrich Property Easement abuts the northern boundary line. This is evident not just from the
metes and bounds description in the Ulrich Deed, but also from the description in the Bach
Deed, which states the Bach Property is "Subject to a 60 foot road and utility easement along
the Western Property lines." (Ulrich Aff., Ex. F). Clearly, if the easement runs along the
entire western property line, it will abut the northern edge of the Bach Property. Regardless,
however, Defendant himself has entered into the record evidence that the Ulrich Property
Easement abuts the northern boundary line of the Bach Property in the form of a plat which
clearly shows the Ulrich Property Easement traversing the northwest corner of the Bach
Property and abutting the southwest comer of the Ulrich Property. (See Affidavit of John N.
Bach Defendant and Counterclaimant Pro Se, Re Objections and Opposition to Plaintiffs'
Motion for Summary Judgment, Ex. 2).
Finally, Defendant argues that Coward v. Hadley, 150 Idaho 282, 246 P.3d 391
(2010), controls the outcome of this case. The facts of Coward are nothing like the facts of
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this case. In Coward, the Hadleys disputed the existence of an easement over their property
benefitting the lot directly to the south of their property, owned by Cowards. The history of
the easement discussed in Coward was as follows:
Freeman Daughters, an individual, acquired lots 1, 2, and 11 together in 1907.
In 1922, Daughters conveyed lots 1 and 2 to Ole Sleteger. That deed ("the
1922 deed") provided that Daughters and "his heirs and assigns shall have a
permanent right of way over and across twelve feet on the east side [ oflots 1
and 2] for the purpose of an alley." Daughters later conveyed away lot 11 with
a deed noting that a permanent right-of-way existed over the alley on lots 1 and
2 benefiting lot 11.
Both lots 1 and 2 apparently came to be owned simultaneously by Martin and
Nellie Mushrow a few years later, and they conveyed the lots separately to
different third parties. The deed first conveying away lot 1 to Hadley's
predecessor did not reserve any easement rights benefiting lot 2, which is now
the Cowards' lot. None of the deeds in either chain of title refer to such a rightof-way either. The easement did continue to benefit lot 11 until1950, when the
owner of lot 11 at that time quitclaimed the easement back to the owners of
lots 1 and 2. The next day, Hadley and her now-deceased husband, Irvin,
purchased lot 1. After that time, the alley was a grassy area occasionally used
by occupants of lot 2 to reach an old garage at the back of the lot.

Cowardv. Hadley, 150 Idaho 282, _ , 246 P.3d 391,394 (2010). In Coward, the express
easement was quit claimed back to the property owners over which the easement traversed.
Further, the issue in that case pertained to whether lot 2 had an easement over lot 1. The
court found that the no easement had ever been created for the benefit of lot 2 - rather the
easement which traversed lot 1 and passed over lot 2 had purely existed for the benefit oflot
11. Consequently, the court found lot 2 had no express easement. The facts of this case are
nothing like those of Coward. The Ulrich Property Easement was created when the Ulrich
Property Easement was reserved in the Bach Deed and granted in the deed to the Ulrich
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Property issued to Plaintiffs' predecessors in interest. (Ulrich Aff., Ex. E and F). The Ulrich
Property Easement was additionally included in the Ulrich Deed. (Ulrich Aff., Ex. A). The
easement was never quit claimed back to the owners of the Bach Property. Further, the
Ulrich Property is the dominant estate in this matter, unlike lot 2 in Coward, which was not
the dominant estate, but a mere piece of property over which the easement in question
passed. Therefore, Coward has no effect on the outcome of this case. 1
E.

KOLOUCH V. KRAMER CONTROLS THE OUTCOME OF THIS CASE
AND DEFENDANT HAS RAISED NO CONTRARY AUTHORITY
In his Second Supp. Memo., Defendant has failed to set forth any legitimate

arguments against the application of Kolouch v. Kramer, 120 Idaho 65, 813 P.2d 876
( 1991 ), to this matter. Defendant argues at length that various cases "overturn" Kolouch,
making it inapplicable. However, the cases cited by Defendant, Coward v. Hadley, 150

1

Defendant also argues that "[t]wo main principles apply, supported by Coward,
to wit: ... 'In construing an easement in a particular case, the instrument granting the
easement is to be interpreted in connection with the intention ofthe parties, and the
circumstances in existence at the time the easement was granted.' Kolouch v. Kramer,
120 Idaho 65, 69, 813 P.2d 876, 880 (1991)" and "[a]n express easement does not grant
rights in the easement to the parcels other than the dominant estate." (Second Supp.
Memo., p. 10). Plaintiffs will not delve into the intention issue yet again, as this was
addressed at length in Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum. Plaintiffs refer the Court back to
pages 15 through 16 of Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum regarding this issue. Further,
Plaintiffs do not understand the purpose of Defendant's statement that "an express
easement does not grant rights in the easement to the parcels other than the dominant
estate." The Ulrich Property is the dominant estate in question, so Plaintiffs are confused
as to how that particular statement aids Defendant's argument. Regardless, nothing in
either of the two principles above affect Plaintiffs' right and title to their express
easement.
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Idaho 282, 246 P.3d 391 (2010) and Trappett v. Davis, 102 Idaho 527, 633 P.2d 592
( 1981 ), do not "overturn" or even contradict Kolouch, and Defendant provides no
explanation as to how these cases support his argument.
Further, it appears Defendant is attempting to introduce new evidence into this
matter via his Second Supp. Memo. regarding an alleged "water well and subterranean
seasonaly [sic] pond accumulations." At this point in the proceedings, it is entirely
inappropriate and improper for Defendant to put new evidence before the Court. Further,
such "evidence" has not been submitted to the Court via affidavit, as required by Rule 56
of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Regardless, however, whether there is a "water
well and subterranean seasonaly [sic] pond accumulations," such allegation is irrelevant
to Ulrich's entitlement to the easement, as the Ulrich Property Easement is expressly
established by deed.
Defendant also reasserts in his Second Supp. Memo. that he placed various
objects, including farm implements, no trespassing signs, shrubs and bushes, and other
barriers along the "internal westerly 100 foot corridor" of the Bach Property, and that
because he erected these items, summary judgment based upon the law of Kolouch v.
Kramer is precluded. To the extent that Defendant asserts new facts regarding any

barriers he erected or where he placed the barriers, Plaintiffs object to the introduction of
such information due to Defendant's failure to introduce the information in a timely
manner via affidavit, pursuant to Rule 56 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Any
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facts which go beyond what was stated in Defendant's affidavit should be disregarded.
Regardless, however, Defendant's arguments regarding his erection of barriers and signs
actually support the application of Kolouch due to the factual similarity of Defendant's
actions to those of Kramer in Kolouch:
At the time Kramer acquired the subject property, there was a utility pole, a
board fence, and some trees in the easement area. Subsequently, Kramer
planted six spruce trees down the center of the easement, planted other trees
within the easement, constructed a fence inside the northerly boundary of
the easement, and a concrete irrigation diversion at the east end of the
easement. Kramer also placed several large boulders at the east end of the
easement. Kramer maintains that, although there were physical impediments
within the easement area at the time he acquired the property, the easement
was still open for ingress and egress, and it was only after he planted the
trees, etc., that the easement was no longer open to use. On the limited
occasions that respondents have sought access to their portion ofLot 10,
they have used a private roadway over the Stephenson easement,
immediately to the north of the subject property.
Kolouch, 120 Idaho at 67, 813 P.2d at 878. These facts are essentially identical to those

in the matter at hand. Even assuming that Defendant placed the above obstacles in such a
manner as to restrict access to the Ulrich Property Easement, Plaintiffs have been able to
access the Ulrich Property without the need for use of the easement, including accessing
the Ulrich Property via alternative routes over the Bach Property. The fact that Defendant
erected "No Trespassing" signs in addition to planting trees, shrubs, farm implements and
other barriers makes no difference. Plaintiffs were still able to access the Ulrich Property
without use of the Ulrich Property Easement. It was only when Plaintiffs began the
process for developing the Property that the need for the easement arose. Consequently,
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pursuant to the law of Kolouch, Defendant has not adversely possessed the Ulrich
Property Easement, and Plaintiffs still have right and title to the Ulrich Property Easement
via the express grant and reservation of the Ulrich Property Easement in the Ulrich Deed
and Bach Deed.

F.

THE CASE LAW RELIED UPON BY DEFENDANT REGARDING
BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE IS INAPPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT
HAND
Defendant cites to Trappett v. Davis, arguing that it is controlling of the issues in

this matter and that Plaintiffs somehow "acquiesced" in Defendant allegedly nullifying
their rights to the Ulrich Property Easement. Any law related to boundary by
acquiescence is completely inapplicable to the determination of the rights of a party to an
express easement. Boundary by agreement or acquiescence has two elements: (1) there
must be an uncertain or disputed boundary and (2) a subsequent agreement fixing the
boundary. Cox v. Clanton, 137 Idaho 492, 494-95, 50 P.3d 987, 989-90 (2002). Neither
of these elements is present in this case. Consequently, any arguments regarding
boundary by acquiescence should be disregarded.

G.

THE AWARD OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR PLAINTIFFS WOULD
NOT VIOLATE ANY OF DEFENDANT'S FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
RIGHTS
Defendant asserts that if the Court awards Plaintiffs the relief requested in the

Complaint that he will be deprived of his Fourteenth Amendment rights. First, if a matter
can be decided at the summary judgment phase, there is no need for a jury trial. The
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province of the jury is that of fact-finder. Summary judgment is only permissible where
there is no question of fact. Consequently, if a matter is decided via summary judgment,
there are, by definition, no issues for the jury to decide. However, even assuming this
matter was not decided on summary judgment, under Idaho law, there is no right to a jury
in a quiet title action. Loomis v. Union Pac. R. Co., 97 Idaho 341, 544 P.2d 299 (1975).
Additionally, even if Defendant were entitled to a jury trial, pursuant to Rule 38 of the
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Defendant has already waived any such right. Rule 3 8(b)
provides: "Any party may demand a trial by jury of any issue triable of right by a jury by
serving upon the other parties a demand therefor in writing at any time after the
commencement of the action and not later than fourteen (14) days after the service of the
last pleading directed to such issue." I.R.Civ.P. 38(b). "The failure of a party to serve a
demand as required by this rule and to file it as required by Rule 5(d) constitutes a waiver
by the party of trial by jury." LR.Civ.P. 38(d). Defendant made no demand for trial by
jury in his Answer, or within fourteen days of filing such Answer. Consequently,
Defendant is not entitled to a jury trial in this matter, and the denial of a jury trial is not a
violation of his Fourteenth Amendment constitutional rights.

III. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs respectfully request that their Motion for
Summary Judgment be granted.
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DATED thi~ day of April, 2011.

Charles A. Homer, Esq.
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, resident of and
with my office in Idaho Falls, Idaho; that I served a copy of the following described pleading or
document on the attorneys and/or individuals listed below by hand delivery, by mailing with the
correct postage thereon, or by facsimile a true and correct copy thereof on this~ day of
April, 2011.

DOCUMENT SERVED:

PLAINTIFFS' PRETRIAL MEMORANDUM

ATTORNEYS AND/OR INDIVIDUALS SERVED:
John Bach
PO Box 101
Driggs ID 83422

("1) Mail

( ) Hand Delivery ( )Facsimile

~Mail

( ) Hand Delivery ( ) Facsi ile

COURTESY COPY TO:
The Honorable Darren B. Simpson
IN CHAMBERS
Bingham County Courthouse
501 North Maple, #31 0
Blackfoot ID 83221-1700

Charles A. Homer, Esq.
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, .L.L.C.
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Driggs, TD 83422/Tel: (208) 354"8303
Defendant/Counterclaimant Pro Se
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DEFENDANT AND COUNTER~LAIMANT JO~N N. BAfH~S
PRE-TRTAL MEMORANDUM

BACH

N,
and all parties claiming
to hold title to the hereinafter des~:·
ciibed proper pursuant to that certain
warranty deed record in the records of
Teton County, Idaho on June 14, 1994
as Instrument: No. 116461 and all unk-:nown claimants, heirs and devisees of
the following property:
A portion of the South Y2 South Y2 Section 6,
Township 5 North, Range 46 East, Boise
Meridian, Teton County, Idaho, being further
described as: From the SW corner of said Section
6, South 89 50'12" East, 2630.05 feet to the true
point of beginning; thence North 00 07'58" East,
813.70 feet to a point; thence North Of37'48"
East, 505.18 feet to apoint; thence South 89
58'47" East, 1319.28 feet to a point; thence South
00 07'36" West, 1321.69 feet to a point on the
Southern Section Line; the;nce North 89 51'01"
West, 1320.49 feet along the Southern Section
Line to the Soulli-94Corner of smd Sectwn 6, a
point; thence North 89 50'13" West, 12.13 feet
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TETON

THOMAS H. ULRICH and MARY M.
ULRICH, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,
~~

)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE No. CV-2010-329
MINUTE ENTRYPRETRIAL CONFERENCE

)
)

JOHN N. BACH and all parties claiming to
hold title to the hereinafter described
property, and all unknown claimants, heirs
and devisees of the following property:

)
)
)
)
)
A portion of the South Yz South Yz Section 6,)
Township 5 North, Range 46 East, Boise
)
Meridian, Teton County, Idaho, being
)
further described as: From the SW comer )
of said Section 6, South 89°50' 12" East,
)
2630.05 feet to the true point of beginning; )
thence North 00° 07'58" East, 813.70 feet )
to a point; then North 01 °37'48" East,
)
505.18 feet to a point; then South 89°
)
58' 47" East, 1319.28 feet to a point; thence )
)
South 00°7'36" West, 1321.69 feet to a
point on the Southern Section Line; then
)
North 89°51'01" West, 1320.49 feet along )
the Southern Section Line to the South Y4
)
Corner of said Section 6, a point; thence
)
North 89°50'13" West, 12.13 feet along the )
)
Southern Section Line to the point of
beginning.
)
)
Defendants.
)

Minute Entry
<

L
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This matter came before the Court on the 6th day of May 2011, for the purpose of a
Pretrial Conference, being held telephonically, the Honorable Darren B. Simpson, presiding
sitting in open Court in Bingham County.
Ms. Sandra Beebe, Court Reporter and Ms. Jaeme Freeman, Deputy Clerk each were
personally present. Mr. Charles Homer, Esq., appeared telephonically on behalf of the plaintiffs
and Mr. John N. Bach, appeared telephonically on his own behalf.
The Court confirmed that the matter was still on track for the scheduled trial date and the
parties confirmed that three (3) days would be needed for the trial as previously-scheduled.
The Court inquired as to whether or not the parties had explored mediation. The parties
confirmed they had not and agreed to meet and discuss if there could be any resolution to this
matter.
The parties confirmed that there would be no need for a court interpreter during the
course of the trial.
Mr. Homer requested that an adjustment be made to his previously-filed Expert Witness
List allowing Mr. Chris Moss, of First American Title Insurance Company to testify in place of
Mr. Grant Moedl, should Mr. Moedl be unavailable at the time of trial. There was no objection
and the Court allowed the addition to the plaintiffs' expert witness list.
Mr. Homer also inquired about the fact that Mr. Bach had not disclosed his witness or

exhibit list according to the deadlines listed in the Court's Scheduling Order. Mr. Bach
remarked that the Court's pending decision on plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment may
influence the direction this matter may take, but said he would have his Witness and Exhibit List
filed within ten (1 0) days.
Mr. Homer requested a copy of the Court's form for Exhibit Lists and the Court directed
the clerk to send copies of said form to both parties.
The parties confirmed there were no other issues to address at this time.
Court was thus adjourned.
DATED this

Minute Entry

·1~
\\) day of May

2

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing MINUTE
HEARING- PRETRIAL CONFERENCE was

class U.S. Mail with pre-paid postage on this
I

~ersonally-delivered,

/~day of May 2011, to the following:

CHARLES A. HOMER, ESQ.
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO P.L.L.C.
PO BOX 50130
1000 RIVERWALK DR., SUITE 200
IDAHO FALLS, ID 83405
JOHNN.BACH
PO BOX 101
DRIGGS, ID 83422

faxed or mailed by first-

~

!;) u.s. Mail

0

Courthouse Box

DFacsimile

0

Courthouse Box

DFacsimile

MARY LOU HANSEN, CLERK
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Charles A. Homer, Esq. (ISB No. 1630)
Dale W. Storer, Esq. (ISB No. 2166)
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P .L.L.C.
P.O. Box 50130
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200
Idaho Falls, ID 83405
Telephone: (208) 523-0620
Facsimile: (208) 523-9518
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TETON
Case No. CV-2010-329
THOMAS H. ULRlCH and MARY M. ULRlCH,
husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,
v.

AFFIDAVIT OF CHARLES A.
HOMER IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION IN LIMINE AND
FOR SANCTIONS

JOHN N. BACH and all parties claiming to hold
title to the hereinafter described property pursuant
to that certain warranty deed recorded in the
records of Teton County, Idaho on June 14, 1994,
as Instrument No. 116461 and all unknown
claimants, heirs and devisees of the following
property:
A portion of the South 12 South Y2 Section 6,
Township 5 North, Range 46 East, Boise
Meridian, Teton County, Idaho, being further
described as: From the SW corner of said Section
6, South 89 50'12" East, 2630.05 feet to the true
point ofbeginning; thence North 00 07'58" East,
813.70 feet to a point; thence North 01 37'48"
East, 505.18 feet to a point; thence South 89
58'47" East, 1319.28 feet to a point; thence South

1 -

AFFIDAVIT OF CHARLES A. HOMER IN SUPPORT OF MOTION IN LIMINE AND FOR
SANCTIONS

00 07'36" West, 1321.69 feet to a point on the
Southern Section Line; thence North 89 51 '0 1"
West, 1320.49 feet along the Southern Section
Line to the South 14 Corner of said Section 6, a
point; thence North 89 50'13" West, 12.13 feet
along the Southern Section Line to the point of
beginning. SUBJECT TO a 60 foot road and
utility easement along the Western Property lines.
AND SUBJECT TO a 60 foot road and utility
easement along the Southern Property Lines.
Defendants.

STATE OF IDAHO

)
) ss.
County ofBonneville )

I, Charles A. Homer, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that the testimony given in this sworn
statement is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, that it is made on my personal
knowledge, and that I would so testify in open court if called upon to do so.
And being so sworn I depose and say:
I am an attorney licensed in the state ofldaho and I am counsel for the Plaintiffs Thomas H.

1.

Ulrich and Mary M. Ulrich, husband and wife ("Ulrichs"), in the above captioned matter.
2.

I have personal knowledge of the pleadings and documents filed by the parties and of
correspondence exchanged by counsel.
On March 10, 2011, I served a copy ofUlrichs' first discovery requests on John N. Bach

3.

("Bach"), a copy of which is attached to this affidavit as Exhibit A.

2

-

AFFIDAVIT OF CHARLES A. HOMER IN SUPPORT OF MOTION IN LIMINE AND FOR
SANCTIONS
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4.

On Aprill2, 2011, Bach served his responses to Ulrichs' discovery requests. I have attached
to this affidavit as Exhibit B a true and correct copy of Bach's responses.

5.

Bach has not supplemented his discovery responses.

\

\}"'(\

DATED this ___...__
<::J_ day ofMay, 2011.

SUBSCRlBED AND SWORN to before me this

t&Jf.-.- day of May, 2011.

Notary Public for tate f Idaho
Residing at: Blackfoot, Idaho
My Commission Expires: 11128/2013
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State ofidaho, resident of and
with my office in Idaho Falls, Idaho; that I served a copy of the following described pleading
or document on the attorneys and/or individuals listed below by hand delivery, by mailing
with the correct postage thereon, or by facsimile a true and correct copy thereof on this J}f\
day ofMay, 2011.
Document Served:

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION IN LIMINE AND
FOR SANCTIONS

Attorneys and/or Individuals Served:

John Bach
PO Box 101
Driggs ID 83422

Cf) Mail

( ) Hand Delivery ( )Facsimile

COURTESY COPY TO.
The Honorable Darren B. Simpson
IN CHAMBERS
Bingham County Courthouse
501 North Maple, #31 0
Blackfoot ID 83221-1700

~)Mail

( ) Hand Delivery ( ) Facsimile

Charles A. Homer, sq.
Holden, Kidwell, Han & Crapo, P.L.L.
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AFFIDAVIT OF CHARLES A. HOMER IN SUPPORT OF MOTION IN LIMINE AND FOR
SANCTIONS
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Charles A. Homer, Esq. (ISB No. 1630)
. Dale W. Storer, Esq. (ISB No. 2166)
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C.
P.O. Box 50130
1000 Rlverwalk. Drive, Suite 200
Idaho Falls, ID 83405
Telephone: (208) 523-0620
Facsimile: (208) 523-9518
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TETON
Case No. CV-2010-329
THOMAS H. ULRICH and MARY M. ULRICH,
husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,

v.
JOHN N. BACH and all parties claiming to hold
title to the hereinafter described property pursuant
to that certain warranty deed recorded in the
records of Teton County, Idaho on June 14, 1994,
as Instrument No. 116461 and all unknown
claimants, heirs and devisees of the following
property:

PLAINTIFFS' FIRST SET OF
INTERROGATORIES,
REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION
AND REQUEST FOR
PRODUCTION OF
DOCUMENTS

A portion ofthe South Y2 Soutl} Yz Section 6,
Township 5 North, Range 46 East, Boise ·
Meridian, Teton County, Idaho, being further
described as: From the SW comer of said Section
6, South 89 50'12" East, 2630.05 feet to the true
point of beginning; thence North 00 07'5811 East,
813.70 feet to a point; thence North 01 37'4811
East, 505.18 feet to a point; thence South 89
58'47" East, 1319.28 feet to a point; thence South
00 07'36" West, 1321.69 feet to a point on the
PLAINTIFFS' FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES, REQUESTS FOR
ADMISSION AND REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS

torPY
EXHIBIT A·
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)

i

)

Southern Section Line; thence North 89 51'01"
West, 1320.49 feet along the Southern Section
Line to the South Y4 Comer of said Section 6, a
point; thence North 89 50'13" West, 12.13 feet
along the Southern Section Line to the point of
beginning. SUBJECT TO a 60 foot road and
utility easement along the Western Property lines.
AND SUBJECT TO a 60 foot road and utility
easement along the Southern Property Lines.
Defendants.
TO:

JOHN N. BACH, Defendant, appearing prose in the above-entitled matter:

YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE That the Plaintiffs requires the Defendant to
answer the following discovery requests within thirty (30) days from the date of service
herein, pursuant to Rules 33(a) and 34 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.

DEFINmONS AND INSTRUCTIONS
In answering these discovery requests, furnish all information available to you,
including information in the possession of your attorneys or investigators for your attorneys,
and not merely information known of your own personal knowledge.
If you cannot answer the discovery requests in full, after exercising due diligence to
secure the information to do so, so state, and answer to the extent possible, specifying your
inability to answer the remainder, and stating whatever information or knowledge you have
concerning the unanswered portion.
If you are unable to produce the requested documents, after exercising due diligence
to secure the documents, so state and identify the reason for your inability to produce the
PLAINTIFFS' FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES, REQUESTS FOR
ADMISSION AND REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS

PAGE2

EXHIBIT A
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)
documents, the whereabouts of the documents if not in your control or possession, and the
means whereby you lost control or possession of the documents. Identify any documents
which once did exist if not now existing and state whatever information or knowledge you
have concerning the information contained in those documents. If you object to answering
any portion of any of the following discovery requests based on a claim of privilege or work
product, please so state by providing a complete description ofthe basis for the privilege
upon which you base your objection.
Prior to answering these discovery requests, note the following definitions:
1.

"You" refers to Defendant, John N. Bach, as well as each of his employees,

agents, representatives (including insurance carriers), investigators and attorneys.
2.

As used herein "Plaintiff' refers to Thomas H. Ulrich and Mary M. Ulrich.

3.

"And" includes "or" and "and/or."

4.

"Facts" means all circumstances, events, and evidence pertaining to or touching

upon the allegations set forth in the pleadings in this matter.
5.

The term ''document" or "documents" shall mean any kind of written, typed,

printed, graphic, photographic, videotaped or computer-generated matter of any kind or
nature, however produced or reproduced, including data or information that exists in
electronic or data storage devices in any medium, any electronic files in their original format,
as well as all mechanical or electronic sound recordings, and written transcripts thereof,
however produced or reproduced, including all marginal notations, drafts, duplicates, and

PLAINTIFFS' FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES, REQUESTS FOR
ADMISSION AND REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS
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EXHIBIT A

carbon copies thereof, whether in your control. or .not, in the possession of you or your
counsel. If a document exists in both a paper or uhard copy," as well as electronically, then
a request to produce such documents shall be deemed to be a request to produce both the hard
copy and the electronic copy of the document.
6.

The term "electronic documents" shall mean any and all digital or electronic

files, however stored, including, but not limited to, local or remote computer hard disk drive,
floppy disc, CD-ROM. tape drive, zip disk, flash or thumb drive, or any other electronic
storage format or medium. Additionally, requests for production of electronic documents
means production of such documents or computer files in their native format.
7.

The term "identify'' when used with respect to documents, or the description

or identification of a document, shall be deemed to request the nature and subject matter of
the documents; the date thereof; the title or name thereof; the name, address, and job title or
job capacity of the person who prepared the document or who has knowledge of it; and the
name, address, job title or job capacity of the recipient(s) thereof.
8.

The term "identify" when used with respect to a person shall be deemed to

request the persons' full name, job title, last known business and residence addresses, and
telephone numbers.
9.

11

Communicate" or "communication" refers to every manner or means of

disclosure or transfer or exchange of information, whether orally or by document and

1
!

whether face-to-face, by telephone, mail, e-mail, personal delivery, or otherwise.

I

PLAINTIFFS' FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES, REQUESTS FOR
ADMISSION AND REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS
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10.

The term '!identify" when used with-respect to oral communications shall be

deemed to request whether said communication was in person or by telephone, an
identification of each person who participated in or heard any part of said communication,
and the substance of what was said by each person who participated in said communication,
and when such communication took place.
11.

"Evidencing" or "relating to" means consisting of summarizing, describing,

referring to or mentioning.
12.

Whenever the plural appears, the word shall include the singular, and vice

13.

All pronouns denoting gender which are in the masculine form shall be

versa.

interpreted in light of the gender of the individual which the pronoun describes and vice
versa.
14.

Where knowledge or information in possession of a party is requested, such

request includes information and knowledge either in your possession, under your control,
within your dominion, or available to you regardless of whether this information is in your
personal possession or is possessed by your agents, attorneys, servants, employees,
independent contractors, representatives, insurers, or others with whom you have a
relationship and from whom you are capable of deriving information, documents, or
materials.
15.

Each discovery request shall be accorded a separate answer, and each subpart

PLAINTIFFS' FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES, REQUESTS FOR
ADMISSION AND REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS
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of a discovery request shall be accorded a separate answer~·
16.

PURSUANT TO RULE 26(e) OF THE IDAHO RULES OF CIVIL

PROCEDURE, TIIESE DISCOVERY REQUESTS ARE CONTINUING INNATURE, SO
AS TO REQUIRE YOU TO FILE SUPPLEMENTARY ANSWERS IN A REASONABLE
MANNER.

I.
INTERROGATORIES
INTERROGATORY NO. 1.: Please identify each individual who answered or
provided information necessary to respond to the following interrogatories, requests for
production and requests for admission served concurrently herewith.
INTERROGATORY NO.2.: Please identify each and everypersonlmown to you
who has any knowledge or who purports to have lmowledge of any of the facts of this case.
INTERROGATORY NO. 3.: With respect to each person identified in response to
Interrogatory No.2, please set forth in detail the person's relationship to the facts ofthis
case, and describe in detail the facts you believe are or may be known to such person.
INTERROGATORYNO. 4.: ForeachfactsetforthinresponsetolnterrogatoryNo.
3, above, identify any and all documents that describe, support, or otherwise reflect the facts
known to each person.
INTERROGATORY NO.5.: Please identify each person you expect to call as a lay
witness in the trial of this matter, and provide an explanation of each such witness's intended

PLAJNTIFFS' FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES, REQUESTS FOR
ADMISSION AND REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS
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)

testimony.
INTERROGATORY NO. 6.: Please identifY each person you expect to call as an
expert witness in the trial ofthis matter. For each such expert, state the following:
(a)

A complete statement of all opinions to be expressed by the expert and the

basis and reasons therefore;
(b)

The data or information considered by the expert in forming the opinions;

(c)

The expert witnesses' qualifications, including a list ofall publications authored

by the expert within the preceding ten years;
(d)

The compensation to be paid for the expert witness' testimony; and

(e)

A listing of any other cases in which the expert has testified as an expert at trial

or by deposition within the preceding four years.
INTERROGATORY NO. 7.:

Please identify and describe in detail the factual

basis for each cause of action alleged against Plaintiffs in Defendant's Counterclaim, and
identifY each document Defendant contends constitutes evidence of or provides support for
each cause of action Defendant alleges in this action.
INTERROGATORY NO. 8.: Please identify any and all documents or other
tangible evidence which supports or tends to support the denials, the assertions and/or
affirmative defenses set forth in Defendant's Answer in this matter.

INTERROGATORY NO. 9.: Please identifY any and all documents or other
tangible evidence which supports or tends to support the allegations set forth in Defendant's
PLAINTIFFS' FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES, REQUESTS FOR
ADMISSION AND REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS
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)

Counterclaim in this matter.·

INTERROGATORY NO. 10.: Please identify in full and complete detail any
statements, affidavits, photographs, drawings, illustrations, written documents, electronic
messages, diaries, calendars, notes, journals, tape recordings and/or video tapes ofwhich you
are aware that pertain to any issues in this litigation.

INTERROGATORY NO. 11.: Identify and describe each exhibit which you intend
to introduce at the trial of this matter.

INTERROGATORY NO. 12.: Identity and describe in detail the factual basis for
each affirmative defense Defendant asserts in his Answer, and identify each document
Defendant contends constitutes evidence of or provides support for each affirmative defense
Defendant asserts in this action.

INTERROGATORY NO. B.: Identify any information that Defendant, or anyone
acting on Defendant's behalf, has that Plaintiffs or anyone acting on Plaintiffs' behalf made
any admission or declaration against interest in any way that would tend to support
Defendant's version of the facts of this case. If you contend such information or statements
exist, please state: the time and place where such admission or declaration was made, the
substance of the admission or declaration and the names, addresses, and phone numbers of
all persons present when such admission or declaration was made.

INTERROGATORY NO. 14.: If you denied any of the Requests for Admission

PLAINTIFFS' FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES, REQUESTS FOR
ADMISSION AND REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS
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.served herewith, identify each and every fact upon which you base your denial and identify
any witness with knowledge of such facts.

INTERROGATORY NO. 15.: If you have withheld any document from production
on the basis of a claim of privilege, please state the following:
(1)

identify the document, including the author, date, number of pages, recipient

and topic; and
(2)

identify the privilege claimed.

II.
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 1.:

Please produce each and every

document which supports or tends to support allegations set forth in the denials, assertions
and/or affirmative defenses set forth in Defendant's Answer in this matter.

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 2.:

Please produce each and every

document which supports or tends to support allegations set forth in Defendant's
Counterclaim in this matter.

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 3: Please provide copies of all exhibits,
documents and witness statements which you intend or expect to utilize at trial of this cause.

REQUESTFORPRODUCTIONN0.4: Pleaseproduceanyandallexpertreports
prepared by any expert retained by you in this matter.

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 5: Please produce any and all documents

PLAINTIFFS' FIRST SET OF INTERROGATOR1ES, REQUESTS FOR
ADMISSION AND REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS
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identified in response to the above Interrogatories or used to derive the information for your
answers to Plaintiffs' First Discovery Requests.

REQUEST .FOR PRODUCTION NO. 6:

If you denied any of the following

Requests for Admissions, please produce any and all documents on which you base your
denial.

m.
REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 1.: Admit that Exhibit A attached hereto is a
true and correct copy of the deed granting title to the therein described property from Teton
West Corporation to Jack Lee McLean, Trustee ofthe Jack Lee McLean Family Trust, as to
an undivided one-fourth interest; Milan Cheyovich and Diana Cheyovich, Trustees of the
Cheyovich Family Trust, as to an undivided one-fourth interest; Wayne Dawson, Trustee of
the Dawson Family Trust, as to an undivided one-fourth interest; and Targhee Powder
Emporium, LTD, as to an undivided one-fourth interest.

REQUESTFORADMJSSIONNO. 2: Admitthattheoriginal of the Deed attached
hereto as Exhibit A was recorded in the records of Teton County, Idaho, prior to the time
Defendant, John Bach, acquired an interest in the property described in such Deed.

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 3: Admit that Exhibit B attached hereto is a
true and correct copy of the deed granting title to the therein described property from
Philip J. Sarasqueta and Marilyn R. Sarasqueta, husband and wife, and Louisa F. Sarasqueta,

PLAINTIFFS' FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES, REQUESTS FOR
ADMISSION Al\r:D REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS
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Trustee .of the·. Sarasqueta Living Trust dated October 30, 1990:; .to Thomas H: Ulrich and
Mary M. Ulrich, husband and wife.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 4: Admit that Exhibit C attached hereto is a
true and correct copy of the deed granting title to the therein described property from Teton
West Corporation to Philip J. Sarasqueta and Marilyn R. Sarasqueta, husband and wife, and
Louisa F. Sarasqueta, Trustee of the Sarasqueta Living Trust dated Oct ber 30, 1990 .
.>( ...........

Dated this l!_ day of March. 2011.

PLAINTIFFS' FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES, REQUESTS FOR
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State ofidaho, resident of and
with my office in Idaho Falls, Idaho; that I served a copy ofthe following described pleading .
or document on the attorneys and/or individuals listed below by hand delivery, by mailink
with the correct postage thereon, or by facsimile a true and correct copy thereof on this
day of March, 20 11.

1Jl

Document Served:

PLAINTIFFS' FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES,
REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION AND REQUEST FOR
PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS

Attorneys and/or Individuals Served:

NJ Mail

John Bach
·POBox 101
Driggs ID 83422

( ) Hand D ivery ( )Facsimile

Charles A. Homer
'---HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, .L.L.C.
G:\Wl'DATAICAH\15313· Ulrlch, Thomas\Diseovery\Discovery, Requesu,VOl.wpd:Mlll

PLAINTIFFS' FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES, REQUESTS FOR
ADMISSION AND REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS
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ARRA NT Y DEED

PHILIP J. Sl\RASOUE'l'A & MARILYN R. SARASQlJE'l'A, husband and
wife, and LOUISA S. SARASQUBTA, Trustee of the SARASOUE'l'A LiVING TRUST,
dated Octobe:r; 30, 1990
.
· ·
.. . . .
·

For Value Re£Clvtld

,. i

Hetein_afler ealled the Grantor, hereby gr.mts, bi!Jgain.s, 6<:11s and cmxvcys 1ltiiD

THOMAS H. ULRICH and MARY M. ULRI CH, huSbi!llld and wife
whose address is: 281 W. Hl'.nVEST RUN, IDAHO FALLS, ID, 83404
Herelmfter called the Grantco, 1lu> following described premises aitullled in Teton County, ldiho, 1o-wit:

_S EE ATTACHED BXHIEIT A
SUBJECT ~0 THE

RESTRICTION 'l'HA'l' 'mlS P.IUlC~L C\NRO'l' BE SOLD SEPARATELY OR
SUBDXVIDED WITHOUT BEING JOINED TOGETH!R ~1HT BH FOLLOWXNG DESCRIBED
PROPER'l'Y: A portion of the North l/2 South 1/2 Section 6, Township 5 North,
Range 46 East, Boise Meridian, Teton County, Idaho being further desQribed
as: From the SW corner of aai"d Section 6, North 0 degrees l7'55" East,
1312,45 feet and south 89 degrees 58'22" East 2639.46 feet to the true
point of beginning1 thence North 00 degrees -04'52" East, l3l8.71 feet to a
point on the East-West 1/4 Line of said section 6; thence North 89 degrees
53'27" East, 1320.33 feet along the East-West 1/4 Section 1~ne to a point;
thence South 00 degraes 07'36" West, 1321.69 feet to a point; thence North
89 degrees 58'47" West, 1319.26 feat to the point of beginning; LESS a
portion of the Noi:th"l/2 South l/2 Sootion 6, 'l'ownahip 5 North, Range 46
East, Boise Meridian, Teton COunty, Idaho being further described as: From
the SW Corner of said seotion ·6, North 0 degrees 17'55" Bast, 1312.45 feet
and south 89 degrees 58'22~ Bast 2639.46 feet; thence North 00 degrees
04'_52''. East, 659.35 feet to the true point of beginning; thence North 00
degrees . 04'52n East, 659.36 . £eet to a point on the Bast-West 1/4 Line of
said Section 6; thence North 89 degrees 53'27" East, 660.16 feet along the
East-West 1/4 Section line to a point; thence South OO . degrees 04'52 West,
659.36 feet; thence South 89 degrees 53' 27" West, 660.16 feet to the point
of begirining AND MUS'l' COMPLY Wl 'fH '!88 'rlt'rON COUN'rY' SIISDXVISION ORDINANCE.
Subject to reservations in United States and State Patents; existing and
recorded Right-of-ways, Easements, Zoning, Building and Subdivision
ordinances; T~xes and Assessments es prorated between the parties hereto.
TO HAVE AND TO HOlD tht Sllid prein!r;es, with thc:ii appllrtl:l!anCeS Ullto the said Omah:c ..,d to tbc Gtantca's heita
and riSslgns !Drever. And the said Gnmtor does boreby covomant to and witb tho said OrllnUe, thai tha Gtantor Is the ovmcr ip fee
simple of said prcmis.s; 1hill IOald premises are free frOtn all cnC11mlmulcea except amen! yea15 taxes, leviea, and assessments. 1111d
except U. S. Patent ttservalioos. tt51rlC11<mS, e.u;emem of ttconl, and easemcnls Yisible upon the premises, and that Grantor wDl
warrant tu~d dcfcrul lb., same from aU claims whiiiOOOVor.
Dated:

TRUST DATED OCTOBER 30, 1990

STATE OF IDAHO, COUNTY OF TETON
On tbill (oih
day of .December. in the year 1996, befote me, a Nowy l'Pblic in and fur said S~a~~:, ~ly appeared
PHILIP l SARASQUErA and &fAIULYN R. SARASQUETA. lalown or identified to mG to be the pem>n(s) whose name(s) are
subscn'bed to tha within lnstnlment, 1111d acknowledged to me lbal tbgy executed the SMIO.
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STATE OF lDAKO

.

]

ss

County of Te1ori
I HER EBY CERTIFY that the above and loregowg 1s a full. tr u e and cmr ect copy of the
oro g•na 1thetjoJ- orr, tile If\ my office

Dat ed .•• ;

- - ·t-.1
~ c:·
u "1.).

.f) /l?rUQ • · •

O)UNfY OF
ST/INI.f4-"1U

• ••

~

-

)

J--<..

( / . ')

/

'

\

.

,..._,.•

'

)

...

a .

On this 1'
day Qf December, in the year 1996, before me, a Nolaly J'Q'blic in 1111d for said State,
personally appealed LOUISA S. SARASQUBTA, linDWn or fdlllltified to me to be lb~ Thlst'c of 1he Tr\l&t 1bllt cxeCUicd the
inslnlmcnl or tb~ person who =led the instnunent on behalf of. &aid Ttu&t and acbow!wgcd to me ll>al sucl1 '!ius! ex.ecut«<

the saroe.

\

J

STATE OF IOAHO

}

County oi Teton
ss
1HEREBY CERTIFY that the above and fore·
gomg as a lull, true end _c orrect copy of the

onganal ther!Jfrn f.!e m myofface
Dated • • • •

)

.f/j!!i?(J/f?. • •
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COUI'ORATIO~ WARRANT\'

HilS

INDE~TURE

I i::TON Co ld

DU:ll

is made this !l!!:day Clf June. j994,

ere!~'. Ht'co~~t.?r

bctw~en TETON

WEST

.

.

COil J>ORATIOl\, n Nevada corpora!ion duly rmthorized to ilo business in the State of Idaho. ami

hnvmg its principal office in Idaho at Driggs in the Count~· . of Teton, State of Idnho. the
"GIC\~TOir'.

and PHILIP J. SAR.ASQeETA and MARilYN R. SARASQUETA, hulllband and

\':ifl-. and JOAQCP,;.; F. SARASQl'ETA nnd LOUISA SARASQUETA. husband and wife. whose
rnail 1ng address is 1~05 Gnlena. '{win Falls, Idaho 83301, !11e "GRANTEE".

Wll!'\ESSE'n I. thnt GRA~TOR. having been duly authorized br resolution of its Board of .

Dirct.:..,rs. for :md mconsideration cfthe sum ofTen Dollars {$1 0.00) lawful money of the United
State~

of America. and other good and vnluablc consideration. to it in hand paid by GRANTEE,

rccdpt whereofis hereb~; acknowledg~d. has granted. bar~ned and sold. and b)' these presents does

grant

barg~in.

sell. convey and .confinn unto GRANTEE and to GRANTEE's heirs and nssigns

foreYcr. all the following described propcrty in the County ofTeton. State ofldaho. to--wit:
{The legal description of the real propcr1y is set ft:irth in Ex.hibit "A•
attached hereto and by this reference incorportlted herein)
SPF.ClFiCAll Y INCLL.DlNG the fotl<m'ing described portions ofthc follo\\ing described
wat~r

rights appurtenant thereto:

W!lter

Total

Proportion of Right Allocated

B~t ~Q.

Ammml

~

0~

16'77

Groundwater

18.0cfs

.39cfs

. . . 1·rw ( ·1 t 11 all exi5tin~· easements or claims of easc~t>nt~. ratcnt rcservn~ioos. rights nf
" .I\ .

ph>t~dhc w\ c:nar.ts. 7.t•ning ordinam:&.-s. and applicable budding codc~.laws and regulation!-.

~-

'

(

).

'· ··< :
~

~-.~-\,_.·

. , .. ,

~.:

.

..

·iA:.

C' ·; · ·

.

. .,

..._

.

.......\::;:~::..
....
-·.... ,; .

. .~;;·

.

t:-: . .

tncroochmctits, uverl3fJS, boundary iinc disputes mid otlrer mau~rs which wout(fbc di!it-lnsed~h)· an.

.

..

nccuratc sutvcy or irupcetion of the premises.
•

•

:

•

.;
.~~-

r~:

. ._

.

•

,

.

~-

--~,--- .

;.

1

i~~~~t.. '·

..

TOGETHER with the tenements. hereditaments and appurtenancts thereunto belonging ot _. _................

in anywise appertaining. alsO any ·reversions. remaindets, rents, issues and profits therefrom. dhd all
estate, right. title·and interest .in and to said proJ)crty, as well in taw llS in equity,:of the O~R.

· TO HAVE .AND TO i~OLD, the Bbove described premises and nppnrt~nances unto· the " ·
.
·.
GRANTEE and to GRANTEE's heirs and assigns forever. The GRANTOR shall warrant and defend
said prem!se_s in the quiet and peaceable possession of the GRANTEE ngeinst GRANTOR and

GRA?--:TOR's successol"!, and against every pcrwn whomsoever who lawfully liolds (or who later
lawfully claims to have held) rights in the premises as of the date her~of.
In construing this deed and where the conte&t so requires, tbe singular includes the plural.

lN WITNESS WHEREOF, the GRANTOR has caused its corporate name to be affixed by
its duly authorit.ed officer.

TETON WEST CORPORATION

By:~L3/UL
lts:Pm~
.
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IN \\1T:-iESS W'JIEREOF, I have hereunto ;: ·t my hand and affixed my official seal, the day

ana year in this certificate first above writtea.
I

•'

\.

• I

...

(seal)

.

:.J~

...-- ..

..

.
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EXHIBIT A

EX~IBIT

"A"

A portion of the· North 1/2 South l/2 Section 6, Township 5 North,
Range 46 East, Boi.se Meridian, Teton county, Idaho being further ·
described as: From the SW Corner of said Section 6, North 0
degrees 17'55" East, 1312.45 feet and· South 89 degrees 58'22"
~ast 2639.46 feet to the true point of beginning: thence·North 00
degrees 04'52" East, 1318.71 feet to a point on the Eas~-West 1/4
Line of said Section 6; thence North 89 degrees 53'27''. East,
1320.33 feet along the E~st-West 1/4 Section ~ine to·a point;
thence South 00 degrees 07 '36" West, 1321. 69 f~et to a point;
thence North 89 degrees 58' 47" West, 1319.28 feet to the point of
beginning.

Together with a 60 foot road and utility easement being the 60
feet directly East of the following described lines: Beginning
at a point North 89 degrees 50'12" West, 12.13 feet from the
South 1/4 corner of sa£d Section 6; thence North 00 degrees
07'58" East, 813.70 feet to a point; thence North 01 degrees
37'48" East, 505.18 feet to the SW property corner, and subject
to a 60 foot road and utility easement being the 50 feet direct~y
east o£ the following described line: · Eeg:!:-mrlng· at. the Southwest
Property Corner and running North 00 degrees 04 '52" East, 60 feet
to a point.
SUBJECT TO Grant of Easements recorded in Teton County, Idaho,
Recorder's Numbers 115883, 116087; 116079, 115907, and 116078.

116576

EXHIBIT A

JOijN N. BACH, P,O. Box lOl
Driggs, I'D 83422/Tel~ (208} 354~8303
Defendant/Countercla±mant Pro Se

SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, rDAHO, COUNTY OF TETON
THDr·1AS H. ULRICH AND MARYMt. ULRICH~'. CAsE No~' CV 2010.-329
husband and wife,

PEF~.NP2\N'r AND COUNTER..CI..AIUA.NT JOHN N. BACHtS
ASSERTIONS OF PRIVILEGES,
OBJECTIONS TO, ALTERNATE
REFERENCED .RESPONSES~ and
. ANSY.!ERS, ALTERNATIVELY TO:

Plaintiffs,

V/._

JOHN N, BACH

and all parties cla:tining
to hold title to the hereinafter descn:
ci:ibed proper pursuant to that certain .
warranty deed record in the records of
Teton County f Idaho on June 14, 1994
as Instrument No. 116461 and all unk.,-.
nown claimants, heirs and devisees of
the following property:

· Plaintiffs,. First
Interrrogatories,
·;.<'For Admission and
For Pit'Oduction of

Set of
Requests
Re!g;uest
rxx::unents.

/

A portion of the South% South liz Section 6,
Township 5 North, Range 46 East, Boise
Meridian, Teton County, Idaho, being further
described as: From the SW corner of said Section
6, South 89 50'12" East, 2630.05 feet to the true
point of beginning; thence North 00 07'58" East,
813.7 0 feet to a point; thence North 0 r3 7'48 II
East, 505:1_8 feet to a_point; thence South 89
58'47" East,-1319.28 feet to a point; thence South
00 07'36" West, 1321.69 feet to a point on
Southern Section Line; th(1nce North 89 51'0 1"
West, 1320.49 feet along the Southern Section
Lin~i to the Soutfi % Corner of srud Section 6, a·
point; thence North 89 50'13n West, 12.13 feet
along_the Southem Section Line to thepoint of ·beginning. SUBJECT TO a 60 foot road and
utility easement along the Western Property lines.
AND SUBJECT TO a 60 foot road and utility
easement along the Southern Property Lines.

,..

the

I

I/

..

,

1

EXHIBIT B

C?COMES NQW JOHN N. BACH,. ·~1:ie~erida.i!lif. r appea;rin.g pro se

in the above entitled matter", having only been served in that
nestrict.ed capacity, with Plaintiffs'' First Set of Interrogat.;..
aries, Reuquest for Admission and Request

~or

Production of

Documents, purportedly on Thursday, Marcn l.Or 2011, but whi..ch First Set was not received in .his mail until S.aturday ,, March
12, 2011, and does hereby, this. Tuesday, April 12, 20!hl, witlldn.
and on the 3 3rd day r.ili!se, state, as ser.t ·arld respond with his:
1.) Privileges, attorney client, w0rk pioduct and·a:a:coutant·client/rights of privacy-confidentialities as to all Interroga.,...
tories Numbers 1 through 15 and all subparts thereof( 2.) Reiter.,..
ating all afores

~-,_Privileges

tialittes to all

Reques~s

and Rights of Privacy, Confiden ....

for production, Numbered Requests 1

through 6; arid 3.) Reiterating and incorporating also herein,
all sa:idi privileges, rights of confidentialities, etc., to
Reuests·for Adimission

·No.

1, th~ough Admission No. 4, and,

wherever appropi:±ate, per the provisions of I.R,C.P,
refer to and incorporate alternatively, the designated public
recordS 1 ' fileS and dOCumentS aS answerS and respOilSeS a!;> set.

public records, files,. actions,. etc. r
'ANSWER TO

INTE~RO~~TQBY

NO. 1:

John N. Bach is the only indiv-

idual who has provided the afore stated objections, privileges,
referenced/incorporated public records, files, etc., ·:Iand all
responses to the said FIRST SET of said combined interrogatories,
request for adimission and production.
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 2,

Each person known to John N, Bach

who has any knwoledge or purp.opts. to have knowledge of the facts
2

EXHIBIT 8

<bf the Plaint.;l:f;fs t·
dant;~s

cases are set. :forth already in the Defert-

statE;Inent al:t'eady· filed and served in with the CO"!Jrt re ·

the witnesses, defendant intends to call at time of
ANS~ER .~o

trial~

Other than :my sister, Diana

INTERROGATOR¥ NO. 3;

Cheyovich; and her nus}Jand r. my brother in law r Ml.lan Cheyovich,
all other named indwidiia1h.s,. on said list qf persons I may· call,
are friends, neighbors or visitors and assod'::i:ates of;mine and
my deceased wife, Cindy, who hi;l.ve .been on our forty acre parcel r
. and seen, observed, assisted in enforcing or pronfu:Pif.:limg any
trespassing violations, incursions or·

intru~;ion!;l

on said 40 acre

par~el", etc:

ANSWER TO' rNTERROGATQR¥" NO •. 4;

First,. objections i::; raised{ made.

and asserted to this interrogatory as violating tne provisions
of IRCP,

Rule

33 (a) (3} , when

count~ng

the sub.,-parts of Interro.,..

gatorires;;Nos 1, 2, arld 3,. exceeds 40 interrogatories,

However,

without any of the aforesaid objections and this objection to
. interrogatories and all subparts exceed;i.ng 40 r Defendant refers
to EXIBitT

~l't

and irtcorpov.a:bes the same im·.full per lRCP ,. Rule

33 C:c)

ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY'. 5: .

As I understand

'a lay witness is

1

not an expert one nut a percipient witness to the .events, occurrences, etc·. ,

Thu~·r

all. witnes:ses

:r a.l:t>ea,dy

na;me.d prior a.;r:e

lay w.i tnesses except· poss-iblf. Travins Thompaorni a real tor and
developer.
ANSWER TQ. !.Nf~~W9G~'1QR!_l;
haven •·t made that

d~cision

consideratio:h by the Court.

Possipley Travis Thompson but I
yet deperidirig on the matters under
I also renew and assert the objections

. i raised to t"nter:r;ogatory 4, s:upil!a:1:. whicn:1.is incorporated herein,
3

EXHIBIT 8
"'""'

-- ..
_

I may have. to decide d.iltrtlll.g. the trial whether

:r may be.

called as ari expert w±tne$5·?· in _the event, such information
as may be requested per sul:>parts (a) through (e) , which aie
also objected as in vio1at:Lon. o;f teh

4o··

li:init irite'l:-riiga:J!:;lorjes

wiil~.be estahl:ished by foundational· p:r:'ooof arid showing~.
AN&WE.R TO

TNT~'R_R0~~\ ·. 7; · Ag~in all objections as to the

excess of 40 fnterr()gat0r;i:.es is raised~! asserted and. presented.
Such detailed and pedantic basis is already set forth not drily
in all those J!:hl.IJ.l:ic files in E:XH::i$I'T"- ~!1" (· incorporated herein,
but per IRCP, Rule 65 by all filin~ns, presentations~ etC.',. and
offered objections and.evidence/crOss examination bymyself
apposing Plaintiffs t. hearing re restraining order and prelilu:...
inary injunction, the lack of~any :foundat.&!;Dnal snowing to issu.,.._
ance of any. preliminary or permanerit injiinctj:on as fourid by. the
Court,. s memorandum decision tlie:fa.<!tfter, · RoW-ever, the verified
answer with affiramtive defenas ·and the countercl.aim coun·ts,
along with the affidavits filed sofar by defendant an'd still
to be filed .. on or before' April 22, 2011, cover the same.
ANSWER': TO INTERROGJ\TO'RY NO~

Same objections and p'rivileges

8:

as asserted to all previous interrogatories are r·aised and assert
ed :fu.erein.

See alflib Exhipt

••r•f

which is incorporated herein and

the answer to interrogatory No. 7.
ANSWER TO INTERROGATO~Y· NO'~-. 9; ·.· SAME. OBJE.CT:CONS ,. PRIVILEGES &
-,

Responses a.s rai.sed supra and per
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY
.
·-·· 10:
..
•'

Interrogator~es

1 through 8. ·

Same opject;ion,s- r· pr;i:.vi:leges a:nd

response as raised ininterrogatories 1 through 9.

Further,

all such documents; photographs are alreayd contained in each
of said

publ~c

files,

~-records.

and

affidavits, etc.

r

in t:ti.is;

4
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•

action~~

<

·Any photographS: not produced or attac;hed per·

any Affidavits filed h.et€d.n

by

myself as defendant<-:mll

be made ava.tlable for lrispect,ion 'and Photocopying at plairi:...;
tiffs'· expense upon arraigrini€mts made re sight of inspection
and copying or duplicating.

The letter I received from Thomas

Ulrich in July 2009 will not pe produced as under the privileges
raised hereina supra and infra, its us-e is· for purposes of

cross~

a6camination of the plaintiffs·;_ P:laintiffs should have' ·a. copy
thereo~

per their own records and correspondence.

ANSWER.~!.HO

INTERROGATORY: NO. 11. ;

Same obj ect-iions, privileges,

and alternate answensa.as set forth in

Interroga"~;:ories

1 through 10.

H1have not decided which exhibit or exh:L)Dits, other than on crossexaminations I intend to int~roduce at time of trial other than
those exhibits aleady presented to the court at all bearings to
date or attached as exhibtts to my affidavits filed with the court.
Same object-ions, :·•privileges,

ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 12;

alternate an:S"WeJZSas set fort:li in Interrogatories 1 through ll,
SU;pra.
ANSWER .TO_ INTER~OG~TO~Y -~9 ~. 13. . ·Sani.e- objections, pri vileg.es and
alternative anwers as .set forth to inter:t.ocyatories i9through 12.
ANSWER TO

INTE~ROGATORY

NO.

alternate. answers as set

14:

forth.~.in

Same objections, privileges and
Interrogatories 1 thourgh 13 F

Moresot I have stated my objections on th.e record at several
hearings and in memoranda filed w·l:b.b . the Court,. The rulings of
the court are a matter of record, I do not admit any requests for
Adnission but stand by my objections

to

preserve the issues in

the event ·of any: appeal.

5
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ANSWERS TO

lNT~gR0GA':I'QRY\.~O

-A:p :11 ··bl:ij ect;hpns r privi 'r

t·'-15: .

leges assert-ed/ra~sed arid alternative answers to all previousinterrogatories are reasserted,.

~aised

and incorporatated herein.

The particular privilege e>f work product is weful knwon to counsel
for Plaintiffs and such privilege a:Long w;l:,th all othe:r;- privileges

;~re ·.set· ·:ierth in the Idaho ·Rules of Evidence.
The letter of .July, 2009 from Plaintiff Thomas Ulrich,

be~

ing<;i:n'':his own hardwriting, contains adrrtissions,. declarations ag"
ainst interests and confirmation of a personal agreement,.'.:'ihlliel.erst-::anding andexecuted in fact, along with waiver and abandonment
hi31s±s.,: novation, estoppel in different forms, but are objected

to

as within any request for production of documents un(ler · ttctse

interrogatory nor subsequent request for production, the latter
which is not in the proper required format per

r~~.c.P.,

Rule

34(b) (1) (2), and is further not discoverable,. unless and until
such letter/document is covered during cross e:xa:ndnation,. rebuttal,
or denied accurately by the plaintif-fs"', .thieir witnessesi:.or counsel,
at time of trial.

This letter has not been produced 1 not oeen

included nor disclosed in any of plaintiffs t·. affidavits nor
purported verified
Most

com~laint

herein.

inadequate and without foundational sho~d.ng

or chronology as in fact having occurred,. 1 both :Py plain:td:ffs:\'
failure and deficiency of wording of th.ia lnterrogatory NOt.
are the two (2) supparts {1) and (2).

l~~

,.

Additionally, the. hereafter

REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION,. NUMJ3r.:RED 1 thr:oug:tl 6 ~· particularly No 6,
is a disguised form of interrogatory,

which seeks to reinsert

each pr_evious improper request for production as multiple int.ex:-..,-.
rogatories. in place of requests for production 1 through 5 1, making
them uncertain, va.guef~ eompoundr comp 1 e}; ana· n ot understandable.
6
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EXHIBIT B ·

Defendant JOliN N. BACH refers tp all .his objections,
privileg~s,

or alternate answers/responses to the foregoing

interrogatories

No,

1 thro1.1gh 15, and incorporates all ·of the·

same herein in direct response and denial of each of the Requests
for

I?.m:mduct.~cmsc;·dtl

through 6. ·

Under I . R.C,P r-. Rule 34 Cbl (2) , l?laintiffs were req1.lired
("'shall

t•)

item~

to set. forth the

to pe inspected either by indiv:-:-

idual item or by category and (to) describe the

eac~h

itenf and

category with reasonable particularH:yy'1· Also required which was
not complied with by Plaintiffs anddtherefore objected·to as
vchid and· invalid request:s· for product;ton was 1
specify a reasonable time, place and manner
tion and performing the re:hated acts.
each and all of the

foreg~ing

"I~",

request shall
in~ec~

o;l! malcing the

W:Lthout any waiverof

opjec:tions, Defendant '·Responds~

-DENX'ES_ ~?UEST FOR PRODUCTION' NO', <~.•.
per EXH.IBIT

\t·

~'"l'he

Alternatively r see anawers

IRCP r Rule 33:{c} •

DENIES REQUES FOR PRODUCTION _NO. 2.

~lliPi t

Incorpora tea

DENIES. REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION ·No. 3. Incqrporate:s E.xhibit

lt::t u·

'"' ~~

DENIES REQUEST FOR PRODUCITON NO, 4. Incorporates Exhi:Pit ,.I,,.
DENIES REQUEST FOR PRODUCITON NO,

s.

Incorporates ExhlLTh±t /}!·! 1'

DENIES REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 6! .Incorporates Exhibit

It I It

Moreoever most of the documents, materials apparently
desired or sought have already been produ,ced 1 ·offered and rec ....
.

.

.

eived by the Court re motions-alreas:ty': had or still. be fore.
the court to be further briefed and subm;ttted by April 22,. 2011,.

-

-
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EXHIBIT B
/1'. i;.;
':1;

III.

REQUES~S

FOR ADMISSIONS

Request for Admission No. 1;

Denied in part, :because there

is the warrant Deed which is attached to Defendant JOHN N.
BACH"s

adlftf.id~:v;tt

in opposition to Thomas Ulrich''s motions for

summary judgment; moreover there is a

correc~ o~'correction

deed,

not mentioned which was recorded.
Request fo Ad;mis·s:;i:.em No\. · 2; Eased upon th.~. g;r;a:.mma,tical struc~
ture of this request and in view of th.e aforesaid den;ial in ·.:
part to No 1~ this Request for amd;i:.ss!on No 2,. is also denied~
See

and as they are incorporated herein, Penia1s to Request for

Production Nos 1-tinough 6, supra.
Reg~~_sj::_£.or

__Admission No. 3:

·Denied, as per ·the answers 'to·

interrogatores and denials of Reque:st for Prodcution.

Defendant

objected to the admission of said Exhibit B and stands by his
o:bjections and deniai of the vaiidity of said Exhibit ,...,.,B~ . Moreover,
~

the Denials to the aforesaid Admissions No, 1 th..rougl.'f ·2

.. ,. ,.1

:ire

reasserted herein and the denial of Request for Admission No. 4,
infra.
Request fo;r-

Admissi'O~O.

4 : ..

Denied,

The uncertainty and

:'#,

and lack of ~~t~rization of the purported ~~13l:'r.' H1\\~,
statements of said EXHIBIT

14

'A.tt- as to the

and, th~

~~su:aJE.C'L''~'tKl ~Mi'l'L'

OF

EaE;ements record in Teton County, Idaho, R.ecorder ''s: Numbers
115883, 116087, 116079, and .116078, :followed by the stamp of

FILED AT THE REQUEST OF First American on June 17 f· l-,992 wh.en..
purportedly. the previous pages and said EXH:ca:tT

11

'A 11' was filed

abeut ~~:f.ii~os:t-:two ~:.(2 J. . yea:r:s later, casts more than incompleteness
of said deed being true and correct in granting_ any title'·
..

8

EXHIBIT'S

E

X H

I- B

I

t.t

T

Pe.r the provisions of l .R~'C • P • Rule

I

1~

33(c) ,

as

and

for an optional sufficient answer to each of the 15 Interroga.,..
tories and alternate answer/response·to the incomplete and defi,..
cient. R:!quests

for ProdQ.ction, l thnoug.h:;6, defendant does hereby

designate· the p\lblic and business recordsfrom which. the answers
responsesm~y, be derived and/or ascertained .. Such records are:

l.

The rezo:riJ.,ing . and subdivision application by
the Bai-l·o:W.!in bf the STILLWATER R.ANC:S SUBDlVISION 1
Tetonia{ Teton County.

2.

The rezonin~i and subdivsion applicatton :t::>y the
Ulrich 1's of Carrington Crossing and

GROUSE LANDING,

Tetonia, Teton County.·
3.

State of Idaho v. John :t-Jicholas Bach, \rE,ton CR 04"
filed in Teton County, BUT venue granted transferred
to Bonneville County,· conta;tning prel.imi.nary hearing
transcripts, etc,

~

of the tresvasses:

ot B.lal:te Lyle

and Shauna Crandall.over the wester1y portion of
Peacock 40 acres • Dismissed for lack of credi.bility
byyLyle/Crandall.
4..

Cheyovt.ch.

·Qi

~l3a.cl\ v ~ :·St.a,<Q.a. >o:f. ·~AA~:~

Idaho·. 'l'r'al\s?lpon.~at';i::op.:~D'ept~:· '.Cetion,
&

5.

t .. s.c.

Pepii. '<i<f'

~a,n.&~,

,G.~nty·~! ~r 06:~-09:1,

PK'l's 3383B & 347:L1r.· i C;i,exl(l.\s: YPl'Wl!e~

Teton County· Public Roads/Ri.o;;Jt.L.ts: of.
.

.

W:ay·i r.:ea.rt.ngs:
.

and County Road/Easements ':Ma,p( 20.04 th,rO"':l;:Jh. J?resentt
:6 ~

Dawso:r::t 'v. John N\ Bach.,. J:n.t~:r;venbr. J\pJ?ea)... P:Jt;t:(a

wi:tn

Trasncripts, ISC Dkts 31712 an,d 38370~. (}\.}?l(ea!l f:r:·om
Judge Darren Simpson's Second Amended Judgment, Oct 20lO.
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VERIFICATION OF JOHN

N. EACH,

STATE OF IDAHO
COUNTY OF TETON
I; JOHN N. BACH, of Driggs, Idaho 1

have read and given/stated

the foregoing Assertions of J?rivileges,·ohjections to, Alter~
..,
.. nc
natee:Jmfcr.encedb Responses, and Answers, Alternativ:ely to/ Plaintiffs'
First Set of Interrogatories 1 Req:uests for AC!rni.ssion and Request for Product..tion of Documents,

and do hereby

state of my own personal knowledge,

particpation and understanding, that
correct:' as I understand the same stat

foregoing are tn.ue

ens~ of whatever ~turn

71. ~ 1lf67/ti

given they are.
DATED:

and

April 12, 2011

BACH

I, the·~ undersigned Notary. of Idaho 1 hereby attest, affirm and
state that on this date April 12, 2011, appeared before me,
J~~N N. BACH, personally known tome, did give the foregoing
privileges, objections and referenced reponses and answers,
signing the· same in my 1 :presence and wi tnes ·· ng thereof~
SWORN TO AND

SUBS~RIBED

TO BY ME,

Notary Seal
·AddreSSf.
'Residing iti Teton County
Commission Exp~es on 06108/2013

10
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Charles A. Horner, Esq. (ISB No. 1630)
Dale W. Storer, Esq. (ISB No. 2166)
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P .L.L.C.
P.O. Box 50130
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200
Idaho Falls, ID 83405
Telephone: (208) 523-0620
Facsimile: (208) 523-9518
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRJCT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRJCT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TETON
Case No. CV-2010-329
THOMAS H. ULRICH and MARY M. ULRJCH,
husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,
v.

JOHN N. BACH and all parties claiming to hold
title to the hereinafter described property pursuant
to that certain warranty deed recorded in the
records of Teton County, Idaho on June 14, 1994,
as Instrument No. 116461 and all unknown
claimants, heirs and devisees of the following
property:
A portion of the South Y2 South V2 Section 6,
Township 5 North, Range 46 East, Boise
Meridian, Teton County, Idaho, being further
described as: From the SW corner of said Section
6, South 89 50'12" East, 2630.05 feet to the true
point of beginning; thence North 00 07'58" East,
813.70 feet to a point; thence North 01 37'48"
East, 505.18 feet to a point; thence South 89
5 8'4 7" East, 1319.28 feet to a point; thence South
00 07'36" West, 1321.69 feet to a point on the

MOTION IN LIMINE AND FOR SANCTIONS

MOTION IN LIMINE AND
FOR SANCTIONS

Southern Section Line; thence North 89 51 '0 1"
West, 1320.49 feet along the Southern Section
Line to the South 1;4 Corner of said Section 6, a
point; thence North 89 50'13" West, 12.13 feet
along the Southern Section Line to the point of
beginning. SUBJECT TO a 60 foot road and
utility easement along the Western Property lines.
AND SUBJECT TO a 60 foot road and utility
easement along the Southern Property Lines.
Defendants.
COME NOW Plaintiffs Thomas H. Ulrich and Mary M. Ulrich, husband and wife,
(hereinafter "Ulrichs"), by and through their counsel of record, Holden, Kidwell, Hahn &
Crapo, P.L.L.C., and hereby move this Court for an order:
1.

Precluding defendant John N. Bach ("Bach") from introducing any exhibits at

trial in this matter because exhibits were not appropriately produced in response to discovery
requests and were not disclosed in defendant's pre-trial memorandum entitled "Pre-trial
Tviemorandum Part" 1" dated May 2, 2011 ("Pre-Trial Memorandum");
2.

Excluding all fact witness testimony of witnesses at trial in this matter because

they were not disclosed in defendant's Pre-trial Memorandum.
3.

Excluding all testimony of expert witnesses at trial in this matter because expert

witness opinions were not appropriately produced in response to discovery requests, and as
required by the Court Trial Scheduling Order entered January 11, 2011 by the court
("Scheduling Order"), and excluding all testimony of expert witnesses at trial in this matter
because expert witnesses were not disclosed in defendant's Pre-Trial Memorandum.
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